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 In the early 2010s, discoveries of offshore gas reserves generated considerable 
excitement both for international oil companies, national politicians, and local populations 
in Tanzania. The promises of hydrocarbon wealth changed the imagined future of Tanzania’s 
economic development and was further buoyed with planned infrastructure projects and 
political promises to the nation. In the decade since these offshore discoveries, the 
movement from exploration to extraction has stalled, with declining prices and new laws, 
dubbed ‘resource nationalism’, presenting Tanzania as a less attractive investment 
destination than before.  
Utilising one-on-one interviews, group interviews and documentary evidence, this thesis 
presents a study on the politics of time in Tanzania. It focuses on the differing and changing 
perceptions of time by the Tanzanian government, oil corporations, Tanzanian nationals, and 
businesses. It explores the different forms of time that are present in the hydrocarbon sector, 
and argues that these temporalities, combined with different actors’ perceptions of time 
have created friction across the hydrocarbon sector and has been reflected geographically.  
Such frictions have been between local communities and the national government, and 
the government and international oil companies. However, there have also been different 
perceptions within these different geographical scales. With these contrasting perceptions 
of time, and in particular, the future of the industry, there has been a variety of means where 
actors have sought to increase the control of time through the control of pace and urgency.  
Current research, particularly in geography, has not explored time and temporality as a 
lens for research. With increasing state involvement in the extractives sector occurring across 
the African continent, this study presents a well-timed intervention to further the knowledge 





In the early 2010s, discoveries of offshore gas reserves in Tanzanian waters generated 
considerable anticipation both for international oil companies, national politicians, and local 
populations. The promises of hydrocarbon wealth changed the imagined futures of Tanzania 
with political suggestions that hydrocarbon extraction could catalyse economic development 
and was further buoyed with planned infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars. The 
introduction of the hydrocarbon sector to Tanzania changed perceptions of time and 
introduced the temporalities of extraction to the country. Since then, these promises and 
expectations have yet to come into fruition, with the offshore sector has yet to enter the 
extraction phase, and the infrastructure projects have yet to begin construction. 
This thesis presents a study of the politics of time in the hydrocarbon sector in Tanzania. 
It focuses on the tensions generated by legislative changes, policy changes and planned 
infrastructures to present how different actors’ perceptions of time, specifically around the 
future and pace of developments in the sector, have shaped frictions between stakeholders. 
Central to this is multiple and sometimes conflicting temporalities. This thesis argues that the 
introduction of the hydrocarbon sector has both created and exacerbated frictions in the 
perceptions of time for a variety of stakeholders at differing spatial levels. At the core of this 
has been the future, or more specifically, the competing imagined futures that the gas sector 
would have on Tanzania’s economic development. These frictions have been dependent on 
a variety of factors, ranging from the geographical, to the material and imagined. 
Theoretically, this thesis proposes a greater focus, understanding and clarity on the 
temporalities of extraction to better understand modern extractive phenomena within the 
social sciences. This is particularly true within multiple African states, whereby there are 
growing expectations of resource-based development and increased state intervention in the 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1 East Africa: From ‘Sleepy Backwater’ to ‘Energy 
Frontier’ 
Historically a region that has garnered little to no interest from international oil 
companies (IOCs), in the past twenty years, the East African region has seen a rise, and a fall, 
of hydrocarbon investment and exploration. The discovery of commercial amounts of oil in 
Lake Albert in Uganda in 2006, combined with rising commodity prices, changed oil industry 
perceptions of the whole East African region from what the international consultancy 
Deloitte derisively referred to as a ‘sleepy backwater’ (Deloitte, 2013), to an ‘energy frontier’ 
(Time, 2010; Forbes, 2015). East Africa was seen, as market research firm Visiongain put it, 
as ‘fast becoming one of the world’s most interesting oil and gas hotspots’ that would attract 
‘tens of billions of dollars of investment over the next decade’ (Visiongain, 2015). This was 
reflected with growing exploration by some of the world’s largest IOCs, including Total, Shell, 
and ExxonMobil. Alongside discoveries in Uganda, further discoveries of oil in Kenya, and 
natural gas in Tanzania and Mozambique (Figure 1), cemented the idea among investors that 
Figure 1: Map of East Africa with Proven Hydrocarbon Deposits 
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East Africa was ‘the last real high-potential area in the world that hasn’t been fully explored’ 
(Time, 2010). This problematic and neo-colonial discourse from investors and market 
analysts also changed a perception of the future for the region; gone from being forgotten 
by IOCs, East Africa was now regarded to have ‘potential’ on the global energy map, and a 
future of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation had opened, and with it, discussions 
around potential economic impacts the industry may have. 
Political leaders followed suit over the predicted transformative effects hydrocarbons 
would bring; Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, described the discovery of oil as a ‘new 
ray of hope to Uganda’s long-term vision of transforming itself from a low income to a 
medium income and self-sustaining economy’ (Museveni, 2011), while Tanzania’s president 
at the time, Jakaya Kikwete claimed that gas discoveries are ‘leading the way in Tanzania’s 
economic transformation’ (Kikwete, 2014). Opposition MP’s, such as Tanzania’s Zitto 
Kabawe, on the other hand, warned of an alternative future where the ‘resource curse’ could 
take root (The Citizen, 2012). NGO’s shared similar sentiment in preparing the state against 
the resource curse and its potentially detrimental effects on the democratic process, 
transparency, and the economy (World Resources Institute, 2010). Hydrocarbon potential, 
not yet extracted, presented alternate futures, some of which were anticipated to allow for 
an increased pace towards economic transformation.  
Hydrocarbons are economically and politically transformative. These transformations 
often have negative effects from a human development and environmental perspective and 
have been explored under the ‘resource curse’ theory. Economically, hydrocarbon revenues 
can make a state vulnerable to price shocks, the Dutch disease, and enclave development 
(Auty, 1993; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). In terms of political transformation, Ross highlights the 
fact that oil uniquely shapes governments by the way of three mechanisms: a rentier, 
repression and an (anti) modernisation effect (Ross, 2011). In essence, Ross argues that oil 
obstructs democracy and contracts non-oil parts of the economy. On a more local level, 
Watts argues that the oil sector has considerable transformative effects on the politics of 
local communities in the Niger delta, with violent results (Watts, 2004). These transformative 
effects themselves have influenced prospective oil states (Weszkalnys, 2011). With Tanzania 
being a recent hydrocarbon producer, the question of whether the country will suffer the 
same fate as ‘resource cursed’ nations such as Nigeria, Angola, and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo remains.  
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Despite these discoveries and political promises of hydrocarbon-based development, 
progression from the exploration phase to the production phase of the extractive lifecycle 
has stalled across the East African nations; only Kenya has started to extract hydrocarbons 
for export, albeit in limited amounts (Petroleum Economist, 2019b). In Tanzania, market 
commentators have been quick to point to both the suppressed commodity prices post 2014, 
which have made projects economically difficult (Manley et al, 2015), and the government’s 
increased fiscal demands for the sector (Financial Times, 2018b). However, while these pro-
market views do carry some weight on the economics of extraction, a greater understanding 
of the politics behind such changes can enhance the knowledge behind the hydrocarbon 
sector. While domestic issues have been explored, a greater understanding of how time and 
temporality interacts with the politics of extraction can expand understanding behind some 
of the perceived slow progress of the sector in Tanzania.  
The above statements revolve around anticipations and projections of the future, and 
how the introduction of oil and gas exploration and export will change the economies of their 
respective countries. It also denotes the pace of change that would occur from hydrocarbons. 
Central to this is the changing perception of time. Time and temporality are ever-present 
factors of life, but with the exception of anthropology (e.g., Munn, 1992; Bear, 2016), have 
rarely been analysed in-depth within wider social science disciplines. As will be shown later 
in this introduction and the literature review, this has also been the case for extractives 
literature.  
This thesis will focus on the politics of temporality and time in the Tanzanian 
hydrocarbon sector. In terms of exploration and production, Tanzania has been both on the 
forefront of gas discoveries and an example of the delays experienced in the sector. The 
Tanzanian portion of the Ruvuma basin contains an estimated reserve of 57 trillion cubic feet 
(tcf) (Petroleum Economist, 2020), which, if proven, would place the country in the top 
twenty countries in terms of gas reserves (EIA, 2020c).1 Natural gas has become a growing 
part of the world’s energy supply, in part due to technological advancements such as fracking, 
which has enabled wider exploration and exploitation, particularly in the US, and has a lower 
carbon output when compared to other fossil fuels; natural gas has less carbon dioxide 
emitted per million British thermal units (MMBTU) than either coal or oil, with emissions 
 
1 According to the EIA, the world rankings are for ‘proven’ gas reserves. While the total gas reserves 
have been announced by IOCs, at the time of writing, this has not been represented by EIA statistics 
and thus the 57tcf are not included in the EIA rankings.  
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weighed at 103.7kg per MMBTU for coal, compared to 53.1kg per MMBTU for natural gas 
(EIA, 2020d).2  
Gas is a growing, and increasingly global, market (Bridge and Bradshaw, 2017). 
Tanzanian and Mozambiquan gas are geographically positioned to supply the East Asian 
market, which holds both the largest consumption of natural gas and the highest price for 
natural gas, and is projected to grow further (IEA, 2019a). However, the country has yet to 
progress to the export of hydrocarbons, exploration has dwindled since 2015. Furthermore, 
infrastructure required for export, such as the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant, which was 
originally planned to be completed in the early 2020s (East African, 2016b), has yet to 
progress beyond negotiations with the government and IOCs. Tanzania is also the planned 
point of export for Ugandan crude oil for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), which 
was originally predicted to be finished in 2020, has yet to begin construction (Observer, 
2019a). These two infrastructure projects would bring in billions of dollars of foreign 
investment into the country and would facilitate Tanzania’s entry into the global 
hydrocarbon economy.   
Politics plays a considerable role in the lack of transition to production for Tanzanian 
gas, as well as the East African hydrocarbon sector as a whole (Patey, 2017). While the 
Mozambican gas sector has accelerated towards production, with the construction of an LNG 
plant underway,3 the Tanzanian sector has seen little advancement since 2015. Coinciding 
with the growth of the sector in East Africa and Tanzania, there has been a growing rejection 
of neoliberal approaches to natural resource governance (Campbell, 2009; Childs, 2016; 
Haslam and Heidrich, 2016). In its stead has been a growth of policies that look to increase 
state involvement in extractive governance for greater involvement from domestic 
businesses and citizens, greater down and midstream linkages to the extractive industries, 
and greater resource revenues for states relative to multinational investors. This has been 
combined with a changing discourse that has tied natural resources to nationalistic rhetoric. 
These policy changes and increased rhetoric have been called ‘resource nationalism’ 
(Stevens, 2008; Koch and Perreault, 2019).   
 
2 It is worth noting that recent research suggests that natural gas, and in particularly gas from 
fracking, has been tied to methane emissions, another greenhouse gas that significantly contributes 
to climate change (Howarth, 2019; Hmiel et al, 2020).  
3 At the time of writing, the region in Mozambique which contains the gas fields, Cabo Delgado, is 
currently facing an Islamist insurgency (Financial Times, 2019b), which, alongside considerable 
human cost, could cause delays to the sector.  
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Policy analysts, observers, and academics in the fields of political geography, 
anthropology and political economy have noted that a greater state presence in the 
extractives sector has materialised as a reaction to the neoliberal policies brought in during 
the era of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Haslam and Heidrich, 2016; Hickey et 
al, 2020). The neoliberal policies during SAP era were market-oriented; they involved 
reduced involvement of the state beyond obtaining taxes and royalties, and many firms were 
lured by financial incentives to create a ‘business friendly’ environment that inspires 
‘confidence’ (Campbell, 2003a; 2003b). Furthermore, these tax codes tended to be generous 
as low commodity prices were the mainstay throughout the 1980s and 1990s and were 
ineffective in obtaining greater revenues when prices rose during the commodity boom of 
2000-2014 (Katz-Lavigne, 2017).  
Conversely, policies described as ‘resource nationalist’ in nature, can be described as 
greater state involvement in the sector beyond fiscal revenue generation (Childs, 2016), and 
include initiatives to increase domestic employment and supply-side participation (also 
known as local content – see Ovadia, 2016a; chapter seven of this thesis), generate greater 
domestic linkages to the extractives sector (e.g., Caramento, 2020) and, in some cases, 
nationalisations (Stevens, 2008). It is worth noting that these policies vary significantly from 
country to country and the maturity of the sector (e.g., Stevens, 2008; Andreasson, 2015; 
Wilson, 2015), and are often pursued through the redrawing of extractive resources 
legislation and licencing systems.  
The Tanzanian government has enacted legislation that has been used to maximise 
resource revenues, ensure a greater degree of participation from Tanzanian businesses and 
workforce, and exert a greater degree of control over the extractives sector (e.g., Jacob and 
Pedersen, 2018; Poncian, 2019a). This has coincided with a discourse that has emphasized 
natural resources as a cornerstone of national economic development. Although this has 
been chiefly applied to the gold sector (Roder, 2019), the gas sector has also seen attempts 
at increased involvement by the Tanzanian state (Sørreime, 2019).  
These developments go against the assumptions of pro-market theories about state 
intervention in the extractives sector, which have focused on the temporalities of extraction: 
Vernon (1971), in his influential obsolescing bargain model (OBM), argues that states 
intervene more in extractives when infrastructure has been established and the sector has 
matured, while Wilson (1987) argues that nationalisations and increase state intervention in 
the hydrocarbon sector occur during periods of high oil prices. Time is central to both 
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theories; the OBM model follows infrastructure lifecycles around the extractives sector to 
determine when a state is more likely to increase their involvement in the sector or 
nationalise it. The commodities cycle dominates Wilson’s analysis, which suggests states are 
more likely to pass legislation to obtain greater revenues during times of high commodity 
prices.  
In the Tanzanian case, neither is true; the infrastructure required for offshore 
extraction and export has yet to be built, and oil and gas prices have fallen from their heights 
of the commodity supercycle. Yet, Tanzania has pursued a resource nationalist path, both in 
terms of greater resource revenues and control over the sector, and as a social discourse for 
nation-building. These attempts have resulted in frictions across spatial scales. A greater 
explanation behind why it has done so is needed. As will be shown in the literature review of 
this thesis, literature on Tanzanian resource nationalism has excellently understood the 
political and policy dimensions of the policies and rhetoric of both Kikwete’s and Magufuli’s 
administrations (e.g., Jacob and Pedersen, 2018; Kinyondo and Huggins, 2019; Poncian, 
2019a). These current explanations have not included the role of temporalities within their 
research, which is important because time and temporality are central to hydrocarbon 
extraction; commodity cycles dictate investment strategies and government revenues, and 
as mentioned above, the transformative effects of hydrocarbons led to changing plans and a 
differing imaginary of the future. Given the lack of inclusion of temporalities in human 
geography and political economy, this is unsurprising, however, as mentioned above, pro-
market explanations of resource nationalism incorporate different forms of structures of 
times in their analysis. It is one of the goals of this thesis to better explain these temporalities 
in the Tanzanian context. 
In discussing resource policy, geographers, political economists, and anthropologists 
have explored the geographical political economy of resource policies in a variety of different 
ways; one of the most heavily researched areas is space. Space has been hypothesised in an 
increasingly complex manner (Thrift, 2008), and this is true for research into the extractive 
industries (e.g., Ferguson, 2005; Watts, 2005). Space has been used as a primary unit of 
analysis to understand how resource policies, both neoliberal (e.g., Himley, 2008; Appel, 
2012), and resource nationalist (e.g., Koch and Perreault, 2019; Laing, 2020a). While this has 
provided great insights into the different ways extractive companies and nations have utilised 
resource governance, from the neoliberal privatisation and subsequent enclosure (Ackah-
Baidoo, 2012), to the reterritorialization for state oil companies to repurpose land for 
extractive use (Laing, 2020a), gaps have remained. One such factor that has limited 
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discussion in the literature has been exploring how time interacts with the geographical 
political economy of extractives.   
Temporality is defined as ‘the nature or structure of time, in terms of its objective 
existence, its subjective experience, or both, and particularly with respect to the relations 
among its dimensions (past, present, and future) and the way in which it passes’ (Widder, 
2010). While time is a continuous ‘objective’ part of life (i.e., an hour will remain an hour, 
regardless of human interference), the control of the way time passes, through timeframes 
such as extractive lifecycles, or the fallout of cyclical events such as ‘boom and bust’ of 
international markets can elicit different reactions from both the disruption of imagined 
futures and potential fallouts from such events.  
These forms of temporalities of extraction elicit different perceptions of time, for 
example, shortening time horizons or an increased pace of development and change for the 
future, or alternatively, a desire to return to the past to a pre-extraction life. In essence, while 
time is continuous and linear for people and societies, multiple, and sometimes, contrasting 
temporalities are exhibited from different actors across the extractives sector. Politics and 
capital are central to this structuring and perception of time, through the range of actions 
they can inspire. In terms of the hydrocarbon sector, this can be seen with the promises of 
hydrocarbon wealth to benefit the nation and resulting increase in development projects, 
either directly from the state or from corporate social responsibility initiatives. These have 
often been ineffective (Auty, 1993; Frynas, 2005). In less economically developed states, 
accompanying the political promises of greater wealth has been warnings of the ‘resource 
curse’ (Weszkalnys, 2016).       
Time has been underutilised not just within extractive literature but also within wider 
social science (May and Thrift, 2001). Temporality has only been utilised intermittently in 
human geography and political economy. As mentioned before, most of the scholarship 
employing the concept has been in social anthropology (e.g., Munn, 1992; Bear, 2016). 
Geography has rarely engaged with temporality, despite the fact that extraction is both a 
spatial and temporal practise. There are a few geographical exceptions (e.g., May and Thrift, 
2001; Klinke, 2013), which will be explored in greater depth in the literature review.  
Temporalities of the extractive sector command the actions of a variety of actors across 
different spatial scales; at the global scale, the cyclical nature of commodities markets (better 
known as the ‘boom and bust’ cycle), dominate IOC strategies, investment decisions, stock 
prices and shareholder demands (e.g., Bowman, 2018; Wiegink, 2018). The boom-and-bust 
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cycle dominates potential legislative changes at the national level, with governments both in 
the global north and south often looking to increase revenues and windfall taxes during 
periods of high commodity prices (Katz-Lavigne, 2017). This is combined with long term 
strategic goals of both IOCs and states, and how extracted resources are included in this 
(often) economic strategy. Alongside the boom-and-bust cycle, the lifecycles of extractive 
projects, either in the form of wells and mines, or midstream projects such as refineries, 
pipelines, or LNG projects, also have an influence on local and national political actors (Larkin, 
2013). These are combined with perceptions of either successes or failures of the past, 
present or the future (e.g., Ferry and Limbert, 2008; Weszkalnys, 2016). Mixed perceptions 
of the future, actions spurred from hydrocarbon investments and infrastructures due to the 
temporalities of extraction, and the boom-and-bust cycle are central to this thesis.       
2 Extraction in Tanzania: A Background 
This thesis is based on research in Tanzania, with fieldwork in Dar es Salaam, Mtwara 
and Tanga. Tanzania has been on the forefront of committing to resource nationalist policies. 
To understand current events in the Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector, it is important to 
historically contextualise both Tanzanian nationalism and the Tanzanian’s state’s previous 
interactions with international capital, and how these have influenced discourse around the 
gas industry (Poncian, 2019b). When compared to West Africa, the East African region is 
geologically complex, and because of this, the region has historically been under-surveyed 
(Anderson and Browne, 2011). Additional difficulties hindered exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons throughout its postcolonial history, ranging from the geographical location 
from markets, lack of technology, unfriendly investment environment, technical difficulties 
in extraction and a desire from to discover oil rather than gas. This resulted in little activity 
in the Tanzanian hydrocarbon industry before the 2000s (Pedersen and Bofin, 2015).  
While Tanzania has extracted minerals since the colonial era, the country lacks a 
sustained history of resource extraction, with the gold sector expanding in the late 1980s and 
1990s (Elbra, 2016), and the gas sector expanding in the mid to late 2000s and 2010s. Rather 
than the history of extraction guiding recent developments in the sector, it is the historical 
connection to Nyerere and African socialism that have shaped recent developments in the 
sector. The influence of Nyerere, Ujamaa and African socialism on developmental 
imaginaries should not be understated, indeed, ‘academic discussions of Tanzania inevitably 
begin – and often end – with an emphasis on the role and impact of the country’s founder, 
Julius K. Nyerere’ (Lofchie, 2014: 4).  
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2.1 Resource Extraction and Tanzania: From Colonial Times to 
the Millennium  
The first legal framework for extraction was conducted during British colonial rule, with 
the Minerals Ordinance of 1920. Nine years later, this framework was updated with the 
Minerals Ordinance of 1929. This gave control and ownership of all minerals to the Governor 
of Tanganyika, and the power to grant licences and leases to individuals and companies was 
left to the governor of the territory (Pedersen et al, 2016). This served to be the legal 
background for the first forays into hydrocarbon exploration.  
Hydrocarbon exploration began in 1952, with the British colonial administration 
awarding BP and Shell concessions for the costal basin of both Tanganyika and the islands of 
Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia (Mmari et al, 2019). As a response to BP and Shell’s exploration, 
the Mining (Mineral Oil) Ordinance was passed in 1958. It set out general conditions for 
licencing, prospecting, and exploration in the hydrocarbon sector. After independence, in 
1962, the powers to grant licences and leases in the previous legislation were transferred to 
the Minister for Commerce and Industry and BP and Shell relinquished their concessions in 
1964. 
The year 1967 saw a radical turning point in the history of the political economy of 
Tanzania. The Arusha declaration outlined the developmental model Tanzania would look to 
adopt a socialist society. At its core, the declaration set out a vision of self-reliance and 
egalitarianism and to change control of the economy to the workers and peasants. The 
declaration saw the nationalisation of foreign industries, as well as banks, and newly formed 
industrial parastatals were to drive the economy to self-dependence. For natural resources, 
the declaration brought the nationalisation of mines operating in the country, although these 
were few in number (Elbra, 2016). Furthermore, the declaration stated that ‘all citizens 
together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants’ 
(Nyerere, 1967).  
The Arusha Declaration continued the centralisation of natural resource management 
that had begun in the colonial era and began the doctrine of natural resources under national 
ownership (Poncian, 2019a). This would be further solidified in the Tanzanian constitution, 
which declared that natural resources are the property of the state (GoT, 1977). While these 
economic policies were ambitious, the transformation of the distribution of economic power 
was limited (Gray, 2018), and a division between the intended economic results and actual 
economic practises took root (Gray, 2018; Lofchie, 2014). 
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The core of African Socialism was Ujamaa (familyhood in Swahili). While the Arusha 
declaration was followed with nationalisations of industries and mines, Ujamaa was a project 
for the long term. Alongside the nationalisations mentioned above, Ujamaa was also a social 
policy for nation building, which resulted in ‘arguably the most serious nation-building 
program in sub-Saharan Africa’ (Miguel, 2004: 360). It set to promote Swahili as the national 
language and made primary education free. It set the foundations of a tradition to not to 
distinguish Tanzanians on religion, geography, or tribe (Miguel, 2004). It also undertook a 
policy of villagization, which aimed to restructure rural society around village units under 
local authorities. While it begun as a voluntary project, it quickly morphed into a compulsory 
activity, particularly in the southern region of Mtwara (Lal, 2015). While villagisation 
attempts failed, Ujamaa and African socialism would have a social and economic legacy in 
Tanzania that would shape the current government’s attitude towards extractives.  
As a part of the government’s programme to create parastatals to aid 
industrialisation during this period, the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation 
(TPDC) was founded by the government in 1969 to aid the development of a domestic 
petroleum industry as a National Oil Company (NOC). TPDC was granted exploration licences 
from the government and could enter joint ventures with foreign partners through 
production sharing agreements (PSAs). This coincided with a PSA signed with the Italian IOC 
Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP), who discovered natural gas in Songo-Songo in 1974, 
but this discovery was not developed due to a lack of a domestic gas market, inadequate 
infrastructure, and limited amount for commercial export (Mmari et al, 2019). While there 
was now confirmation of hydrocarbons in Tanzania, there was little appetite by IOCs to 
exploit the resource. 
The demise of African socialism in Tanzania began in the late 1970s. While initial results 
of industrialisation were impressive (Gray, 2018), villagization attempts failed, with many 
farmers resisting the changes (Schneider, 2004). Other domestic issues also affected 
Tanzania’s economic performance, which included a costly war to remove Idi Amin in 
Uganda, and droughts affecting the still-dominant agricultural sector. There were also global 
economic issues; the oil shocks of the 1970s and the following economic stagnation in the 
global economy severely hampered not just Tanzania, but the whole continent (Johnson and 
Wilson, 1982). The result of this was that by the early 1980s, the socialist policies brought by 
Nyerere were an economic failure (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003).  
11 
 
The early 1980s saw Tanzania begin to engage with the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout of the economy. Along with many countries on the African 
continent, the conditions for financial aid rested on policy changes to a command economy 
to an open market economy. For Tanzania, this involved a move away from Ujamaa and 
socialism, and to change economic policy to one that invited foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The first of these was the 1981 National Economic Survival Programme, followed by the 1982 
SAPs. After Nyerere stood down from the presidency in 1985, his successor, Ali Mwinyi, 
accepted the SAPs conditionalities, despite resistance from the public (Emel et al, 2011). With 
these programmes, socialist policies and ujamaa were abandoned, and even mocked 
(Fouéré, 2014).  
The 1980s saw continued sporadic exploration and the passing of the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act of 1980 (GoT, 1980). This replaced the modified colonial 
legislation that had previously been in place. Much like legislation passed during the era of 
structural adjustment, this legislation provided greater security for private investors, and 
safety causes for contracts in respect to nationalisation (Mmari et al, 2019). The 1980 act 
marked an official separation of the petroleum industry from the mining industry (Andilile et 
al, 2019), and was the legal foundation for oil and gas exploration until 2015. The next 
discovery of gas in the country occurred in 1982, in Mnazi Bay by AGIP (TPDC, 2019a). Further 
exploitation was not deemed to be economically viable and the rights were relinquished to 
the Tanzanian authorities. In 1989, a Model PSA was introduced to guide negotiations with 
private companies. It represented a move towards ‘a more rule-based system to both guide 
and limit the room for negotiation by outlining the royalty and taxation terms’ (Pedersen and 
Bofin, 2019: 412). In essence, much like SAPs in other developing countries during this period, 
these were investor-friendly neoliberal reforms. There were also changes to the 1980 act, 
which changed arbitration from the High Court of Tanzania to the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington D.C. By the end of the 1980s, licences 
were held by Shell and Texaco in the Rovuma Basin with no major finds, and with declining 
oil prices during the 1980s and 1990s, little further exploration occurred.  
The SAPs preceded an expansion of the gold sector, rather than hydrocarbons. This was 
both in the form of artisanal mining (Bryceson and Geenen, 2016), and from multinational 
companies (Lange, 2011). The management and social impacts of the gold sector in the 1990s 
and 2000s would have a massive impact on perceptions and desired outcomes from the 
government. The gold sector has created difficulties for Tanzania, both at the local and 
national level. Nationally, generous tax regimes have led to poor fiscal returns for the 
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Tanzanian government (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). The dominance of multinational corporations 
in the mining regions has created considerable social tensions between the state, the people 
and MNCs (Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Kitula, 2006), and has resulted in violence. This has been 
reflective of the social tensions that had been created by the SAPs, where ethnic and religious 
tensions began to appear in the country because of the SAPs (e.g., Campbell, 1999; Heilman 
and Kaiser, 2002). In essence, the opening of the gold sector to MNCs created particular social 
and fiscal issues have led many in the country to see it as a failure (Emel et al, 2011), and has 
had knock on effects for the hydrocarbon sector.   
The 1990s saw the beginning of gas extraction, with the government focusing on 
developing the small gas discoveries found in Songo-Songo and Mnazi Bay with the 
involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions. This focused on the Songo-Songo field. 
Songo-Songo was characterised as a ‘sub-commercial’ field where donor finance was 
required for exploitation (World Bank, 1991). With the exception of domestic development 
of onshore gas reserves, the ‘whole east coast of Africa was dismissed’4 for hydrocarbon 
exploration due to the low global commodity prices of the 1990s. The beginning of this 
change occurred in 1999, when TPDC and Western Geophysical, an American hydrocarbon 
surveying company, acquired deep water seismic, gravity and magnetic data, and found 
hydrocarbon traces in the Indian Ocean off the southern coast of Tanzania (Mmari et al, 
2019). From then on, exploration moved into the deep sea.  
Economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions, 
looked to liberalise the extractive sector, and offer generous terms to MNCs to attract FDI. 
While FDI inflows from mining increased to over 50% of all FDI received by the country by 
2002 (Emel and Huber, 2008: 1402), there were considerable social costs, including 
displacement, dismissal, and confrontation between artisanal miners and MNCs, with the 
government often taking the side of the latter (Emel et al, 2011). The result of the social 
failures for extractive-led development was the increasing perception that Tanzania was not 
getting enough out of its natural resources, and opposition parties were beginning to 
capitalise on these frustrations during elections (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018; Poncian, 2019a). 
2.2 Onshore Gas Development and Offshore Discoveries: 2000 
– 2015 
Following interpretation of the seismic data, the Tanzanian government launched its 
first offshore deep-water licencing round in September 2000, with a second round occurring 
 
4 Interview, Retired Senior TPDC Executive, Dar es Salaam, 15.03.2018.  
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in 2001 and third in 2004. The exploration area was divided into 12 blocks of approximately 
10 square kilometres, similar to international competitors at the time. These rounds saw a 
few bids, with the second licencing round awarded block five to Petrobras, the Brazilian NOC. 
The introduction of the NOC provided greater confidence, and were followed with bids by 
Ophir Energy, Shell, BG,5 and Equinor.6 All blocks, bar from Shell’s, were explored for 
hydrocarbon deposits. The reason behind Shell’s lack of exploration was because the block 
was situated within Zanzibari territory, and a disagreement with Tanzanian parliament and 
the Zanzibar authorities over who controls the territory ensured that no exploration 
occurred.7  
The onshore sector saw greater progression than the offshore gas industry. This 
centred on the discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s in Songo-Songo and Mnazi bay. While it 
was commissioned in the early 1990s, the Songo-Songo gas project was finished in 2004 and 
included a gas processing plant on the island and a 232km pipeline connecting the gas to 
Ubungo power station in Dar es Salaam. Mnazi bay gas fields have been on-stream and 
operating since January 2007 and has been providing gas for electricity generation in Dar es 
Salaam and Mtwara. The fields are operated by Maurel et Prom and Wentworth Resources, 
with the former owning 48.06%, and the latter owning 31.94%. The remaining 20% is owned 
by TPDC (Wentworth Resources, 2019). While the onshore sector is producing, it has not 
been without controversy, with the riots in particular causing considerable tensions between 
the government and the local populace over the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline.  
In terms of capital investment, the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline is the smallest 
project out of the three projects that are explored in this thesis. It is also the only project out 
of the three that has been completed, with construction finished in 2015. The pipeline was 
built to connect gas from Mnazi bay in Mtwara, to the Kinyerezi power plant in Dar es Salaam 
for electricity generation. The pipeline was 542km in length and was built to a cost of 
approximately $1.22bn, which includes the cost of the construction of the gas processing 
 
5 BG was later acquired by Shell and hence explains their involvement in the Tanzanian gas sector 
beyond the initial bidding rounds.  
6 Equinor is better known by their previous name, Statoil. The Norwegian NOC changed their name in 
2018. For this thesis, it will use the new name except for cases of direct quotes from respondents.    
7 Oil and gas are just one of the disputes that has emerged between the union of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar (see Killian, 2008). Zanzibar now conducts its own PSAs with IOCs, and has its own 
petroleum act, passed in 2016, as well as their own regulatory authority for petroleum exploration 
and production. At the time of writing, little has occurred in the Zanzibari petroleum sector. Due to 
these factors, combined with methodological constraints of having to submit another research 
permit to access the island, this study does not explore either the dispute mentioned above or wider 
petroleum exploration in Zanzibar.  
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plant in Dar es Salaam. Construction was done by the China Petroleum and Technology 
Development Company, which is a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Company. The 
project was marred in a corruption scandal whereby $600m was lost both in China and 
Tanzania (The Citizen, 2015b). It is noticeable that this is one of the few forays of Chinese 
investment into the gas sector in the country. The pipeline is more noticeable for the social 
frictions that surrounded the construction; discussions of the project caused protests in 
Mtwara, who objected to the removal of gas from the region. These protests turned violent 
on the 22 May 2013, with riots breaking out at the confirmation that construction would go 
ahead in the national budget. This event has had long repercussions for the region, which are 
covered extensively in chapter four of this thesis.  
The offshore gas sector began with BG and Ophir energy commencing the first 
exploratory well in Pweza-1 bloc on the 18th September 2010 (TPDC, 2019b). In the same 
year, BG and Ophir made a gas discovery in block four, equivalent to 1.8tcf. In 2012, Equinor 
and ExxonMobil made a discovery of 6tcf in block two. These discoveries proved to be ‘a 
turning point in the history of petroleum exploration in Tanzania’ (Mmari et al, 2019: 15). 
Exploration finished in December 2016 for Ophir, Pavilion Energy and Shell, who brought BG 
in 2015 (Ophir, 2016). The last company to drill offshore was Equinor in 2017, and this was 
more to do with a commitment in their contract than a real desire to find more hydrocarbon 
deposits.8 To date, Tanzania has roughly 57tcf of proven gas reserves (Petroleum Economist, 
2019a), with 8tcf found onshore.9 
The quantities of gas found offshore have made an LNG plant economically viable. 
An LNG plant cools and condenses the natural gas to a liquid form, allowing it to be 
transported to markets without the use of pipelines. The intended market for export is the 
East Asian market, which carries the highest LNG prices in the world. Out of all the projects 
featured in this thesis, it is by far the largest in terms of capital expenditure; it is estimated 
to cost $30bn, spread out through the four to five years of the construction phase. The 
investment potential of the LNG is huge; during the construction phase of the project, 
economists from the Tanzanian central bank estimate that the project will increase the 
annual GDP of the country by two percentage points (Reuters, 2019b). Despite the 
considerable amount of investment that is on offer, the project has yet to enter the 
 




construction phase of the project, and negotiations on the project have been slow to 
progress further.  
With these developments in the gas industry in the country, it is worth noting that 
there are really two different forms of gas industry in Tanzania: Firstly, there is the deep-sea 
exploration occurring inside Tanzania’s maritime borders, whose history has been covered 
above, and the second part of the industry which is based on land. Mnazi Bay is located to 
the south of the city of Mtwara. In 2006, the success and eventual development of the Songo-
Songo gas field catalysed development of the Mnazi Bay gas field. Mnazi bay is located to the 
south of the town of Mtwara. These differences are important at a technical level but are 
less visible at a social and local level. Nevertheless, they are important due to the fact that 
hydrocarbon wealth led to promises of enormous developmental potential. 
The first main difference is the amount of capital and technology required. Even by 
industry standards, deep sea exploration and production is incredibly capital intensive and 
requires modern technology for exploration, extraction, and refinement, which includes 
specialised infrastructure such as LNG plants. It is therefore little surprise that supermajors 
such as Shell and ExxonMobil have participated in this part of the Tanzanian gas industry. 
This contrasts with the onshore sector, which requires less capital and technical expertise 
and relies on a more traditional method of extraction. 
Secondly, the sub-industries are currently at different phases of exploration and 
production. The deep-sea sub-industry has finished exploration in 2015, with only 
intermittent exploratory wells done after. Production has been delayed through a variety of 
legal battles between IOCs and the government, which will be covered in chapter eight. While 
there have been examples of legal issues between the government and IOCs operating in 
Mnazi Bay, these have not been on the same scale as those between the supermajors and 
Dodoma. However, the most important aspect of this is that the land-based industry is 
currently extracting gas, while the deep-sea industry has entered a period of stagnation.  
Finally, the third largest difference is the intended destination of the gas. Land-based 
gas that is currently being extracted is being used solely for domestic purposes, chiefly 
electricity production. While smaller in terms of reserves, there are plans to export this gas 
for regional use (GoT, 2015b). However, for the time being, this gas is being used 
domestically, with a pipeline connecting the fields in Mnazi Bay and Songo-Songo to Kinyerezi 
power plant in Dar es Salaam. Due to the size of the reserves and the capital invested, 
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offshore gas is intended for international export towards the East Asian markets of South 
Korea and Japan. 
Despite of these developments, both on land and offshore, the legal framework to 
govern the sector had not been updated since the 1980s. Legislative change was required to 
fully govern the gas sector, particularly since the industry, and global commodities market 
were widely different than they had been in the 1980s. The first of these major legal changes 
would occur in 2015, before the 2015 general election, and in 2017, with a new government 
and president at the helm.   
2.3 Legal Changes, General Elections and Regional Politics: 
2015-Present 
By 2015, PSAs had been signed with ten IOCs in the coastal regions and had seen a 
variety of mid-range to supermajor IOCs invest in exploration of the coast of Mtwara (See 
Table 1 and Figure 2). With the rise of a functioning hydrocarbon sector, there have been 
considerable legal changes to hydrocarbon legislation as well as development of other 
policies, like local content. The first of these was the 2015 Petroleum Act, which had 
considerable changes from its 1980 predecessor. Unlike the 1980 petroleum act, which was 
tailored towards the oil sector, the new act was written for gas exploration and production. 
The act, passed at the end of Kikwete’s tenure, also saw a return of resource nationalist 
policies to the hydrocarbon sector (Jacob and Pedersen, 2019; Poncian, 2019a). Under this 
legislation, TPDC evolved from a promoter for exploration (Clarke, 2010), to a vehicle for 
greater involvement in the industry (Pedersen and Kweka, 2017). It is worth noting that all 
the PSAs signed were before the 2015 petroleum act passed.  
Table 1: List of IOCs operating in offshore and onshore Tanzania. Note, this does not include onshore exploration blocks or 
companies. 
These legal changes also brought changes in the bureaucratic structure of the gas 
sector. This included the establishment of the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority 
(PURA), and the changing of the roles of TPDC to be a functional NOC (Melyoki, 2017). The 
2015 act also brought new responsibilities for the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory 
Authority (EWURA), and new advisory bodies such as the oil and gas bureau, which was 
Block Name Main Operator Partners 
Block 1 Shell Ophir Energy, Pavilion Energy 
Block 2 Equinor ExxonMobil 
Block 4 Shell Ophir Energy, Pavilion Energy 
Mnazi Bay Maurel and Prom Wentworth Resources, TPDC 
Songo-Songo Orca Exploration Songas 
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created within the office of the president to advise the cabinet on matters relating to the 
hydrocarbon industry.  
Developments in Tanzania’s legal and institutional framework has tended to come as 
responses to international factors such as price fluctuations and activities of IOCs (Figure 3). 
They are also framed by the authorities’ ideological vision of the state’s role in the extractives 
sector (Pedersen and Bofin, 2019). Much like the history of extraction in Tanzania, many legal 
developments first occurred in the mining sector, with the gas sector following, with policies 
shaped by the experiences of the mining sector.  
 The election of Magufuli had a considerable impact on the discourse of the extractives 
sector and has coincided with a global change in the nature of state-MNC relations, whereby 
states have sought to obtain greater economic and social results from extraction than seen 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The historical memory of Nyerere’s opposition to foreign investment 
has continued to this day and has been a rhetorical tool for the government to secure public 
support for resource nationalist policies (Poncian, 2019a). 
Figure 2: Map of Current Operational Blocks in the Offshore Tanzanian Gas Sector 
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Under Magufuli, there has been a larger push into resource nationalist policies, with 
the passing of four major pieces of extractive legislation: Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act (2017a); the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review 
and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act (2017d); the Petroleum (Local Content) 
Regulations (2017b); and The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (2017c). The 
latter is primarily aimed at the mining sector but does amend some parts of the 2010 Mining 
Act.10 Since the announcement of these laws, frictions between the government and the IOCs 
have been exacerbated, and there has been little progression to extraction of deep-sea gas. 
It is within this context that fieldwork begun, and these legal changes and government 
discourse that would dominate the extractives sector.  
Alongside legal changes and bureaucratic restructuring of the hydrocarbon sector in 
Tanzania, has been the announcement that Tanzania would be the chosen route for EACOP. 
Unlike the previous LNG and Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline mentioned above, the EACOP 
project is a cross-border project between Uganda and Tanzania. Announced in April 2016, 
the route will take oil from its source in Hoima to the port of Tanga. At 1,443km in length and 
at an estimated cost of $3.5bn (EACOP, 2017), EACOP will be the longest electronically heated 
pipeline in the world, and one of the largest cross-border infrastructure projects in the history 
 
10 An in-depth analysis of the politics behind these legal changes is included in chapter eight. For an 
in-depth discussion on the history of local content in Tanzania, see chapter seven.  
Figure 3: Average Global Oil Prices 1960-2015 and Key Tanzanian Regulatory Events (Bofin and Pedersen, 2017). 
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of East Africa. Most of the construction will occur in Tanzania, with 1,147km of the pipeline 
being constructed across eight regions.11 
EACOP is now its own registered company, although ownership of the project is 
divided between five partners. The first two are the NOCs of the nations which the pipeline 
passes, Uganda, and Tanzania. These are the Ugandan National Oil Corporation and TPDC, 
respectively. The other three partners of the project are IOCs currently operating in 
exploration and production of Uganda’s oilfield in Lake Albert: The French Supermajor Total, 
the Anglo-Irish medium sized oil company Tullow Oil and the Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Corporation, owned by the People’s Republic of China. Much like the Tanzanian offshore 
sector, EACOP has had difficulties in the negotiation phase with both the Tanzanian and 
Ugandan governments. Since the 4th of September 2019, all technical work on the EACOP 
project has been suspended. This is less to do with the project itself, but rather issues in the 
Ugandan upstream sector over the farming down of a stake in the industry between Tullow 
Oil and Total (Reuters, 2019c).12  
With the current difficulties in the export-oriented sector, the current gas industry is 
solely used for domestic consumption, primarily for power generation. As of 2018, natural 
gas provided TANESCO with 55% of total power supplied to the national grid (Mmari et al, 
2019). Alongside power generation, gas has proved to be finically beneficial for the state; 
although it has diminished in time, due to the lack of continued exploration and the lack of 
new deals signed since 2015, in 2011 and 2012, the petroleum industry’s contribution 
through exploration licence payments accounted to 2% total government revenues 
(Pedersen and Bofin, 2015). However, the biggest saving has been through the reduction of 
hydrocarbon imports. Between 2004 and 2018, the use of Tanzanian gas, instead of imported 
hydrocarbons, has provided savings of $11bn (Mmari et al, 2019). 
The developmentalist imaginaries in Tanzania have been heavily shaped by Nyerere and 
African socialism. The political legacy of these policies, while mixed in practise, have been 
utilised by successive CCM governments to legitimise resource extraction. This effect has 
been catalysed by the perception that Tanzania fared poorly during the era of structural 
 
11 These Tanzanian regions are (in order of pipeline route west to east) Kagera, Geita, Shinyanga, 
Tabora, Singida, Dodoma, Manyara and Tanga.  
12 A ‘farm out’, or a ‘farm down’, is ‘a contractual agreement with an owner who holds a working 
interest in an oil and gas lease to assign all or part of that interest to another party in exchange for 
fulfilling contractually specified conditions’ (SLB, 2020).  
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adjustment, which has caused both contemporary issues for both the government and for 
local populations near mines.  
3 Arguments of this Thesis and Research 
Questions 
This thesis explores how time and temporality has been utilised in the Tanzanian 
hydrocarbon sector. Specifically, it explores the temporalities of direct stakeholders, and how 
they have been influenced by the introduction and changes in the sector. These temporalities 
have altered the actions of actors at variety of spatial levels and have manifested in a variety 
of ways. It argues that these differing temporalities of direct stakeholders in the sector, 
across different spatial scales, have created friction between actors. Central to this has been 
the friction between competing imaginaries of the future between various actors, and how 
different actors have sought to change the pace of the sector to suit their own strategies.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to remove space, as space is, and always will be, the 
‘fundamental stuff’ of geography (Thrift, 2008: 85). It is rather to explore underexplored 
temporalities within extractives and how these influences or are influenced by resource 
policy. In essence, this thesis will explore the temporalities of the Tanzanian hydrocarbon 
sector, with a particular focus on differing and competing imagined futures and resource 
strategies. Central to this is a growing resource nationalism in Tanzania, and an 
accompanying discourse that has tied Tanzanian nationalism with a national use of 
hydrocarbons. Due to these factors, the overarching research question for this thesis is:  
• How do the temporalities of extraction influence the actions of direct stakeholders 
in the Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector?   
This question requires some explanation of some of the terms it is utilising. Temporalities 
of extraction, in this instance, involve the foremost temporalities found in the hydrocarbon 
sector. These include the commodity cycle and lifecycles of infrastructures and gas wells. The 
former consists of supply and demand of the mineral or hydrocarbon in question and is 
dependent on a variety of factors that influence this supply and demand. The latter consists 
of a linear project timeline whereby a project will go through specific phases from its 
initiation to eventual closure. These temporalities are dominated by capital, technological, 
and political factors at both a global and national scale. Finally, there is the perceptions of 
time experienced by all actors, which can be through a glorified past, or expectant future, or 
in some instances, both. In the Tanzanian context, temporalities of extraction focus on the 
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Japanese and Asian gas market commodity cycles, the lifecycle phases of onshore and 
offshore gas wells, which are in different stages of production and exploration respectively, 
and the project lifecycle phases of midstream infrastructure, in this case the LNG plant and 
EACOP, both of which are supposedly entering the construction phase.  
In terms of perceptions of time, this thesis will chiefly focus on how the hydrocarbon 
sector has changed perceptions of the future, particularly within the context of economic 
development, both at the local and national level, and how this has contrasted with 
perceptions and time horizons of IOCs operating in Tanzania, as well as between other 
national actors. This is both in the form of current perceptions of the future of the sector, 
and how this is creating frictions in the present, and how previous imaginaries of gas-led 
development have turned out to be false, and the fallout from these predictions and plans.   
For this thesis, direct stakeholders include not just the Tanzanian government, but also 
its various ministries and parastatals that are involved in the hydrocarbon sector. Within this, 
the thesis will explore natural resource strategies, which include the variety of different laws, 
policies and plans the Tanzanian government had, or has, for the hydrocarbon sector. These 
have changed with successive governments, or from new events from both inside and 
outside Tanzania. These are as much political and social as they are economic strategies. They 
seek to both construct and reconstruct national identity and unity from the development 
natural gas promises. In essence, they either are or represent the government in some 
capacity on hydrocarbon governance matters. Non-state stakeholders, in this instance, 
include private companies (both IOCs and smaller Tanzanian companies), NGOs and 
communities and individuals within Tanzania.      
Temporalities of extraction can be broken down into different aspects of extraction 
where time is central. For this thesis, this is primarily focused on the commodity cycle, the 
timeline of a gas well’s lifecycle and the project timeline of associated infrastructures, and 
how these have influenced state and non-state actors. These are dictated by different 
aspects of time, such as the linear aspect of lifecycles of a non-renewable resource, and the 
cyclical nature of commodity prices. Alongside these are the differing time horizons of key 
actors, most notably the IOCs and the Tanzanian government. These are international in 
scope and dictate IOCs corporate strategies. Yet, at the same time, they also must engage 
with both the government and the wider population. As it will be shown, the latter’s hopes, 
expectations and imaginaries of the future change with the actions of political and corporate 
decisions and actions around the sector. This research question also has a set of research 
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sub-questions. These will focus on different aspects of the sector and are covered in the 
succeeding chapters. These are:  
• How do the temporalities of the extractive industries interact with economic 
development?  
• How is time utilised in extractive resource governance?  
• What role does materiality have in the temporalities of extraction?  
For the first question, a definition and understanding of what development is, is required. 
Development can be seen as providing ‘a frame of reference, a set of themes, and a wealth 
of ideas and interpretations, contestations, and debates, across the main social science 
disciplines’ (Bernstein, 2006). Thomas (2000), separates three contemporary meanings of the 
term development, as:  
1. As a vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society; 
2. As an historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long 
periods; 
3. As consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the part of various agencies, 
including governments, all kinds of organizations and social movements. (Thomas, 2000: 
777, emphasis in the original). 
The three meanings above highlight the fact that ‘development’ has meant different things 
in different places throughout history (Bernstein, 2006). This thesis focuses on the 
‘immanent’ process of development. First coined by Cowen and Shenton (1996), immanent 
development occurs as a penetration of capitalism (Ulluwishewa, 2014). This form of 
development resembles Thomas’s second and third contemporary meanings of 
development. This is due to the thesis’ focus on the internal processes driven by the 
extractives sector, rather than ‘intentional’ development projects brought upon by outside 
development agencies. 
Development is a central discourse when discussing African extraction, albeit it in an 
uncertain role. On the one hand, the extractive sector has been central to attempts to 
economically develop, either through exports of raw materials, attraction of FDI, or attempts 
to spur local industries down the supply chain using raw and processed resources. However, 
as it will be explained in detail in the literature review, these have often failed, and 
governments are wary of the risks of mineral dependence can bring. However, less has been 
discussed on how the temporalities of extraction shape and alter economic development 
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strategies and local expectations. Chapters five, six and eight will explore how temporalities 
of extraction have altered the process of economic development.  
The second question explores how time is understood by state actors and how it is 
utilised within extractive resource strategies. It is closely tied with the first question in that 
in Tanzania, the extractive industries are planned to aid wider economic development. This 
question has a strong focus on greater state participation in the sector, and how Tanzanian 
‘resource nationalism’ has encountered difficulties in the commodities cycle and project 
lifecycle. Chapters six, seven, and eight will explore how these policies have interacted with 
extractive temporalities, as well as how these have altered actor’s behaviour to engage with 
the hydrocarbon sector.   
The final sub-question will explore the interaction between materiality and temporalities 
in the hydrocarbon sector of Tanzania. Materialities, in this instance, encompass the 
hydrocarbon itself and the associated infrastructure required to extract, transport and 
process raw hydrocarbons into useable products. Materialities of natural resources shape 
social processes (Mitchell, 2011), and as will be shown, technological advances alter both the 
materiality of hydrocarbons and the temporality of the sector. These material 
transformations of both the hydrocarbon and the infrastructure also alter the temporalities 
of extraction, with consequences for state and non-state actors. Chapters four and six will 
delve deeper into this question.  
3.1 Argument of the thesis and relevance 
This thesis’ main argument is that the introduction of the hydrocarbon sector, and its 
corresponding temporalities, have caused a fundamental change in the behaviours and 
perceptions of time at multiple spatial levels, with the primary result of this change being 
friction. As will be shown in the empirical and analytical chapters of this thesis, this change 
has expressed itself differently within actors, ranging from the government, to national 
businesses, to the local population.  
Central to this has been differing perceptions of the future, which have dictated 
actions in the present. This has been guided by changing temporalities in the sector, chiefly 
through market and technological changes. This has been combined with a greater desire to 
utilise extraction for economic development. Due to differences, this has created friction 
between direct stakeholders in the hydrocarbon sector. These come from different spatial 
levels, from the global with IOCs, the national with domestic large to medium sized 
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businesses and the government, to the local, with small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
extraction areas and local communities near extractive sites.  
The promises of hydrocarbon wealth have changed both the Tanzanian government’s 
development strategies and discourse around economic development. It has served both to 
obtain a greater share of hydrocarbon wealth than before in the gold sector, and to fracture 
national unity between gas producing areas and the national government. This is in contrast 
with the IOCs, where falling hydrocarbon prices have questioned the economic viability of 
the larger scale hydrocarbon projects. These divergent positions have served to create 
frictions between multiple actors, from the national government and the IOCs over both the 
wealth created through extraction and the time horizons of obtaining that wealth, to the 
shifting perceptions of the future generated by gas extraction between the government and 
local communities. The perceptions of a prosperous future financed by gas had direct 
implications for the region of Mtwara, who anticipated an economic resource boom that 
never arrived. Finally, infrastructures and technological change of the materiality of natural 
gas have both created opportunities for the government, IOCs, and domestic businesses to 
obtain greater wealth and control, but also have served to disenchant perspectives of future 
prosperity in pipeline and gas producing areas.    
This thesis primarily contributes to the disciplines of political geography and African 
studies. For the political geography of extractives, it utilises a greater emphasis of time 
alongside space as a means of better understanding extractive phenomena. For African 
studies, this thesis contributes to the scholarship on resource governance in African states. 
This is particularly timely due to the growing ‘resource nationalism’ on the continent, 
supported not just by states, but by international organisations such as the African Union 
through their Africa Mining Vision, which set out greater state involvement and domestic 
participation in extractives sectors on the continent (African Union, 2009). 
Theoretically, this thesis utilises a temporal lens to better understand the politics of 
extraction. In doing so, it seeks to present an alternative viewpoint of both the development 
and the politics of extraction through how changing temporalities, and perceptions of time, 
have been drivers for stakeholders’ actions in the hydrocarbon sector. As it will be shown in 
the next chapter, temporalities have typically been under explored in a variety of social 
science disciplines, particularly in geography and political economy. Extraction provides a 
good opportunity to highlight the different ways temporalities and spatialities affect resource 
governance across different scales. Temporality, in this respect, is understood to be 
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multifaced and plural, but has traditionally been hard to conceptualise. The extractive sector 
has its own set of times; be it the commodities cycle, rhythms of extraction and linear project 
timelines, and these combine with the politics of the local and the national, as well as altering 
perceptions of the future, particularly regarding economic and social development. It is 
therefore a theoretical goal of this thesis to present temporalities as a viable way to better 
understand current trends in extraction.  
This thesis finds its empirical relevance through a variety of contemporary socio-
economic phenomena that are present throughout many resource intensive economies. 
Firstly, global commodity markets declined sharply from 2014 to 2016, and since then, has 
seen considerable volatility (Figures 4 and 5).13 Considering that the economic viability of 
many hydrocarbon extractive projects relied on the high oil and gas prices that were seen 
during the global commodity boom of 2000 to 2014 (with a brief fall during the 2008 
recession), this has resulted in IOCs and mining corporations owning projects that require 
large sums of investment in a short to mid-term market that will not justify the costs, and 
where long term concerns over the demand of oil have arisen (Roland and Mjelde, 2016; 
Jefferson, 2020). This is particularly true for hydrocarbon projects in East Africa. In one 
 
13 Note on Figure 5: Compared to the oil price, the gas market is more regionalised in terms of 
pricing (Bridge and Bradshaw, 2017) and is more receptive to regional variables. For example, the 
reason for the lower gas price in the US in the past decade is the shale fracking revolution that 
occurred in the US (Boersma and Johnson, 2012). This is also the reason why Asia’s natural gas is 
imported in LNG form; the lack of available natural gas means that gas is imported in a liquid form 
and undergoes regasification upon import. As one could imagine, this is more expensive than 








































































































Figure 4: Annual Crude Oil Price in Dollars per Barrel, 2000-2019 (IMF, 2019). 
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respect, IOCs overextended their exploration and production projects during the boom 
period, and in the resulting bust are left with projects that may not be profitable. 
Temporalities are central to this; the commodities cycle is central to investment strategies 
by IOCs, but they also have to interact with local and national forms of organising time, be it 
through electoral cycles, or changing short to medium term resources strategies and 
development agendas.   
This leads to the second reason behind this thesis’ relevance: the rise of greater state 
intervention in extractive resources in the global south, often decried as ‘resource 
nationalism’. As will be shown in the next chapter, current theories on resource nationalism 
suggests that states engage with the practise during times of high commodity prices and 
when the infrastructures to extract and export hydrocarbons are established. Yet Tanzania 
has neither the established infrastructure nor is it pursuing resource nationalist policies 
during a time of high prices, in fact it is the opposite. This suggests that the older literature 
on the subject is inadequate to explain why this is the case.  
The third aspect of this thesis’ relevance relates to the lack of theoretical 
understanding of how time is understood, changes, and is utilised by different actors in the 
hydrocarbon sector. Empirically, this lack of insight currently limits the understanding of 
motivations of actors from a temporal perspective. This is in both in terms of actions caused 
by the temporalities of extraction, such as boom and bust cycles, and perceptions of time, 
either from the past or future. As it will be shown in the literature review later in this thesis, 















































































































Figure 5: Annual Natural Gas Price per MMBTU in Dollars, 2000-2019 (IMF, 2019). 
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Limbert, 2008; Weszkalnys, 2014), however there are still considerable gaps in the literature 
that could greatly enhance the social and political understandings of extraction.  
The initial discovery of natural gas in Tanzania and resulting political promises, 
combined with the high prices during that time, created great expectations of wealth in the 
country (Bugane, 2016; Polus and Tycholiz, 2019). However, at the time of writing, the gas 
sector has seen little movement in the projects with the highest capital investment or export 
capability; while the onshore sector is currently producing gas for the domestic market, the 
offshore sector, where there is the largest potential for resource wealth through export, has 
not progressed sufficiently since 2015. Indeed, it is regressed, with major oil companies such 
as Petrobras, and now, ExxonMobil, looking to leave the sector completely (Reuters, 2018a). 
This, combined with the research questions mentioned above, provides fertile ground for the 
study of how extractive temporalities interact with the political economy of varying spatial 
scales, and how they have been used and affect operations both at the boardroom and local 
level. 
4 Chapter Breakdown 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters, two of which are this introduction and the 
conclusion, literature review, methodology, and five of which are empirically and analytically 
focused. The research chapters of this thesis are structured spatially. The first two research-
focused chapters start with the local level in Mtwara, the region with gas deposits and used 
as the main port for offshore exploration. It explores how the promises of natural gas wealth 
changed expectations and actions accordingly, and the fallout after it became apparent that 
the projected resource boom would not happen, and the imagined future of an economically 
developed Mtwara did not come to fruition. It will then move on to a more national level 
focus, highlighting how contrasting strategies and imaginaries between the government and 
IOCs have created considerable frictions between the actors. It is worth noting that this thesis 
does not treat businesses, both national and international, as monolithic, and it will show 
that there have also been divisions between businesses over how to progress the 
hydrocarbon sector.  
The second chapter is a review of the literature on extraction and temporalities. The 
purpose of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it provides an outline of the theoretical tools that 
underpin this thesis, as well as providing an in-depth discussion of the core themes of this 
thesis: time, development, and resource governance. Secondly, it discusses developments 
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and debates in extractive literature, specifically resource geography literature, and which 
gaps in the literature this thesis seeks to fulfil. While the discipline of this thesis is resource 
geography, it looks to take advantage of the interdisciplinary nature of scholarly 
engagements with extraction. Debates around anthropology and political economy of 
extraction in particular are examined. It highlights how temporalities have often been 
neglected for space, and how the lack of understanding of time has limited current academic 
engagements with extraction.  
Chapter three focuses on the methodology of this thesis. It covers the practical 
aspects of this study, such as obtaining access and data collection, as well as how events and 
other factors shaped data collection. This includes discussions on positionality, research 
assistants and unexpected events that occurred during fieldwork in Tanzania. It also explores 
a methodological issue that is currently lacking discussion in methods literature: the stresses 
and unexpected consequences that fieldwork can have on mental health.  
The first empirical chapter focuses on the Mtwara gas industry, and how the 
introduction of the gas sector dramatically changed expectations of the local population 
there. It seeks to fill a literature gap by highlighting the roles infrastructures play both in the 
construction and evolution of resource nationalism. It argues that the introduction of the gas 
sector to a region that has typically been disregarded by colonial and post-colonial 
governments, combined with political promises made in the 2010 general election, raised 
both expectations and the pace of development. The construction of a resource sub-
nationalism formed in Mtwara based on both grievances and expectations. However, the 
construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline provoked considerable protests and riots 
and resulted in a crackdown by the government. The construction of the pipeline, combined 
with the lack of perceived progress of socio-economic development in the region, in both 
frustrations in the local population, and a shift away in perceptions of what hydrocarbons 
could bring. In this respect, this chapter does not just engage with the material realities of 
the gas sector, but also the imagined futures that preceded the pipeline, and how it evolved 
once it had been constructed. This chapter has been edited and submitted to the Journal of 
Southern African Studies as a part of a special issue on resource nationalism in Southern 
Africa. It has been reviewed but, at the time of writing, has yet to be resubmitted with 
revisions. 
Chapter five engages with the introduction of international temporalities and how 
these interact with the global energy landscape. Focusing on Mtwara, it argues that the 
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boom-and-bust cycle has changed Mtwara from an economic periphery to an ‘extractive 
frontier’, not just for international investment, but also for domestic capital. The change of 
Mtwara to a frontier for extractive capital investment also introduced the region to the most 
dominant temporality in the hydrocarbon sector, the volatile boom and bust cycle. It argues 
many of the long-lasting changes occurred due to the changes in Tanzanian perception of 
Mtwara. This boom was further propped up by the exploration and construction phase of the 
gas well lifecycle, which is traditionally the most labour- and capital-intensive part of the 
lifecycle. The drop in gas prices resulted in an economic slowdown of the region, in turn 
changing once again the perception and status of Mtwara as a ‘frontier’.  
Chapter six focuses on the temporalities behind hydrocarbon megaprojects in East 
Africa. It focuses on two projects: The LNG project, based in Lindi, and EACOP, which is a 
planned pipeline to connect the oilfields in Homia, Uganda, to Tanga for international export. 
While both projects have the possibility to bring substantial amounts of capital to the 
country, both have stalled. This chapter focuses on the conflicting strategies of actors and 
various extractive and electoral cycles. The reasons for this are both national and 
international, and the contrasting long term strategies between actors involved in the 
projects have led to lengthy negotiations.  
Chapter seven follows on the discussion into infrastructures by examining the spatio-
temporalities of the implementation of local content policies for EACOP by the Tanzanian 
government. Costing $3.5 billion and spanning Uganda and Tanzania, the pipeline is one of 
the largest cross-border infrastructure projects in the history of East Africa and has presented 
both countries an opportunity to enhance local content policies in the hydrocarbon sector. It 
has also presented a unique project to study the temporalities of local content. With the 
majority of investment expected to occur in the construction phase that is estimated to be 
completed in two to three years, there appears to be a short term ‘window of opportunity’ 
for companies and labour alike to participate. This chapter argues that the temporary nature 
of EACOP resulted in the construction of urgencies to establish a comprehensive local 
content sector. The result of this is one of multiple paces, and a division on what local content 
entails based on geography. Significant portions of this chapter have been converted into a 
journal article for The Extractives Industry and Society (see Barlow, 2020).  
The penultimate chapter explores the recent legal changes that have occurred in the 
Tanzanian petroleum sector since 2015, and its impact on the offshore portion of the gas 
industry. These changes, decried as ‘resource nationalism’ by pro-market opponents, have 
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been conducted in an attempt to control the pace of development in the sector. It argues 
that time, in this case, in the form of delay, has been used by the government to attempt to 
obtain greater revenues from the sector. Central to this has been the gas well lifecycle, and 
how the transition of exploration to production has been stifled with these legal changes. 
This chapter seeks to highlight the flaws of current pro-market resource nationalism theories, 
particularly OBM, and how they fail to consider domestic pressures and drivers for such 
policies.  
Chapter nine concludes. It seeks to bring the arguments presented in the previous 
chapters to present the findings to the research questions mentioned above. It also seeks to 
highlight some of the limitations of this study, from both methodological limitations, as well 
as events that have happened after fieldwork that have altered some of the findings of this 




Chapter II: The Temporalities of Extraction 
1 Introduction 
Time is an ever-present way of organising life. Be it daily routines, annual events like 
Christmas, or quadrennial events such as the Olympics, the organisation of time provides 
structure and routine to individuals and societies alike. Time is ever-present and 
homogenous across all actors and all spatial scales. With this, time has also tended to be 
treated as the background to social science research, whereby time acts as a ‘Newtonian grid 
in which social processes are determined by variables that act upon each other by a smooth, 
predictable, gradual, and linear social gravity’ (Sewell, 2008: 517). However, while time is 
homogenous across all actors, the perception of time is multifaceted. Yet, it has not been 
treated as such, discounting how various, and as this thesis will demonstrate, sometimes 
competing, time horizons, cycles, rhythms and perceptions of the past and future influence 
actions, motivations, and perceptions of actors.  
Resource extraction comes with distinctive multiple temporalities, including a variety 
of pauses, rhythms, and speeds that interact at different spatial levels (D’Angelo and Pijpers, 
2018). This can be at the global level, with commodities markets dominating actions of states 
and MNCs alike, and at the local level with a gas well’s production lifecycle impacting 
communities near extraction. These are infused with the effects of time, such as hope, 
expectations, dread, and nostalgia, and can differ within individuals and across class lines 
(Ferry and Limbert, 2008). However, as it will be shown, time has often taken a back seat to 
space as a central mode of analysis of the political, economic, and social implications of 
natural resource extraction.   
This literature review focuses on resource extraction as a whole, rather than just on 
the hydrocarbon sector or natural gas extraction. Whilst oil has unique effects on the political 
economy of a state, in that it generates unique social structures (Watts, 2008), unique 
political effects (Ross, 2001) and unique temporalities (Weszkalnys, 2014), the natural gas 
sector does not generate such strong effects on states and is seen as oil’s ‘little brother’ 
(Komlev, 2016: 95). While natural gas is a part of the hydrocarbon sector and involves the 
same, or similar actors, particularly in the private sector, it does not generate the same 
amount of revenues nor does it have the same geopolitical significance as oil. It also has a 
more regionalised market structure and a smaller (but growing) role in global energy supply 
(Bridge and Bradshaw, 2017). Furthermore, while literatures on mining, development and 
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temporality may have differences within the mode of extraction and the material sought, 
they offer valuable insights into how extraction influences, and is influenced by, temporalities 
across various spatial scales.  
This chapter argues that temporalities has been on the side-lines when conducting 
extractive geography research into extraction. However, this is not to say that it has been 
excluded wholeheartedly. Rather, temporalities and time have been included in analysis 
through the inclusion, and somewhat limited discussion, of temporalities of extraction, in 
particular the commodities cycle. As it will be shown, unlike resource geography, 
anthropology has explored the temporalities of extraction in greater detail. While this has 
aided our understanding of the social and political phenomenon of extraction, a more 
geographical focus would aid our understanding further.  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it highlights resource geographies 
limited engagement with time in an empirical sense, as well as provide definitions and 
outlines of themes that are central to this thesis. Some of these terms have been contested 
and require explanation of both their use and their origins and debates. Secondly, this 
chapter will engage with wider debates within natural resource literature, with a focus on 
literatures that have engaged with the temporalities of extraction. As it will be shown, much 
of the research exploring temporalities of extraction has come from anthropologists (e.g., 
Halvaksz, 2008; Pijpers, 2016). It has been anthropology that has explored the temporalities 
of extraction in greater detail. Rodgers (2015) identifies two broad themes which 
anthropologists have explored oil: temporalities and materialities. Both themes are central 
to this thesis.14 In this respect, this review is not limited to geographers, but rather how social 
scientists have looked to engage with natural resources. Because of this, this review is not 
limited to geographers, but rather how political geographers, anthropologists and political 
economists engage with temporalities and/or natural resource governance. This follows the 
multidisciplinary nature of natural resource literatures as a whole.  
The chapter is organised as follows: following on from this introduction will be a 
discussion on definitions and categorisations select terms which are central to this thesis 
utilise. It also discusses how time has been theorised in political geography. It places 
emphasis on how temporality has been neglected in geography. Section three discusses how 
the literature has explored resource governance, with a particular focus on the temporalities, 
 
14 Unlike temporalities, materialities does have a substantial discussion within geography and 
resource geography. This is discussed below.   
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either directly or indirectly discussed in neoliberal and resource nationalist resource 
governance. It also discusses the temporalities of the resource curse, highlighting both how 
it has progressed scholarly understanding but also its current limitations. It highlights how 
natural resources have been viewed as a vehicle of development, and many of the pitfalls, 
known as the multifaceted ‘resource curse’, that have affected many developing states. The 
chapter then moves onto wider discussions of temporalities and extraction, highlighting how 
select temporalities, such as shifting imaginaries of the future that come with extraction and 
the boom-and-bust cycle have been covered by political geographers, political economists, 
and anthropologists. Section five concludes and underlines the gaps in the literature that this 
thesis will look to contribute too. 
2 Definitions and Categorisations 
This thesis will engage with resource literature, particularly literature that engages with 
the politics behind resource nationalism and resource geography. Resource geography is 
‘positioned largely at the intersection of political ecology and political economy’ (Koch and 
Perreault, 2019: 616; see also, Bakker and Bridge, 2006, Bridge, 2014; Bridge and Le Billon, 
2013). In a broader sense, resource geography can be described as: 
‘linked to political geographies by concerns over territoriality and proprietorship, to economic geographies 
through networks of production and consumption, to social and cultural geographies by collective practice and 
meaning making, and to environmental geographies through the modification of natural systems’ (Rossiter, 
2010: 2446-2447). 
In this respect, the sub-discipline is wide ranging, with connections to other sub-
disciplines through the usage, control, and nature of natural resource extraction. While this 
thesis will look to use terminology associated with resource geography, it, much like other 
extractive literature, will also engage with resource issues arisen from other disciplines. 
Hence, while this thesis situates itself within the resource geography sub-discipline, it will 
also look to present other disciplines understanding of resource terminologies due to the 
interconnectedness of natural resource literature. Most notable of these are political 
economy and anthropology which will be expanded upon below.  
2.1 Geography and Time 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, temporality is defined as ‘the nature 
or structure of time, in terms of its objective existence, its subjective experience, or both, 
and particularly with respect to the relations among its dimensions (past, present, and 
future) and the way in which it passes’ (Widder, 2010). It is worth emphasising that while 
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time and temporality are similar, there are some important differences between the two 
terms, and academic geographers have not expressed the differences between these terms 
clearly (Mayhew, 2009). Time is measurable and ever present, and this contrasts with 
temporality, which is more concerned with how the sequence of time is experienced or 
perceived (Mayhew, 2009). In essence, time that passes are constant for states and societies, 
but the perception of how that time passes is different.  
These differences between time and temporality are vital when in conjunction with 
a discussion of space. Space is the ‘fundamental stuff of human geography’ (Thrift, 2008), 
and while temporality and time is central to this thesis, this is often done alongside a 
discussion of space. As with the definition of time above, time is the same across different 
spatial scales. The scales this study primarily use is the local, the national, and the global. 
These have been contested terms (Herod, 2010). For this thesis, the local will often refer to 
the local city or village (the cities of Tanga and Mtwara, or the villages surrounding Mtwara 
city), the national will focus on the nation of Tanzania and the global will focus on MNCs and 
markets.  
Temporality has been neglected by geography due to the ‘spatial imperialism’ 
experienced in the discipline (May and Thrift, 2001: 2). The writings of Kant, who separated 
time and space, history and geography, exerted a strong influence of a mind-set that 
geography should be concerned with space rather than time (Merriman, 2012). 
Contemporary geographic literatures rarely explore time or temporality as a part of their 
spatial analysis.  
David Harvey offers one of the most substantive attempts at understanding the 
interaction of space and time in capitalism through time-space compression (Harvey, 1989). 
Harvey approaches through a constructivist lens, viewing space and time as basic categories 
of human existence, and they are ‘both social and objective’ (Harvey, 1990: 442). Following 
on from Marx’s ‘annihilation of space by time’ concept, time-space compression occurs as a 
result in technological innovations, such as improvements in transport and communication, 
allowing for a restructuring of space and time (Harvey, 1989). In essence, technological 
innovations, specifically during the pre-WWI period and the end of the twentieth century, 
where technological innovation oversaw a significant acceleration in the pace of life, 
whereby the space was ‘reduced’ through technology, and both space and time has been 
compressed. A good example of this is the telegram and the internet, which has resulted in 
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less time required to communicate across greater distances. This has entered popular lexicon 
with phrases like the ‘world is getting smaller’.  
However, time-space compression lacks a systematic approach to time, with no 
agreed upon concept of temporality that could be built upon (Castree, 2009). Massey (1992) 
critiqued the idea of ‘time-space’ compression for exclusive concentration on the power of 
capital which results in the neglect of other factors, such as ethnicity or gender, that can also 
dominate the experience of ‘time-space’ in capitalism. Instead, she uses ‘power geometry’ 
as the metaphor to see certain flows of economic, gender and ethnic power in relation to 
which social groups are differentially located.  
Since the mid-1990s, time has slowly been ‘banished’ from geography (Latham, 
2011: 315). A focus on time has been intermittent but has focused on different scales such 
as the local in everyday life, to the international scale on topics such as geopolitics (Kilnke, 
2013). Although some geographers, such as Merriman (2012) argue that geography has an 
‘obsession’ with time-space, the reality is that it has been the opposite, whereby, for the 
majority of geographical literature, time is used in the background for spatial analysis. 
Contemporary theorisations of time and space in geography share the following features: the 
integration of time and space; the co-production of time and space; the unruliness of time-
space; and the porousness of time-space (Gregory, 2009: 709). The final two features 
highlight the difficulty of both empirically and theoretically engaging with time (Lefebvre, 
2004). It highlights the difficulty to conceptualise time, as well as contain it within a single 
theoretical framework.  
This thesis also follows these features of time and space to explore some of the 
multitudes of temporality that has been exhibited. However, with respect to time, it does not 
reproduce some of the strong constructivist views expressed by the authors above. A part of 
this has been due to the interchangeability of the terms time and temporality have 
traditionally had in geography. For this study, time, for all intents and purposes, is 
unchangeable through human interaction. Conversely, temporality, or the perception of 
time, can be changed and influenced by outside actors. The chief form of temporality this 
study focuses on is the temporalities of capital; it will highlight how international 
temporalities of the hydrocarbon sector have interacted with the domestic political drivers 
at different scales.  
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2.2 Materialities and Imaginaries 
The central themes to this thesis are natural resource temporalities and their 
interaction with state and non-state actors, with a focus on resource nationalism. It is noted 
that the term ‘resources’ can be viewed as ‘troubled term’ (Bridge, 2014: 119). ‘Natural 
resources’ as a term has been contested. The discussion of what constitutes a resource has 
been central to discussions of materialities (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This has often 
centred around the level of social interactions and what is considered a resource. ‘Realists’ 
understand resources are something that does not change. For example, Barbier, a resource 
economist, views resources as ‘fixed endowments’ that are ‘provided in varying amounts 
freely by nature and geology, and that are distributed randomly across regions and countries’ 
(Barbier, 2011: 6). In this instance, natural resources are static, not just in location, but in 
terms of materiality.  
Despite the claim by Barbier that resources are static endowments, social interactions 
with the material of natural resources have occurred since antiquity (Schoenberger, 2011). 
Critical geographers challenged the realist position, instead viewing resources as something 
which are created through social processes. An early example of this comes from 
Zimmerman, who argues that resources are relative through both the demands of society, 
and people’s ability to exploit the environment. For Zimmerman, the physical structure or 
chemical composition of a mineral are not enough to classify something as a resource, but 
rather it becomes a resource due to the mineral possessing a specific function and society 
having the power to utilise it in an achievable manner (Zimmermann, 1933). In essence, 
‘resources are not, they become’ (Zimmerman, 1933).  
The question of whether nature is transformed into a resource depends on the social 
needs and practises in society at that given time (Harvey, 1996). In this respect, demands 
from the ‘economy’ is central to the conversion of natural resources into commodities, and 
these transformations are full of contradictions and paradoxes (Bridge, 2009). Discussions of 
materialities has extended be a critique to the ‘resource curse’ thesis, which has traditionally 
seen natural resources as money, and highlight how resources can shape other forms of the 
curse, such as conflict (Le Billon, 2001). 
The view that social interactions and demands shape what natural resources are has 
also been shared by anthropologists, who (unsurprisingly) place people central to the 
discussion of what makes a resource. For example, Ferry and Limbert define resources as 
‘objects and substances produced from ‘nature’ for human enrichment and use’ (2008: 3). 
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This has not been limited to just materials extracted from the ground, but also knowledge, 
diversity, and documents. In essence, materialities are ‘a series of arrangements of 
substances, technologies, discourses, and practises deployed by different kinds of actors’ 
(Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014: 16).  
Alongside materialities of natural resources, this thesis focuses on imaginaries. 
Specifically, two forms of imaginaries: resource imaginaries and nationalism. Imaginaries play 
a core part of the construction of nationalism and the blending of ideology and territory has 
made geographical research into nationalism a fertile field (e.g., Knight, 1982; Penrose, 2002; 
Murphy, 2010). The ideology of nationalism is intrinsically tied to imaginaries and territory.  
Within human geography, imaginaries have primarily been used as an analytical tool 
to research how territory and place have been utilized to construct a discourse of a ‘nation’, 
with a particular focus on territory. This has both been researched internally and externally; 
looking at the ways nationalism is constructed and reinforced internally within the state, 
Benedict Anderson (1983), proposed the concept of ‘imagined communities’. Anderson’s 
argument rests on the fact that at the heart of any nation is a sense of nationalism which is 
imagined or constructed, with members that have never met one another before sharing the 
common image of the nation that has been bounded through mass communication and 
language. This image both binds the community within the state and territory and excludes 
others. One of the core conceptualisations of contemporary research on imaginaries has 
been the acknowledgement of multiple temporalities that can exist within them (Gaonkar, 
2002). 
The materialities of resources in turn have shaped the imaginaries of what resources 
can do for states and communities alike. These resource imaginaries have often been 
interlinked with temporalities, either directly or indirectly: as Ferry and Limbert discuss, 
resources, be it natural or otherwise, can frame time in either the past, present, or future in 
certain ways. This can be best seen at the national level, with the creation of a glorified past, 
in the form of origin myths (Ferry and Limbert, 2008) and tempering expectations of the 
future without resource revenues (Limbert, 2008). Resource imaginaries can shape visions of 
the future for economic development, as Childs and Hearn (2017) argue that in Ecuador and 
Ghana, natural resource use for national development has been utilised for a long-term 
development vision for the former, and the latter has used the past to legitimise the nation 
building project and nationally controlled resources. This is also seen in lithium mining in 
Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, whereby utilising lithium beyond export in science, technology 
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and new industries has created a sociotechnical imaginary to create a wealthier and more 
prosperous nation (Barandiarán, 2019). These materialities have also led to constraints of the 
imaginaries of what natural resources can provide (Kohl and Farthing, 2012).  
Infrastructures are often included in discussions of natural resource materialities and 
imaginaries. In the case of hydrocarbons, there has been a considerable amount of research 
on hydrocarbon infrastructures and their socio-economic effects. Infrastructures are ‘built 
networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over 
space’ (Larkin, 2013: 328). Yet they are often more than the sum of their parts, and can hold 
sovereign, or symbolic meaning and are often closely tied to questions of identity and 
nationhood (Lahiri-Dutt, 2014). At their core, infrastructures facilitate imaginaries and 
materialities ‘at scales greater than their elements’ (Boyer, 2017: 174). In the case of oil and 
gas, the associated infrastructures have been noted for their social and economic 
interactions with the state (e.g., Barry, 2013).  
Mitchell’s seminal book Carbon Democracy (2011) is one such example; the core of 
the thesis lies that the materiality of the resource has influenced the infrastructures created 
around them. For example, coal is a big, heavy rock that must be dug up from the ground, 
and during the industrial revolution had to be transported by train. Mitchell argues that the 
materiality of coal, and the accompanying infrastructures required to accommodate its 
materiality, were instrumental to the progression of democracy and labour rights. This is due 
to the fact that the labour intensiveness of the coal mining allowed for strategic chokepoints, 
like mines, railways, and dockyards, which if strike action were held, would cripple the energy 
infrastructures of the nation. This contrasts with the supply chains of oil. Being a viscous 
liquid that is pumped out of the ground using machinery and often transported across the 
world through pipelines, refineries, and large tankers, has ensured that the industry lacks the 
reliance on labour as seen with the coal industry, with less vulnerabilities to both the state 
and capital from labour action. The core of Michell’s work is the way that materialities, which 
have influenced infrastructures, which have in turn influenced social processes, chiefly the 
democratic and labour forces.  
In this respect, while the definition of a natural resource has been contested, it 
ultimately rests on the social use and demand of a material that makes it a resource. The 
materiality of natural resources in turn fuel imaginaries of what that resource can do for a 
nation’s economic development. As shown above, these resource imaginaries can alter the 
temporalities of both the past and the future. Furthermore, this materiality is not just limited 
39 
 
to the resource itself, but also accompanying infrastructures that are required to extract and 
transport the resource to markets.  
2.3 Resource Nationalism and Local Content 
Discussions in this thesis centre around increased increase state intervention in the 
Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector, often described as ‘resource nationalism’. For Tanzania, one 
of the justifications for these policies has been that there has been a lack of economic 
development that country has had from extraction (Poncian, 2019b). When discussing 
development within this thesis, it is often in the form of economic development. Economic 
development has traditionally been ill-defined, and ‘has meant all things to all men and 
women’ (Arndt, 1989:6), and should not be confused as simply economic growth (Feldman 
and Storper, 2018).  
This thesis understands economic development as ‘activities that expand capacities 
to realise the potential of individuals, firms, or communities who contribute to the 
advancement of society through the responsible production of goods and services’ (Feldman 
et al, 2016: 18). As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, this thesis focuses on the 
‘immanent’ process of development, whereby development occurs as a penetration of 
capitalism. This is particularly applicable to the Tanzanian context, as this thesis, whose 
strategies in the hydrocarbon sector have attempted to expand the wider economy through 
greater ties and training with international firms.  
Renewed focus on resource nationalism has provided a variety of definitions for, and 
characterisations of the term. Often this term has been used to stigmatise policies that are a 
threat to extractive and neoliberal interests. One of the major issues of pro-market resource 
nationalism has been the lack of attention to nationalism in resource nationalism. Instead, 
the term has been used for a ‘descriptive value’ with ‘little analytical purchase’ (Pryke, 2017: 
474), particularly by pro-business press to bring attention to state intervention in the 
extractive industries. Here geographers and development studies scholars have looked to 
place more emphasis on the nationalism aspect of the term, as well as explore the internal 
drivers and factors that aid in the construction of resource nationalisms (e.g., Childs, 2016; 
Koch and Perreault, 2019).  
The multitudes of definitions have often reflected the interests of organisations or 
authors. For example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development has 
defined resource nationalism as ‘anti-competitive behaviour designed to restrict the 
international supply of a natural resource’ (DFID, 2014b: 2). A definition that emphasises the 
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negative effects of resource nationalism on international markets is hardly surprising from a 
UK government department that which is a heavy importer of natural resources and a strong 
proponent of free markets.  
Other developmental agencies have been hostile to resource nationalism; writing for 
the International Institute for Environment and Development, Ward (2009) looks to place 
resource nationalism as the antithesis of economic liberalisation, going so far as to label 
resource nationalism as ‘resource privatism’. Within academia, Stevens (2008), has 
continued this pro-investment stance, stating that resource nationalism has two 
components: the limiting of the operations of private IOCs, and asserting a greater national 
control over natural resource development. What these definitions all have in common is a 
focus on the negative aspects of resource nationalism for international corporations and 
economic liberalism. They look to present the core of resource nationalism as being hostile 
to foreign, particularly western, capital.  
Among other definitions the most simplistic definition comes from the International 
Energy Forum (2006), which defines resource nationalism as ‘nations wanting to make the 
most of their endowment’. It is worth noting that the IEF contains OPEC member states, and 
Russia and China, states that have participated in resource nationalistic policies. Offering an 
African definition, the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy has defined 
resource nationalism as:  
‘The desire of the people of resource-rich countries to derive more economic benefit from their natural 
resources and the resolution of their governments to concomitantly exercise greater control of the country’s 
natural resource sectors’ (Soloman, 2012). 
What is noticeable about this definition is the inclusion of a greater share of resource 
wealth for the general populace. This is a common complaint in southern African countries 
such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, where calls for the indigenisation of the mining industry 
have occurred against settler colonialism (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013). Current definitions 
by actors in the global north, therefore, have been shaped by the negative effects these 
policies have on investment. Conversely, the one African definition provided has been 
influenced by unique processes, such as indigenisation, that may not be applicable to a wider 
global definition.  
Critical scholars have examined resource nationalism in a different manner than pro-
business interests. Such scholars have argued that rather than a rapid change, resource 
nationalism continues some of the characteristics of neoliberal extraction. Resource 
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nationalism is a post-neoliberal development model which ‘retain(s) elements of the 
previous export-led growth model whilst introducing new mechanisms for social inclusion 
and welfare’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 1). In this respect, modern day resource 
nationalism does not seek to replace the roles of IOCs outright, but rather seek greater 
economic benefits from the sector. However, when disputes arise between extraction (either 
from the state or the private sector) or local communities, the government has traditionally 
looked to side with the former. This has led to some to view resource nationalism a 
continuation of ‘extractive imperialism’ (Veltmeyer, 2013).  
Resource nationalism has also undergone a recent categorisation process from scholars. 
Risk analysts Bremmer and Johnson (2009), argue there are four variants of resource 
nationalism: ‘revolutionary resource nationalism’, which contains the full nationalisation of 
a resource industry; ‘economic resource nationalism’, where states look to negotiate a larger 
share of revenues from IOCs; ‘legacy resource nationalism’ whereby states that have typically 
had an historical connection to resources; and ‘soft resource nationalism’, which, the authors 
argue, is similar to economic resource nationalism, but ambiguously claims that these states 
avoid ‘arbitrary tactics’ (Bremmer and Johnson, 2009: 152). It is worth noting that Bremmer 
and Johnson put western countries in this category, providing a clear geographical distinction 
of ‘soft’ resource nationalisms of the global north, and the ‘hard’ resource nationalism of the 
global south.  
The definition of ‘hard’ resource nationalism in contemporary times is similar in some 
respects to the resource nationalism seen during the 1960s and 1970s with the 
nationalisation of extractive industries, particularly oil operations.  With a few exceptions 
(e.g., Venezuela and Bolivia. For a comparison study, see Koivumaeki, 2015), state 
intervention in the extractive sectors has been more modest. Alongside nationalisation, 
‘hard’ resource nationalism has been viewed seen in the cancellation of existing contracts or 
stringent demands in negotiations. ‘Soft’ resource nationalism is more nuanced, and includes 
political strategies that comprise changes to regulation, tax increases and restrictions on 
exports, and can be found throughout the world. This has led to a balanced debate on the 
role of resource nationalism in states such as Canada and Australia (Bremmer and Johnson, 
2009; Wilson, 2011). The same balance to the debate on resource nationalism in the global 
south, particularly within Africa, is lacking. With the exception of South Africa (Andreasson, 
2015), there has been little reference to potential ‘soft’ resource nationalisms in Africa. 
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Wilson (2015) adds greater political context into his categorisation, acknowledging 
that resource nationalism is not just an economic strategy to increase benefits, but also a 
political strategy to strengthen a governments support and power. Wilson separates 
resource nationalism into rentier resource nationalism, developmental resource nationalism 
and market-based resource nationalism. This categorisation has allowed for a more effective 
separation of the motives of developing states that look to pursue resource nationalism into 
rentier resource nationalism and developmental resource nationalism. This allows for a 
greater understanding of the motivations behind such policies when compared to Bremmer 
and Johnson’s (2009) categorisation. This categorisation has allowed for a more effective 
separation of the motives of the governments that look to pursue such policies. However, in 
the survey of twelve states that forms the empirical underpinning of Wilson’s research, only 
one African country, Guinea, is represented. 
These categorisations allow for a more nuanced understanding of the motivations of 
resource nationalist policies. However, they still lack an understanding of the drivers that 
push governments to pursue such policies. For example, Wilson’s (2015) categorisations 
allow for a visibility of the goals of the policies, but not the internal power structures that 
push the government towards a certain policy, either for developmental reasons or survival.   
Alongside the broader policies of resource nationalism has been the introduction of local 
content into the extractives sector. A part of the difficulty in exploring the locality of local 
content is that the ‘local’ is rarely defined or treated as synonymous with the national. Adding 
to this issue is the fact that defining local content has not been a simple task (Tordo et al, 
2013). The Financial Times (2019a) has provided a rather simple definition where local 
content is ‘[w]hen a foreign company makes products in a country, the materials, parts etc. 
that have been made in that country rather than imported.’ Focusing more on the 
developmental potential of local content policies, the World Bank (2016), defines local 
content as the ‘aim to leverage the extractive value chain to generate sustained and inclusive 
growth through economic diversification and employment opportunities.’ What these 
definitions have in common is the focus on the interaction between the national state and 
the international corporation. In this respect, the local is synonymous with the national, with 
the focus of the definition emphasizing the restrictions on importing goods and services, 
rather than the limits and provisions of the ‘local’. While these definitions provide some 
insight into what local content can do, they undersell the wide-ranging aims local content 
policies have. This has been highlighted by Nwapi, who understands that local content 
policies are:  
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‘Undertaken to reduce inequalities faced by domestic companies in relation to foreign companies, increase the 
participation of the national industry in specific sectors of economic activity, improve national technological 
development, create job opportunities for nationals to improve their personal income, support economic 
diversification, promote intersectoral linkages and reduce overdependence on one sector by enhancing the 
value-creating capacity of a particular sector, and to enable domestic companies to compete regionally and 
internationally.’ (Nwapi, 2015: 191). 
While not a definition per se, it nevertheless highlights the comprehensive scope of local 
content policies, particularly when compared to the other definitions of local content 
presented in this thesis.  
3 Temporalities of Resource Governance 
Literature on the extractive industries has tended to focus on the spatial (e.g., Ferguson, 
2005). The focus on the spatial of mineral and hydrocarbon extraction has been across 
disciplines and methodologies. On the one hand, this is logical; unlike other economic 
activities such as agriculture15 or manufacturing or factors of production such as labour and 
capital, mineral and hydrocarbon extraction is spatially fixed. While control of these mineral 
and hydrocarbon resources can be contested between capital and states (Capps, 2012), the 
location of minerals and hydrocarbon themselves are not. Space has become a defining 
theme of extractives literature, and as this section will demonstrate, literature utilising a 
spatial focus on extractives has resulted in fruitful engagements with how natural resources 
interact with social processes across different spatial scales. The growth of literature focusing 
on extractives has been tied to the growth of the extractive industries itself (Bebbington et 
al, 2013), and thus, there has been greater research on natural resources during the 
commodities super cycle of 2000 to 2014.  
3.1 SAPs, ‘Good Governance’ and the Resource Curse 
In 1973, OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo targeting nations that were supporting Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War. While not the intended targets for the oil embargo, the rise in 
oil prices ‘severely imbalanced their international payments accounts, knocked African 
development plans out of their traditional moorings, and nearly drowned the new states in 
a sea of debts’ (Johnson and Wilson, 1982: 211). In Africa, the long-term economic result of 
the oil crisis was, that by the 1980s and 1990s, many states approached the Bretton Woods 
 
15 This refers the transport of seeds that can be grown in the right conditions regardless of its original 
source. Take for example sugarcane, which originally came from South-East Asia, is now grown 
across tropical regions in Africa, South America, and the Caribbean. This cannot happen with 
hydrocarbons and minerals; they are spatially fixed.   
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institutions for loans to bailout their economies. These policies added considerable 
neoliberal conditionalities, which included liberalisation of trade, privatisation, and reduction 
of barriers to foreign investment. An overall reduction in the state, which had become vilified 
in Africa (Mkandawire, 2001), was the goal of these policies in the hope that this would allow 
for increased investment, production, and trade to boost the long-term health of the 
recipient countries economy (Stiglitz, 2002).  
The extractive industries were central to these policies. Neoliberal reforms of mining 
legislation mirrored wider policies of low tax regimes to encourage foreign investment, 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises in the hope to attract greater FDI (Emel and Huber, 
2008). Weakening states bargaining power further with international extractive companies 
was the fact that these changes were conducted in the background of low commodity prices 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Coinciding with SAPs in the 1990s was an increased discussion of the poor economic 
performance of resource abundant states. First termed by Auty (1993), the ‘resource curse’, 
explores the lack of success natural resource extraction has had for economic development. 
The resource curse appears to be paradoxical in nature. Le Billon (2005) has highlighted five 
central characteristics of the curse: poor economic growth, low standards of living, an 
increased risk of civil war, high levels of corruption and authoritarianism. Discussions and 
debates over the resource cruse have become a mainstay for extractives literature. The core 
argument of the curse rests on the fact that developing countries well-endowed with mineral 
resources perform poorly when compared to similar countries that lack natural resources. 
While it started out as an economic theory (Auty, 1993; 1994), the resource curse soon 
expanded into explaining socio-political issues, such as explaining democratic deficits (Ross, 
2001) and increased chances of violent conflict and separatism (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).16  
The resource curse also has become a mainstay for many development agencies (e.g., 
Overseas Development Institute, 2006; Oxfam, 2009). This was particularly evident during 
discussions of governance (Mehlum et al, 2006). It has now become customary that if 
developing nations discover natural resource deposits, that it will come with warnings from 
western development agencies (e.g., Oxfam, 2009), multilateral agencies (e.g., IMF, 2018), 
and the popular press (e.g., The Guardian, 2013), of the potential for the resource curse to 
 
16 This has also been incorporated into another debate over the origins of civil conflict: the greed vs 
grievance debate. As the origins of civil wars are not covered within this thesis, there is insignificant 
space for a discussion in this thesis of the debate. For an overview, see Collier and Hoeffler (2005), 
and Keen (2012).    
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manifest. This has been particularly true for hydrocarbons. Central to this has been the way 
that natural resources enhance opportunities for corruption (Busse and Gröning, 2013), as 
well as the inability of a state’s civil service to handle fiscal booms that come with the sector 
(Tornell and Lane, 1999).  
There is a general consensus that oil has both eroded the state yet it was also ensured 
its survival; in a substantive study of the effect oil has had on the Gulf of Guinea region, 
Soares De Oliveira (2007a), has argued that oil, has hollowed out the state to the point of 
failure, and has only persisted because of hydrocarbons This argument is also prevalent at a 
national scale in the Gulf of Guinea, with similar arguments being made about Angola (Soares 
de Oliveira, 2007b), Nigeria (Watts, 2004) and Equatorial Guinea (McSherry, 2006). Oil has 
come under special scrutiny due to its apparent effects on state and society (e.g., Le Billon, 
2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Watts, 2009). This work, both from a geographical and 
political economy perspective, has often focused on the violence and the ‘unending crises of 
petro-states in Africa’ (Soares de Oliveira, 2007a: 61). As mentioned in the introduction of 
this thesis, using the resource curse framework, Ross (2001), has argued that oil uniquely 
shapes governments by the way of three casual mechanisms: a rentier, repression and an 
(anti) modernisation effect which obstructs democracy and contracts non-oil parts of the 
economy.  
As highlighted above, the resource curse has chiefly focused on governance issues, with 
little discussion of temporality. One such example of the incorporation of temporality into 
the resource curse has been through the speculation over the potential existence of natural 
resources. This is because resources can also produce imaginaries of the future and alter and 
shape behaviours of actors in response to the speculation. Frynas et al (2017) argues that 
both São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) and Madagascar have displayed effects of the resource 
curse, chiefly regarding economic and governance issues, even though neither country is a 
significant mineral exporter.17 Aiding Frynas et al’s analysis has been research conducted by 
Behrends (2008), who has argued that prospects of oil, that have not yet been confirmed, 
have fuelled conflicts on the Chadian-Sudanese border.   
Gisa Weszkalnys work on temporalities in the hydrocarbon section in STP hydrocarbon 
sector demonstrates the most consistent and strongest work on how the potential of oil has 
shaped the temporalities of the both the state and society (e.g., Weszkalnys, 2016). In 
 
17 STP still does not produce or export oil, while Madagascar does provide some form of mineral 
export, particularly in gemstones.  
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general, Weszkalnys work has focused on the creation of different imaginaries of the future. 
It has highlighted the frictions created between differing imaginaries; on the one hand, there 
is the concept of a financial windfall created from the materialities of oil and the world 
markets that enable it, on the other hand, there has been attempts by both governments 
and NGOs to both warn about and counter the resource curse. Both these issues have 
created differing imagined futures, and these have differed across class lines, with the former 
imaginary amongst the STP working class and the latter found with the STP middle class.18   
Much like Tanzania, STP has been awaiting the arrival of oil production, but unlike 
Tanzania, the country has yet to discover considerable hydrocarbon deposits and is currently 
not producing any oil or gas for international export or domestic consumption. The lack of 
success towards ‘first oil’ has led to ‘pauses’ and ‘gestures’ in the hydrocarbon sector, 
whereby technology, investment and exploration continues although little else is moving or 
found (Weszkalnys, 2015). This lack of production has created a temporal imaginary of both 
a future financial bonanza and a ‘not yet’ disaster (Weszkalnys, 2014). Attempts to manage 
these differing future imaginaries has come from initiative, projects, seminars, and 
workshops, and has led to a class divide, with the middle class viewing the delay of oil as a 
‘salvation’ (Weszkalnys, 2008: 480). This ‘not yet’ disaster has been created through concerns 
over the resource curse, which has emerged in various guises (Weszkalnys, 2011), and has 
been aided by the ability to differentiate between temporalities implied by waiting, 
speculation, and anticipation. Weszkalnys argues that the result of this is STPs future has 
largely been predetermined between two extremes of success and failure.  
The resource curse thesis has not been without criticism (e.g., Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2008). Chief among these has been the deterministic nature the theory has been applied, 
particularly to African states (Rosser, 2006). On the one hand, the focus on the negative 
effect’s extraction has brought upon African nations is not surprising, as resource abundant 
states such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria have seen considerable 
violence that was fuelled or funded by resources during the 1990s and 2000s (Frynas and 
Wood, 2001; Watts, 2004). Yet this predisposition to focus on the resource curse has affected 
the wider discourse on African extractives in other states. Critics of the resource curse thesis 
point to Botswana (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001), as an example where there is little evidence of 
 
18 Of course, both imagined futures could come true at the same time; oil producing states in Africa 
have both experienced financial windfalls but at the same time the majority of society has seen little 
material or financial benefit from it, instead suffering from the effects of the ‘resource curse’.  
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the curse. Meanwhile, Ghana has been used as an example of an African state that should be 
resilient to the resource curse (e.g., Kopinski et al, 2013; Heilbrunn, 2014).  
3.2 Resource Nationalism 
SAPs proved to be a failure in Africa (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000; Watts, 2006). Since the 
2000s, inspired by alternative developmental models from Latin America and Asia, there has 
been a paradigm shift towards an increase in state involvement in development (Gore, 2000; 
Hickey, 2013). This shift has also occurred in the extractive sector (e.g., Nwapi and Andrews, 
2017; Ovadia and Wolf, 2018; Saunders and Caramento, 2018). With rising commodity prices 
and dissatisfaction with the neoliberal extractive regimes, greater state involvement in the 
extractives sector, also known as ‘resource nationalism ’, has experienced a renaissance both 
within oil producing states and in academic study.  
The failures of SAPs to create substantial and widespread development, combined with 
new paradigms of development that involve greater state involvement and rising commodity 
prices during the ‘commodity super cycle’, has driven national governments both in Latin 
America and in Africa to increase their involvement in the extractive industries. This has 
coincided with political changes towards governments approach to development in the 
global south. Whilst contentious, many factors, such as the rise of China and the growth of 
national extractive industries, have contributed to this paradigm shift in development 
(Hickey, 2012). 
These new models of hydrocarbon governance have been described as ‘neo-
extractivism’ in Latin America (North and Grinspun, 2016) and ‘resource nationalism’ in Africa 
(Andreasson, 2015). While there has been a geographical separation of the term between 
Latin America and Africa, there are considerable similarities between the resource 
nationalism of the two continents; much of literature exploring resource nationalism has 
focused on Latin America (e.g., Veltmeyer, 2012; Burchardt and Dietz, 2014; Lyall and 
Valdivia, 2019), in particular Bolivia (e.g., Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Young, 2017; Laing, 
2020a).19 In Africa, resource nationalism has not taken on the character of the oil 
nationalisations of the 1960s and 1970s. Rather it has taken on more of a legalistic and 
 
19 The focus on Latin America has been due to the fact that the continent has seen privatisations of 
extractive assets in Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. The focus on Bolivia has been because there 
has been friction between President Evo Morales’ goals of nationalising resources for a distribution 
of wealth to the poorest in the country, and the goal of establishing a ‘plurinational’ state, where the 
state is supposedly indigenised, rather than the recognising indigenous peoples. While on paper the 
Bolivian state is supposedly supportive of indigenous rights, these rights have often been secondary 
when issues around extraction arise (e.g., Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Laing, 2020a).    
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contractual approach, with policies highly dependent on the national and regional context. 
Resource nationalism in Africa has been characterised by indigenisation programmes (e.g., 
Andreasson, 2010), local content requirements (e.g., Ovadia, 2016b; Hansen et al, 2016) and 
changes in extractive contracts, taxes, and royalties (e.g., Ward, 2009).  
Bolivia has been a prominent example within research into the interaction of natural 
resources and the state and focuses on narratives on the state’s relation with both the past 
and the future. Its history of mining of silver and tin during the colonial era has aided the 
construction of Bolivia as a ‘mining country’ in the present (Pellegrini, 2018). Today, gas has 
become the resource of note, and has become a core part of the country’s developmental 
discourse, becoming a magic bullet of sorts to the country’s problems (Perreault and 
Gabriela, 2010).   
Literature looking to explain the phenomena of resource nationalism has looked to 
either inadvertently, or deliberately, incorporate temporalities in their analyses. One of the 
most prevalent theories of resource nationalism has been Vernon’s OBM (1971). This model 
follows a linear model of extraction, whereby the power relations between states and MNCs 
differentiates over time. At the beginning of exploration and development of the sector, 
power is centred in MNCs due to the capital, technology and infrastructure required to 
extract, transport, and refine minerals and hydrocarbons. Over time, as infrastructure 
investment is made and cannot be moved, and state expertise in the sector is enhanced, this 
power shifts towards the government as MNCs become ‘hostages’ to state interests, 
particularly in developing countries (Vernon, 1977). This model has been described as the 
‘most accepted paradigm of host country – MNC relations in international political economy’ 
(Kobrin, 1987: 610), and has been utilised in contemporary resource nationalism research, 
particularly from a pro-market perspective (e.g., Stevens, 2008; Vivoda, 2009). However, the 
original model did not directly refer to rising commodity prices as a driver towards resource 
nationalism, neither did it include the ideological component behind the phenomenon 
(Pryke, 2017). 
Vernon’s work inadvertently undertakes a linier approach to temporality. It looks to 
present the fluctuations of power relations between the state and MNCs over the sector 
lifecycle over a period of time as the driver of resource nationalism. It utilises time in a 
deterministic fashion, suggesting that power changes in one direction over the lifecycle of 
the mines and wells present in the state. This discounts that the government may wish to 
attract more than one investor or repeat investment which many projects require. 
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Furthermore, the model excludes other actors from state-MNC relations, such as NGOs, local 
communities, and other states. Alongside this, technological developments in the sector, 
such as deep-water extraction, fracking, and extraction of ‘unconventional’ deposits of oil, 
chiefly tar sands, are primarily led by MNCs. Hence, while the model suggests a continuous 
and gradual change in power over time, such developments are not accounted for in OBM. 
Unlike Vernon’s OBM, Wilson’s petro-political cycle (1987) focuses on the politics 
behind the commodities cycle, with a particular focus on the price of oil. The petro-political 
cycle theorises that the politics behind oil directly corresponds to boom-and-bust phases of 
the market; at its core, the petro-political cycle suggests that when prices are high, sellers 
and governments gain leverage over IOCs, with the roles reversed when oil prices fall. For 
Wilson, the cyclical nature of the commodities market is central to understanding the power 
relationship between the host state and IOCs that operate in the country.  
Such a model of using market cycles has resurfaced during the commodities boom, 
and market cycles has seen as the dominant driver for the renaissance of state involvement 
in the extractives sector. This has often been combined with the OBM model, incorporating 
rising prices into the model’s original analysis (e.g., Wälde, 2008; Joffé et al, 2009). Pro-
market scholarship has argued that resource nationalism has come back into the fore 
because of high commodity prices, which also allows increased bargaining power of states as 
there is greater competition for deposits. Bremmer and Johnson (2009), for example, argue 
that resource nationalism in mineral and natural gas sectors will subside with declining 
commodity prices.  
The experiences of Tanzania in the gold and natural gas sector, suggest that this 
argument was premature. In a slightly different vein and taking a more balanced view, Katz-
Lavigne (2017) argues that with rising prices, a ‘renegotiation window’ had opened for 
African states to improve deals that had been made during the time of low commodity prices. 
Once again, the cyclical nature of commodity prices is central to this analysis and suggests 
that this window has now closed with failing commodity prices. While increased prices played 
a role in rising intervention in the extractives sector, there was also the reaction towards 
neoliberal policies in the sector (Childs, 2016; Poncian, 2019a), and these were legitimised 
on the continental level with the Africa Mining Vision (2009) (Hilson, 2020).  
This pro-market, or ‘realist’ (Koch and Perreault, 2019) literature is global in scope. 
Often seen as an unwanted by-product of high commodity prices, the cyclical nature of the 
global market has seen as the key driver behind resource nationalism. Furthermore, much of 
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this literature focuses on a simplistic state vs. MNC narrative, discounting either non-state 
actors, or the internal pressures that may arise for a state to push for greater involvement in 
the extractives industry. The result of this has been economic determinism; the commodities 
cycle and the OBM model suggest a shift in power towards states when prices are high and 
industries are mature, and in theory, this is where there is a shift towards resource 
nationalistic policies.  
Literature surrounding resource nationalism is now changing, with the term now being 
seen as a ‘discourse applied to political and economic thinking about how a state and its 
population should manage and distribute profits derived from natural resources’ (Koch and 
Perreault, 2018: 1). Contemporary literature has presented a more nuanced understanding 
of the drivers of resource nationalism. This change has largely been driven by geographers 
and development studies scholars (e.g., Childs, 2016; Haslam and Heidrich, 2016). Child’s 
(2016) contribution has been significant in noticing the narrowness of the debate and the 
pro-market tone of resource nationalism discourse. 
Geographers in particular have explored the internal drivers and factors that aid in the 
construction of resource nationalism(s). There has been an emphasis on the spatial aspect of 
resource nationalism, and to understand the domestic and sub-national politics that can lead 
to such policies (e.g., Koch and Perreault, 2018). Some of the strongest literature attempting 
to understand the pollical drivers of resource nationalism has been focused on Tanzania; 
Jacob and Pedersen (2018) argue that resource nationalism policies in the country begun 
before the recent passing of the 2017 legislations. Rather, it had begun to shift with the 2010 
Mining Act and the 2015 Petroleum Act. Both these acts were passed before the general 
election in their respective years as a counter to a more effective electoral opposition who 
had been using grievances over the extractive industries to build popularity. In this respect, 
the driver for resource nationalism in Tanzania has been electoral. Poncian (2019a) has 
furthered this by arguing that the 2017 legislation should be understood in the context of its 
socialist history. Considering the poor implementation of the SAPs, the 2017 legislation has 
been used to both garner popular support and for Magufuli to liken his image to Nyerere.  
New literature on resource nationalism has also engaged with the temporalities 
behind it.  Rather than viewing the phenomenon as a by-product of commodities cycles, new 
literature has explored the possibility of a resource nationalism cycle. For much of this 
literature, this cycle has been driven by economics. Offering a pro-market view and utilising 
the OBM model, Stevens (2008) argues that resource nationalism is a cyclical phenomenon. 
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While there is a degree of acknowledgement of internal factors that led to support of policies 
deemed resource nationalism, particularly grievances of citizens of the countries examined, 
central to the analysis is rising oil prices and how they shift the OBM towards states. Taking 
a more neutral stance, Haslam and Heidrich (2016) focus on the extractive industries in Latin 
America and argue that there is a privatisation-nationalisation cycle where there is a 
liberalising phase, regulation phase and a renationalising phase. Once again, there is more of 
an acceptance of domestic factors in analysis, particularly around the ‘pink tide’ in Latin 
American countries and how they looked to utilise natural resources for development.  
Unlike the authors mentioned above, Kaup and Gellert (2017) have placed global 
power struggles as the driver of resource nationalism. It argues that capital undergoes 
material intensification followed by financial intensification as the basis of spatial expansion 
of capitalism. Using Bolivia and Indonesia’s resource management in the 1970s and the 
2010s, they argue that the material intensification of global hegemons, the USA, and the 
USSR in the 1970s, and then the USA and China in the 2010s, has allowed states the 
opportunity to pursue resource nationalism policies as states are able to play these 
superpowers against one another.  
What this contemporary literature looking to understand the drivers of resource 
nationalism suggest that the drivers are cyclical in nature, and bar from Kaup and Gellert 
(2017), they tend to focus on global economic factors as the driver for resource nationalism. 
It is also worth noting, that the majority of analysis above has tended to focus on Latin 
America and the Middle East, the centre of contemporary and historical nationalisations of 
extractive sectors, respectively. For all these models and explanations, the global and 
national scale are central to their analysis. While there is some inclusion of domestic factors, 
such as increased public demand for a greater share of the resource wealth, these factors are 
often seen as monolithic in nature and lack political and economic nuance for their demands. 
On the other hand, country-specific and domestic analysis of the drivers of resource 
nationalism lack of the temporal angle, bar from the acknowledgement of high commodity 
prices, but has provided more of a focus on internal political reasons why such policies have 
provided to be popular. 
Temporalities at the global scale, in particular the commodity cycle, as well as global 
power struggles, have shaped the debates around temporality and resource nationalism. 
However, these literatures have neglected the role of internal politics behind such policies 
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and discourses. Geography has begun to delve into the internal dynamics of resource 
nationalism to an increasing degree. Adding to this literature is one of the goals of this thesis.   
4 Temporalities of Extraction 
As the above section demonstrates, there has been considerable scholarly examination 
on the nature of resource governance and how it influences both extraction and wider social, 
political, and economic impacts. Yet the impact of hydrocarbons goes beyond resource 
governance. The inclusion of temporality has primarily come in the form of speculation over 
resource extraction, and one of the main temporalities that guide MNC strategies and 
resource exporting states economies: the commodity cycle. 
4.1 Imagined Futures 
Resource imaginaries have often been interlinked with temporalities, either directly or 
indirectly. As Ferry and Limbert (2008) discuss, resources, be it natural or otherwise, can 
frame time in either the past, present or future in certain ways. This can be best seen at the 
national level, with the creation of a glorified past, in the form of origin myths (Anderson, 
1983), or tempering expectations of the future without resource revenues (Limbert, 2008). 
The nature of the extractive industries, particularly in the early stages of exploration, 
conjures up images of vast potential wealth under the ground. Of course, the reality has often 
been different. Hence, one core theme that has occurred from natural resource literature is 
the future of extraction. This is not concerned with the future of the extractives industry as 
a whole, but rather how the exploitation of natural resources shifts social and political 
dynamics of communities, companies, and states alike.  
Much of the research exploring imagined futures of the extractives industry has come 
from anthropologists (e.g., Ferry and Limbert, 2008; Engwicht, 2018). However, this has 
begun to change. Alongside arguing for a greater inclusion of time in geography, Childs 
(2020), discusses the temporalities of deep-sea mining in Papua New Guinea. He argues that 
the geopolitics of deep-sea mining can only be understood with an engagement of time as 
well as the more conventional understandings of space. This is due to the fact that both in 
historical and contemporary literature deep sea mining has been constructed as ‘resources 
of the future’ due to ongoing concerns of future resource scarcities, as well as the temporal-
geological peculiarities that could affect future mining operations in the sea.  
The negatives of extraction, either in the form of wider governance and societal issues 
explored in the resource curse, or environmental issues, either in the form of global concerns 
53 
 
over climate change or more localised concerns of chemical spill overs from mining activities, 
has led to a ‘politics of time’ in regard to protesting extractive projects (Mills, 2019). Kirsch 
(2014) argues that the politics of space is being augmented with a new politics of time, in 
which activists attempt to stop extractive activity before it begins. This is done with the mind-
set that once mining projects have begun, they are difficult if not impossible to stop or 
reverse their effects. In this respect, the negatives of extraction have created futures deemed 
unacceptable by those living closest to the projects, and in an effort to control time, activists 
are looking to prevent the imagined future from occurring, often against MNCs and 
governments.  
Much of the research into the imagined futures of extraction are of resources that are 
currently being speculated whether they will be extracted or not. In this respect, they engage 
with the imaginary of the resources, be it in a technical sense along a new frontier (e.g., 
Childs, 2020), or processes created to stop feared economic processes taking root (e.g., 
Weszkalnys, 2014). In general, bar from the onshore gas sector, this thesis is no different. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the offshore sector has yet to enter production 
and therefore engaged with the imaginary of gas extraction in different forms. There has 
been one other aspect of extractive time that has been explored in considerable detail: boom 
and bust.  
4.2 The Geographies of Boom and Bust 
The boom-and-bust cycles of the commodities market have been a mainstay for both 
the global extractives industry and natural resource literature. This is both for quantitative 
disciplines such as resource economics (e.g., Carter et al, 2011;), and qualitative disciplines 
such as anthropology (Rodgers, 2015). Commodity cycles refer to the fluctuating price of the 
commodity in question, with highs considered ‘booms’ and falls in prices considered ‘busts’. 
Demand for resources is cyclical, with a low-price elasticity of supply (Runge, 1998), creating 
potential price spikes related to under-supply, and extended price slumps when there is 
oversupply (Bowman, 2018). These supply and demand dynamics create the boom-and-bust 
cycle.  
For states and MNCs, when the price is high, it is seen to be in the ‘boom’ phase, leading 
to greater revenues. For MNCs, it can also encourage exploration for new deposits in 
‘frontier’ areas with potential deposits becoming economically viable. Conversely, when the 
price is declining (sometimes rapidly), then a commodity is in the ‘bust’ phase of the cycle, 
often leading to loss of earnings for companies and states, and job losses for those associated 
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with the industry, as well as a ‘retreat’ from fields that are no longer economically viable in 
the short to medium term. Due to this, it is one of the central temporalities of the global 
extractives industry, and price forecasts are central to project planning both at all spatial 
levels.  
Booms in commodity prices encourage exploration in areas either with resource 
deposits that were previously considered to be economically unviable or encourage 
exploration into regions that have not traditionally been part of the ‘energy map’. This is 
done with the expectation that prices will remain high enough to justify the capital 
expenditure of exploration and exploitation. The boom in prices during the commodities 
mega cycle, combined with technological innovations, particularly in deep sea extraction and 
unconventional hydrocarbon extraction, has also led to a reintroduction of ‘resource 
frontiers’. MNCs and states have created resource frontiers in regions as in varied as the 
arctic (e.g., Powell, 2008; Dittmer et al, 2011), ocean spaces (e.g., Childs, 2020), and of 
course, Africa (e.g., Lee, 2006; Frynas and Paulo, 2007; Carmody, 2016).  
It is worth noting that, while the term ‘resource frontier’ may be of common usage to 
MNCs and the business press, the term has been contested for the political connections the 
term has historically caused (Luning, 2018). However, the term is used commonly within pro-
market literature (e.g., Collier, 2011; Deloitte, 2019), as well as critiques of MNC actions in 
the global south (e.g., Chalfin, 2010; Bryceson and Geenen, 2016). It is also a common term 
to explain the expansion of capital into regions that are poorly integrated into the global 
economic system (Tsing, 2003). Frontiers do not specifically mean a place or process, but 
rather an imaginative project melding both (Tsing, 2005). Considering Tanzania, and in 
particular, Mtwara, are on the global peripheries of both the global energy supply at global 
capitalism as a whole, this thesis will utilise the term ‘resource frontier’.  
While the whole continent, barring Nigeria and Angola, has been viewed as a ‘resource 
frontier’, one of the new regions that became a focus for exploration was East Africa 
(Anderson and Browne, 2011). The discourse over African resource frontiers have evoked the 
colonial past of the continent. The increased investment by MNCs and other states, 
particularly China, led to the phenomenon being described as a ‘new scramble for Africa’. 
Critics have accused these authors of utilising a discourse that removes agency from Africans 
themselves over this new scramble (Skaten, 2017). This criticism is particularly apparent in 
the field of international relations, who have focused more on the great power struggle 
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between the US and China for natural resource access (e.g., Klare and Volman, 2006; Burgess 
and Beilstein, 2013).  
Resource frontiers are intrinsically tied to both space and time. The connection to 
space is obvious: frontiers are geographical spaces and are created through a discourse of a 
wild, uninhabited land that is heavily influenced by the American west (Rasmussen and Lund, 
2018). Of course, in both African and the American West, this land was inhabited. They are 
also equally created through temporalities of the extractive industry and capitalism. The 
boom and bust of commodities prices are central to markets, who buy and sell on actual and 
expected demand of a product. Hence, the temporalities of the boom-and-bust cycle aid the 
creation of ‘resource frontiers’ due to high commodity prices and technological advancement 
that make both exploration and potential resource deposits during the commodities super 
cycle.  
The boom-and-bust cycles are central to the expansion of capitalism into new markets. 
Hence the creation of resource frontiers allows for an expansion of the temporalities of 
capital into new frontiers. In essence, boom and bust aid the facilitation of expansion into 
frontiers, and they also introduce boom and busts to the peripheral local economy. These 
cycles also cause capital to retreat from frontiers to areas where it is chapter and less risky 
to produce, and thus these resource busts have had considerable negative effects on poverty 
reduction in developing economies (Le Billon and Good, 2016).  
Literature on resource busts have focused on the detrimental impacts on communities 
closest to the extractive site. The most prominent example of this is James Ferguson’s 
Expectations of Modernity (1999), which explores the responses to the collapse of copper 
prices on the Zambian Copperbelt. Focusing on the imaginary of ‘modernity’, in particular the 
paternalistic care of workers and urbanisation that were expected with rising copper prices, 
Ferguson charters the collapse of the copper sector, and how it altered perceived 
modernisation in the industry where ‘history seems to be running in reverse’ (Ferguson, 
1999: 13). In this respect, the boom of the mining sector in the Zambian Copperbelt brought 
with it expectations of modernity, which were taken away during the economic bust, leaving 
livelihoods shattered in the process. This work in particular challenges the linear concept of 
modernity, highlighting how global factors can rapidly change economic circumstances of 
those in the extractives sector.  
Ferguson is not the only scholar to explore the economic hardships following a 
commodity bust. Breglia (2013) explores the impact of post-oil in the former oil producing 
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region of Campeche in Mexico. They argue that the loss of the oil sector has brought 
demodernisation to the region, as well as affecting other local industries that are not seen as 
tied to the hydrocarbon sector, such as fishing. Regarding temporality, the loss of modernity, 
either real or perceived, highlights both the imaginaries and the materialities of 
commodities; for states and societies alike, there is a perception that material wealth can 
fund economic development and modernity for a better future. A decrease in commodity 
prices, or the removal of the sector itself from the region, also removed such a vision of 
modernity that had been built around the extractive sector.  
In comparison to space, temporality has been neglected by extractive literature. While 
minerals and hydrocarbon deposits are spatially fixed, the drivers for their extraction are 
economic; supply and demand cycles determine whether deposits become economical, 
demands from shareholders can push companies to expand further and further into 
‘resource frontiers’. This push for new sources of hydrocarbons and minerals drive the 
temporalities of other actors, both material and imaginary. These drivers are temporally 
uneven across the global economy. Due to the nature of markets, political and economic risk, 
and the ease of extracting resources, commodity markets make and unmake resource 
frontiers, influencing and changing imagined futures of those that live and participate in 
extraction in the process. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has unpacked geographical, anthropological, and political economy 
literature around temporalities and natural resource extraction. Temporality is 
underrepresented in social science literature as a whole, particularly in geography. This has, 
in part, due to the difficulty to effectively contextualise time, as well as the postmodern turn 
to space as a dominant mode of analysis. This has presented a gap in geographical literature 
whereby time, in all its different forms, has been underexplored and underutilised.  
Research into extractives, particularly within less economically developed nations, has 
tended to focus on the resource curse. While the resource curse is disputed, it has 
nevertheless highlighted the wide-ranging effects an extractives industry can have on 
economics, politics, and society at large. Though there have been exceptions, resource curse 
literature has tended to include extractive temporalities in the background, usually as an 
example to how the volatility of the commodities market can severely affect revenues.   
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Compared to geography, natural resource literature has had a greater interaction with 
time, due to the influence of anthropology within extractives literatures, as well as dominant 
temporal drivers such as the commodities cycle. One such example is literatures exploring 
resource nationalism, with a historically a pro-market literature that is critical of state-
involvement in extraction that has also utilised these temporalities for explanation for their 
theories. Considering the reframing of resource nationalism, and geography’s role within that 
reformation, it has currently neglected the temporalities around the industry. It presents a 
gap in the literatures explored in this chapter to reintegrate time into resource nationalist 
research that more critical and less deterministic than its predecessors. It is within this gap 
this thesis seeks to fil and further knowledge to better understand both the temporalities of 




Chapter III: Methodology 
1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methods utilised to obtain the data to understand the 
temporalities of the hydrocarbon industry. This thesis utilises fieldwork undertaken in 
Tanzania from July 2017 to August 2018 and utilised a qualitative research design. 
Specifically, it utilised semi-structured interviews, group interviews and documentary 
evidence. In terms of interviews, I targeted a range of people, from oil executives to villagers. 
In terms of documentary evidence, I targeted industrial, hydrocarbon and development 
strategy papers by various government agencies, and public and private documents from 
IOCs and domestic suppliers.  
Other methods that could have provided a wider geographical scope, such as 
questionnaires, would have limited impact compared to a more direct and in-depth 
discussion with respondents of considerable expertise and experience. Furthermore, 
participant observation was not used due the focus on the politics of time at all spatial levels, 
and to do so would have to utilise continued and sustained access to IOCs, which would have 
considerable difficulty.   
The original design of this research was centred around a comparative study 
between the hydrocarbon industries of Uganda and Tanzania, with a particular focus on the 
EACOP project. Before fieldwork started, I understood that Uganda has special research 
permits to enter these areas due to the political sensitivity of oil in the country. These permits 
have been noted by other academics as a long and difficult process (Van Alstine et al, 2014). 
During the Ugandan research permit process, it quickly became apparent that my application 
was taking a long time, even by the slow standards experienced by other researchers. I 
believe that this was a process of silent refusal, as emails were not being responded to and 
in my brief visit to Kampala, I was told to conduct the application online. 
As I had a limited timeframe to conduct research for my PhD, I moved away from 
focusing on both Uganda and Tanzania and focused solely on Tanzania. The research permit 
process for Tanzania also took time to complete but repeat visits to COSTECH aided the 
process and I obtained the permit, alongside a residency permit to allow me to live in the 
country. This process took a long time, and I was constrained in Dar es Salaam while waiting 
for approval of the research permit.  
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This chapter is structured as follows: First it will explore the methods used in this 
study, their advantages and potential pitfalls that had to be countered during and after 
fieldwork. It also highlights events outside of my control that made my research challenging. 
Section three of this chapter explores the positionality of myself during the research process, 
as well as the use of a research assistant throughout my fieldwork. Following on from this is 
a discussion of the risks and ethics of this research, with an additional discussion on how 
mental health can affect research in the field. Section five concludes.  
2  Methods 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, this research utilised semi-
structured interviews, group interviews and documentary evidence. The interviews were 
conducted in person, and the gathering of documentary evidence was a mixture of 
documents in the field and online. There were a variety of reasons to choose these 
methodologies: firstly, with the research focus on the hydrocarbon sector, there are limited 
potential interviewees with direct experience in the sector, either as a state or private 
employee, or people located in geographical proximity to extractive sites and their associated 
infrastructure. While this thesis focuses on how perceptions of time have been altered by the 
sector, focus was given to direct stakeholders rather than a wider audience due to the fact 
that these participants were, or are, directly impacted by the hydrocarbon sector. 
Documentary evidence has been both utilised to substantiate claims made by respondents, 
to provide evidence to claims made by the thesis, and to be analysed.  
2.1 Interviews 
Interviews, in a structured, semi-structured and unstructured format, are a common 
method in the social sciences (Brinkmann, 2014). Interviews, in all formats, are ‘verbal 
interchanges where one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information from another 
person’ (Longhurst, 2016: 145). One of the key strengths of interviews is that the researcher 
can take advantage of social clues such as voice, body language and tone (Opdenakker, 2006), 
and they also allow an interviewer to build rapport with informants. However, it was noted 
before fieldwork that such clues can be culturally distinct, and it would be important not to 
accidently commit a faux pas during the interview through a misinterpretation of a social 
situation. Live, face to face interviews also allow for synchronous communication, with 
spontaneous answers and discussion, although this can be a detriment as it does not allow 
for reflection, which will be covered below.  
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Semi structured interviews were chosen as one of the main methods for this study. 
Semi structured interviews allow for a flexible and fluid structure, which allows the interview 
to cover select themes and topics (Mason, 2004). This was particularly important for this 
study, as this research covered a variety of different respondents with different experience 
and expertise, and these differences would have not been accurately covered in a more 
structured and rigid interview format. In other words, the experiences and expertise of the 
hydrocarbon sector between an IOC executive and a cashew farmer in Mtwara could be 
widely different, and a rigid structured interview with a set of questions would have not 
captured these experiences effectively.  
This is further reflected on ontological position of semi structured interviews, in that 
they are ‘concerned with people’s knowledge, understandings, interpretations, experiences, 
and interactions’ (Mason, 2004: 1020). In this respect, asking for perceptions and 
reconstruction of events allowed for fruitful discussions over select issues, such as the 
pipeline protests in Mtwara which are covered in chapter four. Related to this, compared to 
a more structured format, it also allows for interviewees experiences and perceptions that 
the interviewer was not expecting. Considering that this study focuses on differing 
perceptions of time, semi structured interviews were an essential choice.  
Interviews were done in both a group format and in an individual format. It is 
important to note that the interviews where multiple interviewees were present were not 
focus groups, but rather group interviews, as the interviews conducted gave their own 
opinion and experience, rather than responding to views to build an opinion as a group which 
is more commonly seen in focus groups (Bryman, 2012). Group interviews allowed for 
multiple people to express their opinions and experiences of the hydrocarbon sector during 
one session and was mostly used at the village level in Mtwara and Tanga. It was also used 
for some interviews with TPDC personnel, at their request.   
I sought as many avenues as possible for gateways that could lead to openings 
(Harvey, 2010). The hydrocarbon sector is dominated by elites (Hickey and Izama, 2017), and 
thus these people provided the best opportunity to gather data related to my research 
questions. Civil servants were targeted due to the fact that they are considered some of the 
best interviewees for research at the ‘elite’ level (Seldon, 1988). However, as explained 
below, in the Tanzanian context, this did not turn out to be the case. This thesis followed 
Herod’s suggestion that 'the key to successful networking, though, is having done the basic 
research to figure out which organisations are connected to each other’ (1999: 316). This was 
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not just understanding the formal connections between the organisations, but also the 
informal relationships which became apparent during discussions with IOC personnel.   
This thesis utilised 70 one on one and group interviews across various different actors 
in the Tanzanian hydrocarbon industry (See Appendix A). The nature of semi structured 
interview questions allows for informants to take a ‘fluid’ form that considers the interests, 
experiences, and views of the interviewees (Valentine, 1997: 111), and ‘to uncover new clues, 
to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts 
from informants based on personal experiences’ (Burgess 2003: 165). Because of this, there 
is a ‘joint production’ of knowledge from interview (Wengraf, 2001: 3). The fluidity of such 
interviews allowed for both revisiting of previous information and comments, as well as 
exploring the previous experiences and expertise of informants, meant that interviews were 
the method of choice to collect data.  
These interviews ranged from heads of IOCs operating in Tanzania, to mid-level 
interviewees consisted of bureaucratic personnel operating for Tanzanian bureaucracies, 
such as PURA, TPDC and the Ministry of Energy, as well as local governments, and private 
sector individuals working on the technical and legal side for IOCs, and local businesspeople 
in Mtwara and Tanga. Interviews have been described as a more efficient means of obtaining 
qualitative data (Harvey, 2010). For this research, interviews were chosen due to the semi-
structured nature; early on into the interview process, it became further apparent that a 
semi-structured approach was effective for this project; it was noticed that different 
professions would often elicit different responses to questions presented. For example, 
engineers interviewed would often provide technical answers to questions, and would shy 
away from comments around policy or resource governance. The semi-structured nature of 
interviews allowed for flexibility to direct follow-up questions that better tailored to both the 
research questions and the interviewee’s knowledge. This could not have occurred with 
other methods like questionaries; the rigid style of questionaries would have removed 
potential follow up questions and discussions that have proven to be very beneficial for the 
thesis.  
Due to this thesis’ research into resource nationalism and changing policies, one of 
the groups this thesis focused on was IOC executives within the country, as well as NOC 
executives within their respective parastatals. Interviewing these senior members of IOCs 
and state officials provided the best opportunity to gather data related to my research 
questions. Finally, interviews were conducted with those closest to the extractive projects in 
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the Mtwara and Tanga regions. These interviews were conducted both on a one-on-one 
format, and in a group format. I quickly learnt to create interview questions that were 
tailored for the specific audience and their expertise and experience; for example, questions 
would be different for someone in either a legal or technical background, even if they worked 
in the same organisation. Thematically, they focused on the changing policy landscape of the 
hydrocarbon sector, how project timelines have been influenced, and the politics of the 
sector. After the interview, there would be an interview debrief, with either just myself 
writing down how the interview went, or a discussion with my research assistant and a 
comparison of notes and what was obtained during the interview.  
Due to the nature of the questions and subjects this project plans to research, 
selective sampling was used to ensure that interviews are targeted to those that have the 
knowledge, expertise, and experience of the hydrocarbon industry. In Dar es Salaam, I mainly 
targeted IOCs and state organisations that were connected with the sector (See Table 2 and 
3), as well as domestic businesses looking to enter the sector through local content policies. 
In general, interviews of IOC and state employees were located in Dar es Salaam, the 
economic capital of the country. In Tanga and Mtwara, people were targeted based on either 
their geographical proximity to the hydrocarbon projects, potential business involvement in 
hydrocarbon projects, or more regional specific matters, which are discussed below. 
Strategies in obtaining interviews with all respondents are explored in greater detail below.  
Each method has pitfalls. One of the largest pitfalls of semi-structured interviews is 
that they can be time consuming (Longhurst, 2009). This is less to do with the interview itself, 
which, for this research, lasted roughly one hour, but rather the time required before and 
after the interview. Time is required to obtain the interviews and to prepare the questions, 
particularly to make sure the questions can fully engage with the respondent’s expertise and 
experience. Time is also required after the interview, both to type up the notes, reflect on 
the data and, if recorded, transcribe the interview. Semi-structured interviews have been 
described as a ‘construction site of knowledge’ (Kvale, 1996: 2). This means that both the 
interviewer and interviewee have an active, reflexive, and constitutive role in the process of 
knowledge construction. This has both advantages and disadvantages; one of the largest 
disadvantages of this is the fact that the interviewer’s positionality can shape the responses 
made. My positionality, and how it could have altered interviewees responses, is covered in 
greater depth below in this chapter.  
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There can also be difficulties in group interviews. One of the largest difficulties is that 
one person can dominate the conversation (Morgan, 1996). While the approach to group 
interviews was less structured to allow people to contribute as much or as little as they 
personally wanted to, it did create some difficulties. In one such group interview in Mtwara, 
one participant was very vocal and tended to dominate the conversation. The difficulty of 
this was expanded due to the fact that the interview was in Swahili, and my limited language 
skills meant I had to rely more on my research assistant to get other members of the group 
to express their opinions.  
2.1.1 Interviewing IOC and State Officials 
Many of the interviews conducted, particularly in Dar es Salaam, were people that 
were directly involved in the hydrocarbon sector in some form of capacity (See Tables 2 and 
3). Some of these included senior executives and could be considered ‘elite’ interviews. Elite 
interviews have been used in the social sciences since the 1960s (Dexter, 1970). Since then, 
they have been utilised both in political science and geography to examine the role of political 
institutions and industries (e.g., Heinz et al., 1993). The growth of the method in geography 
began in the 1990s (e.g., Katz, 1994; Herod, 1999). Interviews of those considered ‘elites’ 
were a logical methodology for this research, in part due to elites having unique insights into 
organisations that they are a part of (Harvey, 2010). It was noted that elites can be very 
conscious of their own power in interviews and in the organising of them (Richards, 1996). 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of the term ‘elite interview’ has been critiqued, as it relies on 
assumptions on where power lies and the power relations between the interviewer and 
interviewee (Smith, 2006). As shown below, this proved to be true for interviewing state 
personnel, whereby those interviewed were concerned on how an interview could affect 
their career. Harvey (2010) argues that defining elites can be more difficult when comparing 
people across different corporations, sectors, and national boundaries due to changes in job 
titles and roles that people undertake, and this was noted as I was conducting research in a 
new country and in a business culture, I have not previously been a part of.  
IOC Personnel Interviewed 







Location of  
Interview 






Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M No 12.03.2018 
Engineer Single 2 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 02.03.2018 
Engineer Single 1 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 22.02.2018 
Engineer Single 3 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 






Single N/A Independent 
Consultant 
Dar es Salaam M No 09.08.2017 
Former IOC 
Driver 
Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 12.07.2018 
Former IOC Yard 
Worker 
Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 10.07.2018 
IOC Executives Group 1 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam Mx1, Fx2 Mixed 14.03.2018 
IOC Executives Group 2 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam Mx2 Mixed 28.03.2018 
Lawyer Single N/A Independent IOC 
Lawyer  
Dar es Salaam M Yes 18.03.2018 
Local Content 
Director 
Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Mtwara M Yes 13.07.2018 
Senior Engineer Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 24.11.2017 
IOC Senior 
Executive 
Single 1 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 04.12.2017 
IOC Senior 
Executive 
Single 2 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M No 12.03.2018 
IOC Senior 
Executive 
Single 3 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 13.02.2018 
IOC Senior 
Executive 
Single 4 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M No 14.03.2018 
Well Manager Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Mtwara M Yes 17.07.2018 
Table 2: List of Former and Current IOC Personnel Interviewed 
State Personnel Interviewed 







Location of  
Interview 
Gender Tanzanian  
National? 
Date 




Single N/A CCM Mtwara M Yes 13.07.2018  
CUF MP Single N/A CUF Dar es Salaam M Yes 14.03.2018 
Dockworker Single 1 Mtwara Port Dar es Salaam M Yes 18.02.2018 




Group N/A Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and East 
African Cooperation 
Dodoma Mx3 Yes 06.03.2018 
Economic Planner Single N/A Mtwara 
Municipality 
Mtwara M Yes 09.07.2018 
Gas Technician  Single N/A Mtwara 
Municipality 
Mtwara M Yes 09.07.2018 
Lawyer Single 2 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 19.03.2018 
Lawyer Single 1 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 21.11.2017 
Managing 
Director 
Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 26.03.2018 
State Auditor Single N/A Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals 




Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam F Yes 18.04.2018 
Planning Officer Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 28.02.2018 
Project 
Coordinator 
Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 




Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 





Single N/A TPDC Dar es Salaam M Yes 15.03.2018 
State Senior 
Executive 
Single 1 Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam M Yes 21.03.2018 
State Senior 
Executive 
Single 2 Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals 





Single N/A Mtwara 
Municipality 




Group N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam Mx3 Yes 22.03.2018 
State Geologists Group N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Dar es Salaam Mx3 Yes 03.02.2018 










Location of  
Interview 





Single N/A Ugandan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 




Single 1 Mtwara Poverty 
Reduction NGO   




Single 2 Mtwara Poverty 
Reduction NGO   




Single 3 Mtwara Poverty 
Reduction NGO   




Group N/A Mtwara Poverty 




NGO Executive Single N/A Environmental and 
Social NGO 
Tanga M Yes 07.08.2018 
Table 4: List of Miscellaneous Interviews 
As one can see in the tables above, the vast majority of respondents in the private 
and state sector were male. Alongside this, all state personnel interviewed were Tanzanian 
nationals, and the majority of IOC personnel interviewed were also Tanzanian, with the 
exception of the independent consultant, EACOP and Shell personnel, and one of the Songas 
interviewees. The hydrocarbon sector has been, and is still is, male dominated, and the case 
of Tanzania was no different. 
To start my research, I contacted Tanzanian academics as they allowed me to further 
understand the ‘do’s and do not’ of researching in these countries (Vorrath, 2013: 60). This 
proved to be a good choice, with one academic suggesting that access to government 
institutions could be more difficult than it was before due to changing legislation and a 
greater distrust of outsiders. It was further hoped that these would allow me to build 
contacts in Tanzania in the hydrocarbon sector, which did happen, with academics suggesting 
contacts, as well as their own experiences talking to them. A common theme of the literature 
has been the fact that interviews can be difficult to organise. In my experience in Tanzania, 
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the difficulty of organising such interviews was dependent on whether the interviewee was 
associated with the private or public sector, with trying to obtain access easier for the former 
when compared to the latter.  
One of the advantages of interviews is that there is the opportunity for ‘snowball 
sampling’, in that interviewees could get the researcher in touch with other people that 
might be of interest for the research (Bryman, 2012). This is not to suggest that snowball 
sampling does not occur in other interviews, but rather it can present one of the few avenues 
to reach people as it can be difficult to get hold of high-ranking officials in either the state or 
private sector. In the context of my research, this strategy provided mixed results; interviews 
with IOC members, as whole, offered contacts both within their own organisations, other 
IOCs and Tanzanian civil servants operating in the sector. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, 
were more reluctant to give out contact information of other civil servants for potential 
interviews. In one of the earliest interviews, when asked for other state officials that could 
be potentially interviewed, the interviewee said they were not comfortable doing so and 
explained why:  
‘Let me be frank to you, at this point in time, there has been a lot of reforms, and most of the people 
in the ministry have been set aside, pending investigations. While I haven’t been removed, even I’m being 
investigated, as are the people above and below me. People may not be willing to talk to you because of what 
has happened to others. Because of this hostile situation, other people in the industry may be worried at this 
point in time, so you may have to wait until the dust settles.’20 
The reforms Magufuli has enacted in the Tanzanian bureaucracy have been 
widespread and not limited to the extractives sector. The removal of high and mid-ranking 
officials has been widespread since 2015, with many bureaucrats under investigation for 
corruption or poor results (Paget, 2017b). This appears to be a contrast to research 
conducted during Kikwete’s Presidency; while I have not researched Tanzania prior to 
Magufuli’s election, discussions with Tanzanian and foreign researchers suggested the ability 
to interview state officials has become harder during Magufuli’s tenure. The interview 
quoted above was one of the first interviews to be conducted, and it was hoped that these 
concerns would subside and snowball sampling in the civil service would be easier. This did 
not happen.  
In this case, to combat the culture of fear that has emerged over being interviewed, 
I was strict in going through official channels and I ensured I had the correct paperwork to 
 
20 Interview, State Auditor, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 01.02.2018.  
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present to people to help people lessen their concerns. Information on how I kept informants 
anonymised to ensure they did not lose their jobs is covered in the ethics section of this 
chapter. Furthermore, safeguards and promises made clear in the consent form that any 
information provided to me will be for research use only. In the form itself there were 
different options available over the use of their name, however, in the early stages it became 
apparent that the best strategy to use is to say that no real names will be in the thesis at all. 
During the interview itself, it became common for interviewees to bring another colleague 
with them to the interview. For the purposes of this research, these interviews have been 
seen as one-on-one interviews rather than group interviews due to the usual dominance of 
one speaker. While I still ended interviews with a request for further contacts, people were 
still reluctant to give contacts to me.  
The one section of the state that was open to researchers was PURA. Unlike other 
sectors of the Tanzanian civil service, people in the regulatory authority were generally open 
to me, both in the interviews themselves and in organising them. The exact reason why PURA 
was more open compared to other state organisations is not known. However, it is 
hypothesised that PURA personnel were more open due to the fact they were seconded from 
the ministry of energy and TPDC, and thus there was a degree of freedom as the role they 
were undertaking was not their permanent role and there may be a large turnover of 
secondments.  
TPDC were less welcoming and open than PURA, but still proved to be useful once 
trust had been built. Central to this was obtaining clearance by the director to be allowed to 
research TPDC, as well as friendly relations with a gatekeeper that often sped up the process 
and aided organising meetings for me. One of the main issues, however, was the questions 
presented; interviewees often asked for questions in advance and steered away from 
political answers. While the preparation would have allowed for greater detail for my 
answers, I feel that this was done to ensure that sensitive topics in the hydrocarbon sector 
would be answered neutrally. This affected my research as it would have influenced the 
answers given through preparation. There is little that could be done to combat this, as not 
providing the questions in advance is impolite, damage rapport with the interviewee, and 
potentially deny chances of an interview.  
Compared to trying to obtain interviews in the public sector, the private sector as a 
whole, was more welcoming to my research. While it did take time to organise such 
interviews, I only had one formal rejection from an IOC with a request to interview, which 
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was PanAfrican Energy Tanzania, which cited their legal dispute with the government as the 
reason for the rejection of the interview.21 This may be in part due to the current pause of 
the industry; during one discussion with a gatekeeper during my pre-fieldwork trip, they 
recommended I just ‘walk into the office and ask to speak to the director, they’ve got nothing 
else going on!’22 While it was not as simple as this, the ease to get access to top-level 
personnel in the IOCs did surprise me. In Dar es Salaam, I found it was rare for IOC 
interviewees to ask to see my research permit, something I had wished I knew before to try 
and obtain more substantial interviews during my pre-fieldwork trip in June to August.23  
Upon reflection on why IOCs were in general more receptive to interviews compared 
to state institutions, I believe that the study’s focus on governance changes in the sector led 
to both reciprocity from IOCs and distrust from state institutions. It gave IOCs the chance to 
express frustration with the legal changes and the government’s approach to the 
hydrocarbon sector through their interview responses, and because of this, I had to be aware 
how wider events in the hydrocarbon sector may influence the data collected from IOCs. 
Conversely, state institutions could have been less receptive to interview requests due to 
wider bureaucratic reform in the Tanzanian civil service, where there had been considerable 
firings of personnel across the civil service (The Guardian, 2015; Economist, 2018). This is due 
to the fear that if they did the interview, or said something considered incorrect or 
controversial, they could lose their job. To combat this, anonymity was promised to all 
interviewees. It is perceived that furthering the distrust of being interviewed was my focus 
on resource nationalism, as the legal changes have been portrayed as poor by both western 
IOCs, and in western media (Economist, 2017). To combat this, I looked to provide questions 
in advance and to explain that the research into the changes was to understand the 
temporalities behind such changes, rather than arguing against the changes.   
One of the most difficult things was not trying to organise the interviews, but rather 
trying to obtain any follow-up interviews. Once the original interview had been done with 
members of the private sector, I found there was little opportunity to try and obtain a follow 
up interview to discuss any further matters of my research. Due to some of the changes that 
 
21 This was a legal dispute between the government and Swala’s acquisition of PanAfrican Energy, 
the parent company of PanAfrican Energy Tanzania. 
22 Interview, Environmental and Social Consultant, Independent Consultant, Dar es Salaam, 
09.08.2017.  
23 This was tried in Uganda, and the IOCs located there did request to see my research permit, which 
I did not have.  
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were undertook with this thesis’s structure and aims, it would have been beneficial for 
another discussion. These rejections for further interviews were done by silent refusal.  
2.1.2 Data Collection in Mtwara and Tanga 
Interviews at the local level brought different challenges, particularly over who could 
be selected for interview. Both Mtwara and Tanga brought with it different challenges, and 
different solutions. As my positionality of being a white male researching in Tanzania, it was 
important to remember to conceptualise interview questions that relevant to participants 
experience (Berger, 2015). In this instance, I have never lived near an active extractive site, 
nor lived near a site that is central to a multinational infrastructure project. It was also 
important to situate oneself socially and emotionally in relation to respondents (Mauthner 
and Doucet, 2003), particularly when talking about sensitive topics such as frustrations over 
EACOP and memories of Mtwara protests.   
Data collection in Mtwara would prove fruitful. I had ensured that I had the correct 
paperwork, which included a letter from TPDC confirming my credentials, before going to the 
region to ensure that permission to go to the villages would be processed quickly. Ensuring 
that I went through the correct bureaucratic procedures was accompanied with a number of 
interviews of local government personnel that had been involved in the sector. A similar 
process occurred with the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA) and 
interviewing people involved with increasing skills relevant to the gas industry.  
Obtaining permission with the local government was just one of the steps to obtain 
interviews with Mtwaran villagers. While I had official permission, at the beginning I still 
lacked any knowledge of who, and how to contact people that could be willing to give up 
their time for an interview. I contacted one of the local NGOs who specialises in poverty 
reduction and had works with the villages I looked to contact. Through them, I had made 
contacts with their village representatives, who were originally from their respective villages, 
and organised both individual and group interviews of those affected by the gas industry. In 
essence, this NGO became my gatekeeper for village interviews. There were flaws to this 
approach. It only gives a partial view of the community, and those interviewed were people 
who have good relations with the NGO. To combat this, after the initial greetings and 
interviews and when rapport was built with the local communities, I returned for more 
interviews without the NGO present to obtain a wider range of interviewees (See Table 5).  
This tactic did have its downsides; in one instance, it did accidentally undermine the 
authority of one local leader, who did not object to our visit outright, but was not happy with 
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our presence, in part due to previous research being conducted in the village by other 
researchers. According to villagers, this was due to unkept promises of wider development 
for the community. This was connected to another issue around research in the villages of 
Mnazi Bay; the area has been heavily researched, not just for social issues around oil and gas 
(e.g., Must, 2018; Kamat et al, 2019), but also for research on agricultural and fishing 
practises in a marine park (e.g., Mwanjela, 2011; Mangora et al, 2014) and more specifically, 
dynamite fishing (Mwanjela and Lokina, 2016; Kamat, 2019; Raycraft, 2019). In essence, 
villagers were used to researchers coming and going to the region, and there was a degree 
of ‘going through the motions’ with some interviewees. 
Local Communities and Village Participants 







Location of  
Interview 
Gender Tanzanian  
National? 
Date 
Cashew Farmer Single 1 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 2 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 3 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 4 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Chongoleani Village Group 1 N/A Tanga Mx3, Fx3 Yes 18.09.2018 
Chongoleani Village Group 2 N/A Tanga Mx3, Fx3 Yes 19.09.2018 
Fisherman Single 1 N/A Mtwara M Yes 24.07.2018 
Fisherman Single 2 N/A Mtwara M Yes 24.07.2018 
Madimba Village Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx2, Fx4 Yes 12.07.2018 
Msimbati Villagers Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx3, Fx4 Yes 18.07.2018 
Mtwara City Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx4 Yes 07.07.2018 
Mtwara Resident Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 10.07.2018 
Ruvura Village Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx1, Fx5 Yes 05.07.2018 
Table 5: List of Local Communities and Village Participants Interviewed.  
As one would expect from interviewing local communities, all interviewed in this 
table were Tanzanian nationals. The majority of respondents were also male, and this was 
influenced by a desire to interview some of the protesters in Mtwara, which were male 
dominated. The exception to this was the group interviews in the villages, which had more 
women than men in the interviews, and allowed for some female perspectives on the gas 
sector. Nevertheless, it is noted that the gender disparity of respondents is a weakness of 
this research.   
Many of the group interviews occurred in the villages in Mnazi Bay. These were 
organised with the help of the Mtwaran NGO and consisted of people from the villages of 
mixed gender and age. These consisted of four to seven respondents and were conducted in 
Swahili. Their responses were translated to me. Some of the more vocal respondents were 
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requested for a one-on-one interview to provide further depth to their responses, which 
many accepted.  
Obtaining interviews in the city of Mtwara also followed gatekeepers and 
networking, often through more informal structures. Due to a contact of a Mtwaran 
protester made in Dar es Salaam, I had contacted a number of people that had participated 
in the protests. However, early into the stay in Mtwara, it became very clear that finding 
people that had either participated in the protests or had been affected by the gas industry 
was easy to find, as nearly all those who had lived in either the city or the villages had been 
affected by the event. Meetings with boda drivers aided snowball sampling. It was clear that 
word got around about me and my research as later in my trip in Mtwara, people were 
requesting to be interviewed. This attempt to obtain interviews from the ground-up proved 
to be fruitful, but some of the negatives of this was the fact that the respondents were very 
male-oriented. 
Finding potential interviewees in Tanga proved more challenging than in Mtwara. 
This was in part due to the fact that the EACOP project was in the early stage of development 
in the pre-construction phase. This meant that, while Tanga was supposed to be one of the 
major centres of EACOP’s development, there was little discussion or knowledge about the 
project outside of those with direct (or attempted) participation on the project. Furthermore, 
interview requests by some local government institutions were rejected on the basis that 
little to no preparations for the EACOP project had been done at a local level. This was true 
both for VETA and for the local government office. Alongside these difficulties were other 
risks, which are explained below. 
For access to businesspeople in Tanga with an interest in participating on EACOP, I 
approached the Tanga Chamber of Commerce. In general, the Tanga Chamber of Commerce 
was more helpful in becoming a gatekeeper for me to interview businesspeople when 
compared to the Mtwaran Chamber of Commerce (See Table 6). Upon reflection, this was 
due to the fact that many business members wanted their voice heard on the struggles to 
access tenders on the project (See Chapter seven). They provided me with a list of business 
members that had been known to try and participate on the project, with their contact 
details added. It is theorised that the reason for the help was due to the fact that in general, 
there was a level of frustration over the lack of opportunities the pipeline project had 
brought. Due to the fact that access to IOC and state personnel in Dar es Salaam had been 
easier than accessing people at the village level, much of the data collected in Tanga has been 
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focused on the business community, which has altered the analysis of the data in chapter 
seven. This has altered some of the structure of the thesis; as interviews could not be made 
with a large number of village respondents as had been the case in Mtwara, more of a focus 
was made on businesses in the area that sought to participate on the EACOP project. 
Table 6: List of Non-IOC Businesspeople Interviewed 
Since I had a run in with the authorities early on into the visit to Tanga, combined 
with the lack of official permission to Chongoleani, it was decided that there would be no 
direct visit to the village of Chongoleani. Instead, gatekeepers from Dar es Salaam who knew 
people with links to Chongoleani, interviews with villagers were possible. After ensuring that 
we were no longer in trouble with the authorities and were no longer followed, group 
interviews were organised with residents of Chongoleani. This was organised in part with a 
gatekeeper, who would ask people on my behalf to come for a group interview in Tanga, with 
myself requesting the gatekeeper a range of interviewees both in terms of sex and age, who 
had been affected or had an interest in the pipeline project. All travel costs and time costs 
were covered at my expense. This was the best strategy to both protect informants, 
gatekeepers, and my research assistant, and still obtain data. Nevertheless, because of the 
risks associated with travel restrictions and surveillance, data collection was not up to the 
same quantity when compared to Dar es Salaam and Mtwara.  
Non-IOC Businesses Personnel Interviewed 









Gender Tanzanian  
National? 
Date 
Businessperson Single 2 Shop Owner Mtwara M Yes 02.07.2018 
Businessperson Single N/A Tanga 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Tanga M Yes 07.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 5 Construction 
Services 
Tanga M Yes 14.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 4 Medical 
Supply 
Services 
Tanga M Yes 18.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 1 Shopkeeper Mtwara F Yes 24.07.2018 




M No 31.01.2018 
NAF Hotel 
Manager 
Single N/A NAF Hotel Mtwara M Yes 02.07.2018 
Business Senior 
Executive 5 





F Yes 05.12.2017 
Tiffany Diamond 
Hotel Manager 
Single N/A Tiffany 
Diamond 
Hotel 
Mtwara M Yes 18.07.2018 
Mtwara Market 
Association 
Group N/A Mtwara 
Market 
Mtwara M Yes 13.07.2018 
Oil and Gas Bank 
Executives 
Group N/A Stanbic Bank Dar es 
Salaam 
Mx2 Yes 22.02.2018 
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It is recognised that this tactic does have its disadvantages; I had little control over 
who could be chosen outside of the parameters given, and the choices could have been 
affected by the personal relationships between the gatekeepers and the interviewees. 
Nevertheless, given the circumstances that were evident in Tanga, this was perceived as the 
best course of action both to obtain interview data, as well as protecting myself, my research 
assistant and those interviewed.  
All those interviewed above, bar from the IOC supplier, were Tanzanian nationals, 
and were once again male dominated. The language barrier was another issue both in Tanga 
and Mtwara. While I had passable Swahili, my ability in the language was not strong enough 
to conduct interviews. This was not a problem with interviews with most of the business and 
local political elites, where the majority had good English skills. Choices were given to people 
if they would like the interview in either English or Swahili. To combat this, my research 
assistant conducted the interview in Swahili, both taking notes and translating for me to 
converse. This made interviews more time consuming, and things could have been lost in 
translation.  
2.2 Documentary Evidence 
Documentary evidence was also gathered in conjunction with semi structured 
interviews. While sometimes considered the ‘monopoly of professional historians’ 
(Mogalakwe, 2006: 222), one advantage of the use of documentary evidence is that the 
documents have not been made at the request of the social researcher, and are therefore 
are considered ‘non-reactive’, so the possibility of a reactive effect can largely be discounted 
as a limitation of the data (Bryman, 2012: 543). As documentary evidence are not created for 
the researcher, they can tell us indirectly about the social world of the people who created 
them (Payne and Payne, 2004).  
 The documents used in this study are from both state and non-state sources. In 
terms of state documents, they have been in the forms of planning documents, legislation, 
and documents from regional governments. This thesis also utilises regional economic 
statistics compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics. These are easily available online 
through the Tanzanian government’s website. One of the most used primary sources was 
Tanzanian legislation, particularly oil and gas legislation passed in 2015 and 2017. These 
documents are available to the public and are easily accessed online. Alongside these pieces 
of legislation, this thesis also utilised other government documents that were easily 
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accessible; industrial plans, both at the national and the regional level were obtained, as well 
as gas-specific documents relating to gas strategies.  
Alongside Tanzanian state documents, this thesis also utilises reports from state aid 
agencies such as the Department of International Development (DFID) and Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). These were also accessed online and are 
used more in a supporting capacity when compared to the analysis of the Tanzanian state 
documents due to this thesis focus on temporalities in the states extractive sector.  
Alongside state documents, this study uses business documents, newspaper sources 
and multinational reports and statistics. Unlike other documentary sources, some of the 
business documents were gathered during fieldwork and are not available online. This is 
explored in greater detail below. Newspaper sources were collected, often online, to 
substantiate claims made by interviewees. National GDP and commodity price data was 
gathered from IMF and the World Bank to highlight global prices changes in the hydrocarbon 
sector.  
It was hoped that interviews, particularly of those in higher positions, would allow 
access of documents (Herod, 1999). Considering the general secrecy, the hydrocarbon 
industry operates in, in hindsight, this was naïve. While documents, particularly relating to 
local content data was promised to me by interviewees from TPDC and Shell, repeated 
requests after the interview for the documents were met with silent refusal. This perhaps is 
in part due to the fact that they did not have permission to allow me to see the documents 
and therefore did not respond. Hence, the majority of documentary evidence from IOCs 
comes in the forms of publicly available documents. This varies from company to company, 
with some companies, such as Equinor, having far more publicly available information on 
their operations compared to other IOCs.  
One of the major, non-public sources for documents was through general meetings 
of local content. Interest around local content participation was at its highest during my time 
in fieldwork. Information around the numbers of jobs, the skills required and other local 
content information for EACOP were obtained through these meetings. Alongside this has 
been a use of newspaper sources, although this is being used solely for declaration of facts 
corroborated with interview data. This is in part due to the fact that local newspaper reports 
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on the hydrocarbon sector are often sensationalised. This was warned to me by IOC 
interviewees early on during fieldwork,24 and over time I found that they were right.  
Documentary evidence also has negatives. One of the main issues is the issue of 
authenticity and accessibility (Tight, 2019). To combat this, government documents were 
downloaded from official government websites, often from ministry websites. In addition to 
this, some state documents, which were not publicly available, were provided to me during 
the interview process for me to take notes on. This was also true for business and EACOP 
documents, which were gathered during participation of local content conferences in Dar es 
Salaam. It is therefore little concern over the authenticity of these documents within this 
research.  
Overall, the importance of obtaining documentary evidence diminished over time. 
This was due to the fact that I had little success with interviews in obtaining documents. 
Because of this, the strategy of using documentary evidence has changed from being a 
planned equal partner to interviews, to more of a supporting role in analysing the data.  
2.3 Field Sites and Structure 
As this research focused on the politics of time in the Tanzanian gas industry, 
fieldwork was essential. The fieldwork sites for this research were in Dar es Salaam, and the 
 
24 Environmental and Social Consultant. 
Figure 6: Map of Cities and Regions of Interest 
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regions of Mtwara and Tanga (Figure 6). A visit to Dodoma was also held to try and interview 
politicians in the Energy and Minerals Committee, as well as the smaller offices of the 
ministry of mining and energy, which is currently in a transition of moving staff from Dar es 
Salaam to Dodoma. The logic behind this was to get access to MPs before or after the 
parliamentary session held in April, and thus obtain many interviews in a short space of time 
with minimal travel. These attempts were unsuccessful. This could have been due to my 
positionality; being a foreign researcher and approaching MPs just before or after the 
parliamentary session could have meant that I was (understandably) not a priority.  Hence, I 
had to contact MPs directly through emails, and often through individuals in contact with 
them who could vouch for me. Because of this, I obtained fewer MP interviews than I initially 
planned. Attempts to interview people in the ministry of mining and energy offices in 
Dodoma also proved fruitless due to silent refusal.  
Due to the fact that I had never been to East Africa before, and because my research 
funding allowed it, my first trip to Tanzania and Uganda occurred from June to August 2017. 
This was more of a ‘pre-fieldwork’ visit of sorts. The role of this pre-fieldwork visit was firstly 
to get used to both countries, as there was to be expected a degree of challenges or other 
variables that I may have not prepared for beforehand. Secondly, the role of this trip was to 
network Through contacts made from the University of Edinburgh, I had contacted a number 
of people in Tanzania that either worked in or knew people that worked in the hydrocarbon 
sector. These were preliminary meetings in a more relaxed environment rather than strict 
data-driven interviews. The idea behind this was that such relationships take time to build 
trust, and they should be built upon sooner rather than later. Finally, this trip was done to 
speed up the bureaucratic process in obtaining a research permit.  
Dar es Salaam was an obvious choice for a field research site due to the fact that it is 
the economic centre of the country. The city is the national headquarters for all the IOCs 
operating in the country, as well as the headquarters of TPDC, EWURA and PURA. While there 
is currently a movement of civil service personnel from Dar es Salaam, the city is still vital for 
the ministry of energy and minerals, with the majority of staff yet to move. The city was also 
home to some of the organisations that were set up to obtain local content and their 
members were often based in Dar es Salaam. Local content workshops, some of which I 
managed to attend, were also held in the city. Because of this centralisation of personnel and 
institutions, Dar es Salaam was a logical choice for such interviews. When I was not in either 
Mtwara, Dodoma or Tanga, I was based in Dar es Salaam for fieldwork.  
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Some ministries targeted did not work for data collection due to the fact, while on 
paper they are officially involved in certain sections of the hydrocarbon industry, in reality 
they had little to do with policies in the sector. This was best exemplified with approaching 
the Ministry of Labour and Employment for research into the local content policies on the 
EACOP pipeline. In spite of the fact that they are officially mentioned as one of the ministries 
working on this policy on the project, and it would appear logical to have a ministry focusing 
on employment working on a policy that in part promotes employment. After a few 
introductory meetings between myself and mid- and senior level personnel, it quickly 
became apparent that the ministry had little to do with local content on EACOP, with one 
senior member even asking me ‘what is local content?’25  
Mtwara was chosen due to the fact that both the onshore and offshore gas industry 
is based there, with the onshore industry being based in Mnazi Bay, and the offshore gas 
sector utilising Mtwara and the port there as a base of operations. A total of six weeks was 
spent in Mtwara. Furthermore, the city of Mtwara was the epicentre of the riots that 
occurred in the city from late 2012 to mid-2013, and thus it was hypothesised that the gas 
sector had already brought out tensions in the area over the direction of national gas policy 
and its impact on the local political economy. As chapter four and five demonstrate, this was 
 
25 Fieldwork notes, Dar es Salaam, 28/02/2018.  
Figure 7: Map of Villages visited in Mnazi Bay 
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correct; the gas sector had, and is still having, a considerable impact on communities near 
the extraction site and the city of Mtwara. Alongside the city of Mtwara, the villages of 
Ruvura, Msimbati, and Madimba, all located in Mnazi Bay, were chosen as field sites for one-
on-one and group interviews (Figure 7). The reasons behind the choices of villages was 
geography; these villages are located in closest proximity to the gas extraction sites, and the 
infrastructure required to process the gas before the majority of it is piped to power stations 
in Dar es Salaam. 
Unlike Dar es Salaam and Mtwara, Tanga was not originally planned as chosen as a 
field site. However, with events around EACOP’s progression, combined with discussions 
with interviewees associated both in the supply sector and directly on the pipeline convinced 
me that it was the ‘epicentre’ of EACOP’s activity. However, as chapter seven highlights, this 
was not the case, and some of the most difficult moments during fieldwork occurred during 
my stay in Tanga. Because of these difficulties, which will be explored below, my stay in Tanga 
was just three weeks.  
3 Positionality 
3.1 Identity 
Due to the fact that ‘we are all raced, classed, and gendered’ (Townsend-Bell, 2009: 
311), as well as sexed, aged, and nationalised, it is important to understand how these 
variables presented challenges and opportunities to my data collection and authenticity. 
Central to this project was understanding the positionalities of the researcher, which had 
both positive and negative consequences for fieldwork. Being a white, male, and British, with 
no links to the industry meant I was an outsider to both the political scene and the 
hydrocarbon sector in Tanzania. This affected my research in a variety of different ways.  
Being an outsider, both to the hydrocarbon industry at large, as well as a foreigner, 
made me a stranger in two respects. This can provide benefits; doing political research in 
another country in some respects could have presented me as a ‘harmless foreigner rather 
than a threatening domestic investigator’ (Herod, 1999: 322). Additionally, a skilled 
researcher can see things that may not be obvious to the insider who is ‘in a mass of detail’ 
(Hanlon, 1991: 202). While I cannot compare experiences, access, while timely and often in 
an environment of distrust over my intentions, generally was a simple process.  
As discussed above, there is a large gender bias towards men as respondents in this 
research. Being a male researcher in a male dominated industry, my gender influenced the 
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data collection in select ways; while I experienced some assumptions that my knowledge of 
the sector and country was limited, this was more to do with being a foreigner rather than 
my gender. Rather my gender allowed me to ‘fit in’ with the male dominated industry. 
However, upon reflection, it was noted that there was greater gender equality found when 
researching local content, with more women in high-level positions both in the private and 
public sector.   
There were, of course some disadvantages within my position. Firstly, I lacked 
knowledge of cultural details. This was less of an issue for the IOCs, due in part to the 
globalised nature of the oil sector and the fact that many of the respondents tended to be 
foreigners or Tanzanian nationals that had either studied or worked abroad. This became 
more apparent in village level interviews. The presence of a Tanzanian research assistant 
mitigated some of these issues, and on the few occasions I accidentally committed a faux 
pas, my research assistant let me know for future interactions with people. Nevertheless, the 
true extent of how this affected the data cannot be certain of this may have been hidden 
from me.      
Positionalities are not a binary insider/outsider categorisation (Merriam et al, 2001), 
and during my time, my positionality, particularly in more professional circles in Dar es 
Salaam, shifted from an outsider to something of an in-between. This was true in Dar es 
Salaam as I would frequent events and conferences held by the government and notice many 
people that I had interviews with and were on friendly terms. Mtwara and Tanga were 
different. As I was only in Mtwara for six weeks and Tanga for three weeks, there was less 
time to build connections with informants. This was particularly true for Tanga, as concerns 
of being followed by the state led me to less contacts overall in the city, out of concern of 
those being associated with me being questioned. In Mtwara, there was some shifting of my 
positionality within the NGO, and some of the contacts made in the city. As noted by Vorrath 
(2013), in some cases, informants can become friends, and therefore it is noted that it is 
always important to critically engage with the information provided.  
Language was another barrier to research and reinforced positionalities between me 
and the interviewee. Bar from a few interviewees, participants located in villages near 
extractive sites did not know English. Unlike other countries in Africa, Swahili has become a 
universal language of Tanzania. Some respondents had a rudimentary knowledge of English 
and would tell me things in English directly, often for impact on a point they were making. 
For these interviewees, my research assistant acted as a translator between myself and the 
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interviewee, with notes written by myself in English and his in Swahili. He would then 
translate his notes and send them to me, both for comparison, and to pick up more 
expressive details that could have been lost in translation beforehand.  
One of the surprising advantages I found for building trust was being a student at the 
University of Edinburgh, and connections the city and the country of Scotland had with many 
of the Tanzanian professionals in the gas sector. Once I told people that I am a PhD researcher 
at the University of Edinburgh, many Tanzanian’s, both at the professional and working-class 
level, would often know that Nyerere was a student at the university, and allowed for more 
rapport. Furthermore, due to the oil sector in Scotland, many of the Tanzanian professionals 
had studied some form of oil and gas degree at a Scottish university, typically in Aberdeen or 
Dundee.26 This allowed for a greater rapport with these individuals as we discussed 
experiences of the country before and after the interviews.  
Whist efforts can and should be made to consider the positionality of researcher, 
one cannot be fully sure that they have correctly identified what others make of them (Rose, 
1997). Therefore, while this thesis has provided an attempt to consider the researcher’s 
positionality and methodological problems I encountered, it is difficult to fully and correctly 
understand the full scope of one’s positionality.   
3.2 Research assistant 
Early on into my fieldwork experience, I employed a research assistant to aid with data 
collection. One of the most important aspects of employing a research assistant is to 
recognise the power imbalances and ethical concerns, as well as to ensure that the person 
was appropriate for the role (Molony and Hammett, 2007). In this respect, I wanted someone 
who had a proficiency both in English and Swahili, an understanding of the political and 
economic dynamics of the gas sector in Tanzania, analytical and interpersonal skills, and 
would be willing to travel with me. The reasons for these criteria were to ensure a standard 
of data collection, professionalism, and analysis and to provide language assistance.  
To do this, I asked my contact at the University of Dar es Salaam if they could 
recommend someone, either someone they knew or a postgraduate student. They 
recommended their own research assistant, who had helped with data collection on their 
own research in the hydrocarbon sector. There was also no reason to believe that the data 
 
26 This was both in technical and legal qualifications.  
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was changed, bar from some issues in translation.27 Alongside translation help, they also 
aided me in understanding little cultural and political details that may have been missed if I 
conducted the interview myself.  
Research assistants also influence the research process and outcomes (Deane and 
Stevano, 2016), and after I felt that my research assistant had comprehended the objectives 
of the research process, he would often provide follow up questions. These questions were 
typically of good quality and aided the research. Furthermore, they reminded me of my own 
conduct and wording and how it might be construed across cultural lines, and how what I 
meant as an innocuous statement may come across as more confrontational than I 
intentioned. For example, during one interview, an interviewee asked me if they felt that this 
would aid the government, and I responded that I do not think they government would listen 
to me. I had intentioned this to be a comment of my low academic rank as a PhD researcher 
compared to a lecturer or professor. During our interview debrief, my research assistant said 
that my statement came across as the government not listening to researchers.28 
Treatment of my research assistant also revealed intentions and affiliations of certain 
interviewees. During one interview with Tanzanian bureaucrats, they were particularly 
hesitant to give answers beyond that everything was functioning as intentioned. When my 
research assistant asked a question stating some of the facts that contradicted their 
statements, one of them said ‘acha’, which is Swahili for stop, in the hope that I would not 
understand.29 My research assistant sometimes acted as foil between me and the 
interviewee in the form of complaints; these complaints were from a few older men in the 
village of Madimba that complained that we did not provide them with meals.30 Finally, one 
IOC respondent early on in the fieldwork was initially hesitant about expressing their views 
on the government due to the fact that my research assistant that day was wearing a green 
shirt, the colour of CCM. Once it had become apparent that we were not there on their 
behalf, nor CCM members, they were more forthcoming with their opinions, and mentioned 
the colour of the shirt. This reminded both of us about the little details that could change the 
 
27 A good example of this was the word ‘affect’ in my questions. While the word is neutral in English, 
in Swahili it is translated either positively or negatively. Because of the effect this could have had on 
responses, the wording of the original question was changed to make it more balanced and neutral to 
better gauge how the hydrocarbon industry has affected respondents.   
28 Fieldwork Notes, Mtwara, 16.07.2018. On a side note, I also believe this to be true. 
29 Group Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Employees, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African 
Cooperation, Dodoma, 06.03.2018.   
30 Group Interview, Madimba Villagers, Mtwara, 12.07.2018.  
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interviewees perception of us, and after that we ensured that we wore politically neutral 
colours to avoid any political affiliation.  
Research assistants also have their own positionality (Turner, 2010) and the colour of 
my research assistant’s shirt also highlighted the positionality of my research assistant and 
how it could affect data collection. Being a Tanzanian male could have altered responses 
from female respondents. The largest power difference could have been from class; being an 
educated Tanzanian, working with a white man and knowing English could have enforced a 
power dimension between him and the interviewee, particularly in a village setting. Being 
from Dar es Salaam could have also influenced perceptions of us in Tanga and Mtwara. In 
one incident, a government official from Tanga asked my research assistant what his tribe 
was, something that was considered rude and reinforced the perception of hostility towards 
us during our visit in Tanga. There was a higher level of distrust of my research and intentions 
when my research assistant was present during interviews with the Tanzanian civil service, 
due to the fact that he was Tanzanian. Nevertheless, I decided to keep him for these 
interviews to aid in data collection, believing that the benefits outweighed the risks. 
4 Ethics and Risks 
4.1 Ethics 
This project underwent SPS audit, which meant that there was to be no research of 
groups that could be considered vulnerable (children, refugees, addicts etc.), and was cleared 
by my supervisors. This was followed and no interviews of people that SPS deemed 
vulnerable was undertaken. For all interviews, personal data was stored on an encrypted 
memory stick with a ‘kill switch’, which activates if a person enters an incorrect password ten 
times in a row, upon which would activate and wipe the information on the memory stick. 
This memory stick also came with encrypted online storage, allowing me to access the data 
in the case of theft and/or activation of the kill switch. This presented both the best 
protection of personal and interview data as well as potential backup of data in case it was 
lost.  
Previous research has highlighted how, in exceptional circumstances, payment may 
be made to access people for interview (Bachmann, 2011). I never felt that the circumstances 
of my research warranted payment for interviews. This is compounded by the fact this could 
also compromise data quality and voluntary participation (Robinson, 2014). No cash 
payments were given for interviews, although in some instances, I paid for the food and drink 
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of the interviewee if we had met in a café or restaurant. Those that had travelled to the 
location by public transport were remunerated for their costs. 
I presented options to interviewees for preferences before, during and after the 
interview. All interviewees signed a consent form with options on how the data could be used 
(See Appendix C), this form was translated into Swahili for interviewees that did not 
understand English. While it is accepted that the provision of a consent form can alter the 
dynamics of the interview (Araali, 2011), this process was required to fulfil informed consent. 
Due to potential commitments interviewees had with scheduling, as well as ensuring that all 
respondents were comfortable, I let the interviewee have the choice of where to conduct the 
interview. I presented the questions in advance to interviewees if they requested it, often 
through email. For some interviewees, particularly in villages in Mtwara and Tanga, this 
option was not available, however, I did offer them to review the questions before the 
interview, an option that was rarely taken by village respondents.  
For respondents in IOCs and working within state structures, I also gave the 
interviewee the option to be recorded. I did not record interviews at the village level due in 
part how the recorder’s presence can alter the dynamics of the interview. Recognising that 
the recorder itself can alter the dynamics of the interview with its presence (Beamer, 2002), 
and considering the potential power dynamics being a white male with an urban Tanzanian 
research assistant, I did not wish to pressure and make respondents at the village level 
uncomfortable during the process. As fieldwork went on, it became clear that mid-level 
employees of various branches of the civil service did not want to be recorded, so I removed 
the option entirely, and reserved the option of recordings to the highest levels only. After 
the interview, a copy of the transcript was offered to respondents for them to examine in the 
case of any discrepancies. This was done through email. As mentioned above, there was 
some respondents without access to email, and transcripts were offered through email 
through village representatives with one. This offer was rarely taken up.  
4.2 Risks 
Unforeseen circumstances can seriously affect and alter data collection (Bachmann, 
2011). Most of my time in Tanzania saw little interruption in data collection, however the 
exception to this was in Tanga. In the beginning of the Tanga visit, government officials 
stopped me and my research assistant to see my papers. Having handed my research permit, 
they asked to see my residency permit and passport, and claimed my permit was not valid 
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due to the lack of corresponding stamp in my passport. After deliberations I was told to go 
to the immigration office the following day.  
For the next four days we were followed by the same officials that had questioned 
me. This was not just a risk for myself, but also for my research assistant and potential 
interviewees; being a British national meant that I believed if I got arrested, I felt that the 
worst-case scenario would be that I would simply be deported.31 I had told family members 
and my supervisors about contact details at the embassy in Dar es Salaam if I did not talk to 
them in a specified time.  
The risk to my research assistant and interviewees, all Tanzanian nationals, was far 
greater. I cancelled all meetings with interviewees and gatekeepers to ensure that there were 
no suspicions of them by the authorities following us. Me and my research assistant went 
back to Dar es Salaam for the correct paperwork. Upon our return, we were met with 
different officials who sought our papers. However, we did not feel that this time we were 
being followed, and thus after waiting a few days we carried on with data collection.   
Further issues around my visit to Tanga emerged. These were chiefly around data 
collection in the village of Chongoleani, the site of the proposed oil jetty for the EACOP 
pipeline. Permission for entry was refused by the local government. The reasoning for this 
refusal had been that there were concerns that I would be given ‘incorrect information’ 
regarding land compensation, despite my repeated assertions that my research was not 
focused on land issues.32 Concerns over land compensation severely hindered my time in 
Tanga.  
4.3 Mental Health and Fieldwork 
For first time researchers, much is centred around how a lack of knowledge around 
the physical risk of the researcher, and how to identify this risk and overcome unexpected 
realities (e.g., Gokah, 2006). During the process of risk assessment, a number of questions 
and thought focused on the physical risk of the researcher and the participants, but in 
hindsight there was little to no discussion or thought towards how periods of long-term 
fieldwork can affect the mental health issues of the researcher. Given the rise of awareness 
of mental health issues within academic and popular discourses, and having a mental illness, 
particularly more common illnesses such as depression and anxiety, has become more 
 
31 This incident occurred during the final two months of my research and thus most of the data had 
been gathered, and thus the risk to the overall data collection was lower.  
32 Fieldwork Notes, Tanga, 18.08.2018.  
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understood. In hindsight, this lack of preparation in risk assessments for the mental health 
of the researcher, was a surprise. This is reflective on the lack of literature on the subject as 
whole. While there are improvements of the acknowledgement of mental health pressures 
in academia as a whole, this has not yet transferred to mental health in overseas fieldwork. 
The exception to this has come from Pollard (2009), and the anthropology blog, 
Anthrodendum (2019). While both acknowledge the difficulties of fieldwork on mental 
health, particularly in regard to trauma, this section looks to put forward the removal of 
coping mechanisms that had been built previously rather than events that caused a 
fundamental shift in mental health.  
Before I discuss my experience of mental health during my fieldwork, I want to add 
that the majority of my fieldwork was incredibly enjoyable; to live and research in another 
country and gathering empirical evidence is extremely gratifying, and an experience I will 
never forget. When I first started my fieldwork, it was the first time I lived in another country; 
the first time I have had a period of extended research; and the first time I had ever visited 
the African continent. Overall, it has been incredibly rewarding. However, fieldwork brings 
forward changes and issues which can dramatically affect mental health, and can seriously 
impact on data gathering, and more importantly, your personal wellbeing.  
Since my early teenage years, I had been medically diagnosed with depression. I have 
seen therapists and been on antidepressants, but I feel that I am no longer in a place where 
I need to see them anymore. This help, combined with repetitive bouts of depression, have 
allowed me to see, but not fully prevent, periodic mental downturns, and to turn to actions 
that I have previously used to help me become better. My support network is as much 
preventative as it is reactive. My preventative actions chiefly include team sports for social 
as well as physical wellbeing. When a bout of depression hits, I look to (in hindsight, 
eventually) seek help with those closest to me. The reason I mention this is simple: fieldwork 
removed these preventative and reactive measures and added new stresses which I had not 
encountered before.  
One thing I should have prepared for was the removal of the support network that I 
had looked to establish to help with mental health issues. Constant movement, of both 
myself and friends around me, meant that a social foundation that could be used as a support 
network was constantly shifting. The end result of this was isolation for long periods of time. 
Research can be a lonely and isolated process, and during my own depressive bouts I would 
often become a recluse. Considering the main data collection was interviews, this itself was 
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a hinderance that did affect some time periods where research was not going as well as 
hoped. Furthermore, when research is not progressing as well as planned, morale can 
plummet, and this not just affected myself, but also my research assistant. This does highlight 
how the mental health of a person cannot just affect yourself, but also those around you 
during data collection.  
One of the largest symptoms of depression is a lack of motivation. With snowball 
sampling not progressing the number of interviews that I had hoped it would, it did present 
an experience of feeling that little to no progression in the research. This was exacerbated 
by the time constraints placed by fixed dates of fieldwork and putting on a front that added 
to mental exhaustion that is already strained by data collection, speaking, and learning a 
second language and living in a different environment can bring.  
5  Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to establish the methodological tools utilised for this thesis, as 
well as the challenges that occurred during fieldwork. This is not just based on research based 
during fieldwork, but also after, as ‘research continues as we reflect’ (Bourke, 2014: 1). These 
experiences hold lessons not just for my future career in academia, but also wider lessons for 
the practicalities of research. Firstly, it highlights the new difficulties faced in researching in 
Tanzania during the Magufuli presidency. This now may be even harder than during my time 
due to the fact that there has been tighter observation of COSTECH than when I applied due 
to research published that suggested a decline in popularity for the president (The East 
African, 2018a). Furthermore, it highlights both the initial plans before fieldwork, and the 
changes in methodological strategies that had to occur due to changes in personal and 
political circumstance. Responding to these was not just essential for data collection but also 
ensured that such data could be considered reliable. The data collected cannot be 
understood without also exploring the circumstances, both at the international, national, 
local, and personal level that led to the data being collected.  
This chapter has also sought to reflect how my presence has affected data collection, as 
well as events, particularly in Tanga, that explain how and why my data was collected in a 
certain fashion. It also highlights a current under-explored issue within academia: mental 
health in the field. It is hoped that this would aid a discussion on how to better prepare 
researchers, particularly aspirant researchers, to prepare for a deal with mental health issues 
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in new environments that may not fully understand or appreciate how such health problems 




Chapter IV: Piping Away Development: 
The Material Evolution of Resource 
Nationalism in Mtwara 
1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, following the discovery of natural gas, the south-eastern 
region of Mtwara, Tanzania, has rapidly changed from an energy ‘backwater’ to a global 
‘frontier’ for oil exploration companies and international capital. The discoveries coincided 
with political promises and expectations of unparalleled economic growth and social 
development. The most infamous examples of this was the statement by Kikwete in 2010 
that ‘Mtwara will be the new Dubai!’ (Stølan et al, 2017; Must and Rustad, 2019). Yet, on the 
22nd May 2013, after months of protests, riots erupted in the city of Mtwara over the 
confirmation of the construction of a gas pipeline that would connect gas from Mnazi bay, 
Mtwara, to the Kinyerezi power plant in Dar es Salaam. For a country whose political stability 
had been seen as ‘legendary’ in Africa (Green, 2011: 224), the scale of political violence was 
both a rarity and a shock.  
Whilst fieldwork occurred in 2017 and 2018, the protests and riots of 2012/13 were 
still a part of the discussion of the gas industry in the south of the country. In an interview 
with a regional CCM official in Mtwara, one respondent talked at considerable length of 
CCM’s version of events during the riots, although this was completely unprompted, and I 
had just claimed to be researching gas in Mtwara.33 In this interview, he accused business 
actors that stood to lose from the pipeline for inciting the protests against the government.34 
This conspiratorial theory was repeated to me by an IOC executive.35 Such a theory stood in 
contrast with interviews with protestors, who claimed that they wanted more local 
development from the gas, and that the crackdown and riots were caused by these 
‘misunderstandings’.   
 
33 Interview, CCM Regional Party Administrator, CCM, Mtwara, 13.07.2018.  
34 This theory suggested that businesspeople that imported diesel for electricity generation were 
inciting the violence. The diesel that was imported would be replaced with the gas piped from 
Mtwara with diesel generators that had been converted to generate electricity with natural gas 
instead. While this theory was suggested to me from multiple sources (and suggests a clandestine 
network working against the wishes of the government), no charges had been brought forward 
against any individual or organisation.  
35 Interview, IOC Senior Executive 3, Dar es Salaam, 13.02.2018.   
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This chapter explores the evolution of Mtwara resource sub-nationalism in the gas 
industry, its connections to wider Tanzanian resource nationalism and the eventual frictions 
that were generated. The concept of resource sub-nationalism has been spearheaded by 
Childs (e.g., 2016), who, alongside Ahearne, argues that natural gas in Mtwara has 
fragmented citizenship between the southern regions and the rest of the country (Ahearne 
and Childs, 2018). This chapter agrees with this analysis, and further argues that the apparent 
developmental quality of natural gas created a discourse that the resource would catalyse 
industrial development, however, the perception of where this development occurred is one 
of the ruptures between the resource imaginaries of the Tanzanian government and the 
Mtwara population. This was exacerbated with political promises made by politicians during 
election years, which fuelled imaginaries of a future where development will be powered by 
natural gas.  
This chapter argues that the construction of infrastructure has guided the evolution of 
Mtwara’s resource sub-nationalism; firstly, the construction of improved electricity access 
and roads allowed for an imagined prosperous future to begin to materialise. However, the 
construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline brought friction between Tanzanian 
resource nationalism and its regional Mtwara counterpart. The resulting fallout of the 
protests and the construction of the pipeline was the loss of a gas-powered future, whereby 
the developmental promises of the pipeline were being taken away from Mtwara and piped 
to Dar es Salaam.  
This chapter is structured as follows: it will first provide some historical background to 
the region of Mtwara for this chapter and the next chapter. Following on from this is a greater 
discussion of Tanzanian resource nationalism, and how the material properties of natural gas 
has allowed it to be imagined as a resource for industrial development in industrial and 
development plans. Section three details the beginning of the discovery of natural gas in 
Tanzania, and how the discovery allowed for increased investment into the region and 
brought about the first visible changes of ‘modernity’ to the city and surrounding areas. 
Section four explores the pipeline protests, and how the construction of the pipeline changed 
the developmental imaginaries that had been created previously and how the government 
utilised a discourse of national development to discredit the protestors demands. Section 
five follows on from this with a discussion of how Tanzanian resource nationalism has 
exacerbated core-periphery tensions, and how the imaginary of gas-led development has 
subsided with the material realities of the gas sector. Section six concludes.   
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1.1 A Background to Mtwara 
Described as the ‘Cinderella region of a Cinderella territory’ by British colonial 
administrators (Liebenow, 1971: 11),36 the south-eastern region of Mtwara is one of the most 
economically neglected regions within Tanzania. The region is inhabited by the Makonde, 
whose lands cover present day Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique. They are one 
of the largest ethnic groups in Tanzania and are often referred to as Wakusini (southerners) 
by their northern counterparts. Despite considerable the numerical size of the Makonde, and 
the geographical size of Mtwara itself, the region, alongside the neighbouring region Lindi, 
have had a history of low economic development and political marginalisation. This has been 
compounded further with stereotypes that the Makonde are ‘backwards’ and the region as 
a whole being viewed as a ‘static, isolated, backward periphery – within Tanzania and the 
world as a whole’ (Lal, 2015: 2). The capital of the Mtwara region is the city of Mtwara and is 
the closest city with a deep-water port to the onshore and offshore gas sites in Tanzania.37 
During the colonial era, when compared to the northern regions of colonial Tanganyika, 
the southern region was generally ignored by the German and later on, the British colonial 
administrations. This was in part due to the lack of exploitable resources in the region, and 
lack of road infrastructure, with transport by lorry only becoming possible in the late 1920s 
(Rizzo, 2006). The southern region, and in particular the port city of Mtwara, only begun to 
economically develop during the Tanganyika groundnut scheme,38 which started in 1946 and 
ended in 1951. Described as ‘probably the most dramatic and most cited failure of the 
ambitions of British late colonial developmentalism’ (Rizzo, 2006: 205), the groundnut 
scheme was conceived as a way to address the world shortage of vegetable oils and fats 
during the immediate post war period. However, insufficient planning was carried out on the 
ground, and officials instead relied on aerial reconnaissance to survey whether the area was 
suitable for large scale groundnut production. A range of factors, from insufficient rainfall, 
high clay content in the soil, and disease, ensured that the scheme would end in disaster 
(Coulson, 1977). 
 
36 The Cinderella province of Mtwara ‘implied the feminised, passive Southeast would be saved by 
the agentive prince of scientific development and colonial capitalism’ (Lal, 2015: 142). This legacy of 
perceived passiveness towards development has remained, although scholarship has argued that 
this is untrue (Seppälä and Koda, 1998).   
37 From this point onwards, ‘Mtwara’ will refer to the city of Mtwara, while the ‘region of Mtwara’ 
will be designated when discussing about the wider Mtwara region.  
38 Groundnuts are now more commonly known as peanuts.  
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 While the failure of the scheme resulted into a reversion of the status quo by the 
colonial administration, the groundnut scheme did allow for some forms of infrastructure 
development. The most notable of these were the expansion of Mtwara and the construction 
of a deep-water port intended for groundnut exports. Furthermore, the cultivation of cashew 
nuts, which began in the 1930s, saw the establishment of an export-based economy around 
the nut from the 1940s. By the time of independence, cashews became the country’s fourth 
most valuable export commodity (Lal, 2015: 139). While the volume of cashew exports would 
rise and fall, the cashew nut industry would provide the backbone for the region’s economy 
to the present day.   
During the time of independence, the concept of the southern regions being a passive 
‘Cinderella region’ persisted. However, unlike the colonial era, government intervention in 
the region increased, although this proved to be unbeneficial to those living in the southern 
regions. Villagisation efforts started in the region in the 1960s and was implemented at a far 
greater pace and scope than any other region in Tanzania (Lal, 2015). This was in part due to 
the fact that the region was picked as a region to experiment with the policy (Lal, 2015), but 
it also allowed the Tanzanian state to set up countermeasures to protect villagers from armed 
attacks of Portuguese troops, who were searching for Mozambiquan guerrilla fighters 
(Seppälä and Koda, 1998). Cashew cultivation continued to rise during the 1960s, but by the 
early 1970s, relocation demands placed on the region by villagisation made cashew 
abandonment a widespread problem, causing an extreme fall in production from 1974 
onwards (Lal, 2010). This decline would continue until the 1990s (Lal, 2015), and reflected 
the wider difficulties of achieving regional development during the 1970s and 1980s.  
With colonial and post-colonial administrative failures to promote economic growth in 
the region, contemporary Mtwara still lags behind its northern counterparts in terms of 
economics and social indicators. After a recovery in the production and export of cashews, 
contemporary Mtwara has an economy primarily based around agriculture, with cashew nuts 
being the largest commodity. The southern regions are still considered undeveloped, with a 
Human Development Index score of 0.515 in 2017, which places it in the category of low 
human development and is below the Tanzanian national average (Radboud University, 
2020).39 There have been attempts to economically rejuvenate the region through 
infrastructure projects. Built in 2003, the Mkapa bridge, helped to connect Mtwara and the 
 
39 This average includes Zanzibar, which is the most developed region of Tanzania and thus may 
skewer the national average if compared to just the mainland regions of Tanzania.  
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southern region in general. Before the bridge was built, poor weather, particularly during the 
wet season, could sever the region from the rest of Tanzania, with road journeys taking days 
or weeks, compared to the eight or nine hours it takes now. However, road infrastructure in 
general is still poor, with the road connecting the city to Dar es Salaam only being fully paved 
in 2015 (Must, 2018).  
Alongside the Mkapa bridge has been the Mtwara Development Corridor, which is 
aiming to provide road, rail, and waterway access of the southern regions of Tanzania, 
eastern Malawi, eastern Zambia, and northern Mozambique to the port of Mtwara. Despite 
a new bridge connecting Tanzania and Mozambique and several hundred kilometres of new 
roads built, the corridor is considered as not having the required ingredients for a successful 
corridor, and lacks political support (Mtegha et al, 2012). It is also worth noting that, despite 
a history of marginalisation and administrative neglect, there has been little violence in the 
region, with the exception of the pipeline protests in 2012/3. It is in within this background 
of perceived government negligence, and lack of material goods and infrastructure that the 
discovery of gas was perceived to provide a reversal of fortunes for the region.   
2 The Developmental Materialities and 
Imaginaries of Natural Gas 
Compared to other nations in Africa and Latin America, Tanzania has a less ingrained 
history of extraction, particularly in hydrocarbons. The core of the rhetoric utilised by state 
officials has been developmentalist in its approach to the gas industry, whereby it quickly 
became a part of Tanzania’s goal to be a middle-income country by 2025 (GoT, 2000). To aid 
this, gas will be utilised ‘to all sectors of the economy for maximum benefit and [to] alleviate 
poverty to Tanzanian society’ (GoT, 2015b: 4). As this section will show, it is the rhetoric of 
development, alongside a national project that seeks to apparently treat the country on 
equal footing, that has the strongest influences on a nationwide resource nationalism.   
One of the largest influences on the developmental imaginaries of natural gas has been 
the materiality of the gas itself. Industrialisation and job creation are central to Tanzanian 
development plans (Paget, 2020), and in this instance, the materialities of natural gas allow 
it to be framed as a developmental resource; natural gas can be used in electricity generation 
or as a raw resource in basic industries, particularly in fertiliser production. Both 
industrialisation and increased electricity access and generation being an indicator of 
modernity in the country (Winther, 2008), and therefore natural gas has become a key 
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component of Tanzanian economic development. This industrialisation and electricity 
generation was to be undertaken at both the national level and at the sub-national level, with 
claims for gas to benefit both the whole country and the Mtwara region through the increase 
of electricity provision, and industrial development.  
The non-renewable nature of natural gas extraction has led to pressures to ensure that 
the resource is used effectively for national development. As national plans have claimed the 
country ‘may receive criticism from the next generation that the country has handed the un-
renewable national resources to foreign capital without making enough return’ (GoT, 2011a). 
Adding to vision of the future is also memories of the past (Paget, 2020). Some of the 
discontent around achieving development from natural resource extraction has been 
informed by the memory of the socialist era and Nyerere’s opposition to foreign private 
investment (Poncian, 2019b). The liberalisation of the extractives sector has been challenged 
by the election of Magufuli, who has been placing the party more closely to the socialist era 
of Tanzanian politics since his election (Ahearne, 2017). While there is little history of natural 
resource extraction, Magufuli instead wants to rely on the popular historical memory of 
African socialism both to legitimise his leadership and to promote a developmentalist 
discourse around natural gas as a developmental resource that aids self-reliance (Ponican, 
2019b; Paget, 2020).  
Improving energy infrastructure has been a mainstay for Tanzanian industrial plans 
(GoT, 2011b; GoT, 2016b), with the theory that an increasingly available and reliable energy 
supply will in turn aid the manufacturing sector. The government has projected a substantial 
increase in utilising domestic hydrocarbons for electricity generation in the future (GoT, 
2014a). Natural gas is estimated to contribute to 40% of the country’s electricity supply by 
2040 (GoT, 2016b), up from 32% in 2014 (GoT, 2015a).40 There has been an expectation that 
this gas will sourced from domestic sources, rather than imported. This ties into the current 
narrative of energy security in the country, which is presenting hydrocarbon extraction as a 
matter of national security to ensure increased energy generation (Jacob, 2017). 
Alongside electricity generation, unprocessed natural gas can be used to produce 
agricultural fertiliser. Tanzanian natural gas has been described as ‘industry friendly’ (GoT, 
2011b: 68). This is particularly important for Tanzanian development due to demands in the 
agricultural sector, which is currently reliant on imports. Mtwara was central to state-
 
40 Note, while this seems a small increase percentage wise, there is expectation that electricity 
generation will increase substantially from the present to 2040.  
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planned industrial development centred around natural gas. The region was chosen as the 
site for a special economic zone that focused on the manufacture of petrochemicals, and a 
cross-border ‘minerals corridor’, that was planned to aid the construction of industries based 
around natural resources (GoT, 2011a). Regardless of the sometimes-conflicting strategies of 
utilising gas for both national and regional development, one thing is true for both the 
national and sub-national level: These industrial plans and strategies foresaw gas playing a 
major part in Tanzania’s development. 
Industrial plans promoted natural gas as an industrial resource, rather than a resource 
that could be exported to increase government revenues. These industrial projects were not 
just confined to national development plans and government papers, they shaped the 
discourse around gas as a developmental resource. The electricity generated around gas was 
described as ‘cheap’, and ‘clean’ (GoT, 2011b). On the global energy scene, this is true; gas 
turbine electricity generation ranges from $44 to $73 per MWh, beating offshore wind, coal, 
and nuclear power (Lazard, 2020). However, it still is more expensive than both solar and 
onshore wind power, which ranges from $29 to $42 and $26 to $54 per MWh respectively 
(Lazard, 2020).41 Plans around utilising gas for industrialisation were well known throughout 
Mtwara, with all interviewees expecting some form of industrial development from 
extraction. Promises by politicians during the electoral campaign exacerbated expectations 
of gas-based development (Poncian, 2019a). In particular, the 2010 election brought this 
imaginary to the forefront.  
Resource nationalism also entered the discourse around industrial development plans. 
This was both for national and foreign policy. On the international stage, while the IOCs 
operating in Tanzania are focusing on the export of LNG to East Asian markets, Tanzanian 
documents have focused on the internal development gas can provide. Instead of prioritising 
export and the revenues it could generate for the country, there appears to be a push to use 
the gas itself for development. This is due in part due to concerns of the ‘resource curse’, 
particularly over concerns of the ‘Dutch disease’.42 The integrated industrial development 
strategy note that gas export would be ‘a serious challenge to industrialisation’ (GoT, 2011b). 
One can see this policy in action in the mining sector, as bans on exports have already 
occurred in the gold and coal sector (e.g., Jacob, 2020; Roder, 2019). Furthermore, the 
 
41 It is worth noting that this is for global energy prices. Up to date Tanzanian comparisons of sources 
of energy and their cost per megawatt or kilowatt were not found.  
42 The Dutch disease refers to the spike in the value of a nation’s currency, typically after a country 
begins natural resource exploitation. The increase in the value of the currency can lead to a drop in 
exports of other sectors in the national economy.  
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natural gas policy explicitly states that ‘natural gas will be exported when the domestic 
market has been satisfied’ (GoT, 2013: 4). Currently, all natural gas extracted in Tanzania 
serves the domestic market. However, the industrial and energy plans include utilising gas 
for industrialisation in petrochemicals and an increase in electricity generation (GoT, 2013; 
GoT, 2014a; GoT, 2015a). The question of the future use of gas, either in the form of export 
or domestic consumption, has already begun to create friction between the government and 
IOCs.43  
Internally, while industrial plans were made for Mtwara, the discourse remained that 
it would benefit the entire country. Prioritization of gas was given, rhetorically, for the whole 
country, not just the region where it was discovered (GoT, 2011a). One of the core goals of 
natural gas extraction for the Tanzanian is the ‘optimization of benefits to the government 
and the people of Tanzania through strategic participation, interventions and equitable 
benefit sharing’ (GoT, 2013, italics added). The discourse of gas benefiting all of the country 
would become most prominent during the protests and subsequent riots in Mtwara. 
Tanzania’s resource nationalism within the hydrocarbon sector has been influenced 
both by the historical developmentalist narrative of African socialism, and the imaginary that 
gas as a resource is malleable towards a developmentalist agenda centred around 
industrialisation. However, many of the imaginaries put forward by the government have 
been national in scope and emphasise that the nation as a whole will benefit from the gas. 
The materiality of gas ensured that, when compared to other resources, there was a greater 
chance for wider developmental potential when compared to other resources like gold or 
tanzanite; gas can be transported by pipeline and converted into electricity, either with gas 
turbines or converted diesel turbines, but this would be at the detriment of proximity 
industries that could be built near the gas producing area. These material properties, 
combined with the government’s insistence that natural resources are for all Tanzanians, 
ensured that a confrontation could take place between a nationalism and a regional identity.  
3 Mtwara Resource Sub-Nationalism  
3.1 A Neglected Periphery 
 Many of the imaginaries that constituted Tanzanian resource nationalism also found 
themselves in a Mtwara resource sub-nationalism. Interviewees on the whole expressed 
similar sentiments to the overarching imaginaries given by the Tanzanian government: that 
 
43 Interview, Senior IOC Executive 4, Dar es Salaam, 14.03.2018. 
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gas will aid development, particularly around electricity generation and industrialisation. 
Nevertheless, there are some other factors which shaped a distinctive sub-nationalism over 
the natural gas found in the region. Central to this was a historical perception that the region 
has been left behind when compared to other regions. The introduction of a global industry 
that has considerable sums of capital into a region that had been on the periphery both in 
terms of the country as well as the global economy, further fuelled an imaginary of an 
economically developed Mtwara. There was a hope that the gas industry could bring a 
‘second independence’ to the region.44   
 As mentioned before in the introduction to this chapter, Mtwara has often been seen 
as left behind in terms of economic development. The discovery of gas changed the 
perception of the region, this was noted by both other Tanzanians, who had started to view 
the region as a potential investment destination, and the people of Mtwara themselves. As 
one Mtwara local government administrator told me: ‘Mtwara was regarded as a peripheral 
backward area…then came the gas!’.45 In many ways, gas did put Mtwara on the map, not 
just in the country, but also in international capital in the form of investment from IOCs. 
 The biggest (and most unsurprising) difference between the Mtwara and Tanzanian 
government’s resource nationalism was the degree of localism present in the Mtwara. On 
the whole, interviewees from all social strata would claim that they would want the gas 
industry to benefit the region before other areas of the country. These benefits were material 
in nature, with answers focusing on industrialisation, electricity provision and offers of 
employment. In comparison, direct access to revenues were not brought up by interviewees. 
Rather, the focus on the material development of infrastructure and industrialisation, 
buoyed by political promises aided the creation of an imagery of a gas fuelled future. This 
was highlighted in a group interview in Ruvura, the village in closest proximity to the gas 
extraction sites, where one of the villagers claimed: 
‘We hoped that we would be the first ones to benefit more from the gas than other parts of Tanzania. We were 
promised a lot by politicians who came to campaign in our villages... We know many people in Mtwara are not 
educated, so many of us could not work in the gas industry, but we wanted the benefit which came alongside 
the gas industry. We wanted factories that were promised in Mtwara after the gas exploration. Through that we 
could benefit more from the gas industry. We hoped we could get employment chances in the factories first, 
then other people from outside Mtwara could benefit after. We hoped they would consider us locals first.’46 
 
44 Interview, Member of Parliament, CUF, Dar es Salaam, 14.03.2018.  
45 Interview, Senior Mtwara Local Government Officer, Mtwara Municipality, Mtwara, 26.07.2018 
46 Group Interview, Ruvura Villagers, Mtwara, 05.07.2018. 
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It has been a common theme within extractive literature to suggest that it is rare for 
those in closest proximity to benefit from natural resource extraction due to enclave 
development, and instead, often suffer more from it (e.g., Auty, 2006; Watts, 2007; Ackah-
Baidoo, 2012). What is telling is that there was at least acknowledgement of the limits that 
the gas could bring due to the lack of human capital present in the region. Furthermore, it 
also demonstrates a degree of what the future could have brought to the region; gas 
increased the perception of increased pace towards industrialisation. Sentiments similar to 
the statement above were common from interviewees, particularly from poorer and less 
educated respondents.   
Mtwara resource sub-nationalism was influenced by other natural resource sectors 
in the country. Unlike the government’s experiences with the gold industry before the 
discovery of gas, which focused on the mistakes made during the growth of that industry in 
the 1990s, much of the Mtwara imaginary of the apparently positive developmental potential 
was focused on the tanzanite sector. The discovery of gas was described as giving the region 
a ‘tanzanite in Arusha kind of hope’.47 This further aided the southern resource sub-
nationalism’s focus on jobs and development, whereby the tanzanite industry has seen 
attempts by the government to generate local proximity industry (e.g., revenue collection, 
stone cutting) that both adds value to the resource and provide a direct benefit to the region 
(Kinyondo and Huggins, 2019). Less important was the actual benefits and difficulties of 
tanzanite mining (see Helliesen, 2012; Kinyondo and Huggins, 2019), but rather the 
perception in the southern regions that regions in the north were benefiting from natural 
resources. It is worth noting that due to the well-publicized difficulties of the gold sector, 
gold was not mentioned by respondents.  
With this perception of the past, combined with the imaginaries of natural gas put 
forward by the central government, gas did not just change perceptions of development, and 
therefore the future, but also the pace of such development. Much of this imaginary was 
material in foundation; the pace of development would be judged by the improvements in 
infrastructure and the level of industrialisation that was promised by the government.  
3.2  ‘These are Permanent Changes’: Infrastructure and 
Development 
From the beginning of the gas industry, imaginaries were intertwined with the 
development of infrastructure. This is due in part to the low levels of infrastructure found in 
 
47 Interview, Senior Hotel Manager, Tiffany Diamond Hotel, Mtwara, 18.07.2018. 
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the region; since the discovery of gas in the 2000s, the southern regions have yet to be 
attached to the national grid (Fernández, 2017). Furthermore, before the construction of the 
Mkapa bridge in 2003, the southern regions were cut off during the wet season from the rest 
of the country due to the lack of passable roads. This isolation in infrastructure is coupled 
with the imaginary within both developmental and government discourse that infrastructure 
is presented as a physical form of modernity (Larkin, 2013). Hence the materiality of the gas 
sector in Mtwara was not just coupled with what the gas could directly bring in terms of 
industrialisation and employment, but also indirectly with infrastructures built to 
accommodate the industry and its workers.  
The early stages of gas exploration saw an increase in infrastructure development. 
When asked about what the gas industry had done for the area, Mtwara interviewees, 
particularly elderly and middle-aged respondents, would often shape their answers to the 
construction of three forms of infrastructure: roads, electricity, and construction. It has been 
common to describe poverty in relation to access to infrastructure, particularly in the form 
of roads (Porter, 2002), and the case of Mtwara was no different. Main roads were tarmacked 
and improved for increased road traffic, particularly around the port and a part of the route 
leading to inland gas extraction sites.48 Discussion around buildings centred on high class 
hotels and modern houses constructed to cater for IOC personnel.  
This improvement to the infrastructure network, from the mundane of a tarmac road, 
to modern hotels,49 highlighted the apparent visible march of ‘modernity’ to the region. 
Business owners in the region also highlighted the materiality of capital entering the region 
in visible forms with the increase in the number of banks servicing the city.50 The rapid pace 
of much of this construction further strengthened the imaginary that gas would be the 
catalyst for development. Furthermore, a gas-fired power plant was commissioned in 2008 
and has added 18MW to the Mtwara-Lindi micro-grid, and in 2013 a deal announced for the 
construction of a 600MW gas-fired power plant in the region. In many respects, these 
developments allured the linear modernity similar to those seen in other extractive sectors 
on the African continent (Ferguson, 1999).   
 
48 The main roads leading up to the port were still visibly new and were a noticeable improvement 
compared to the other roads in the city. Furthermore, the road leading the Mnazi bay was also 
partially tarmacked, although further construction all the way to the extraction site has halted.  
49 Before the gas industry, there were no hotels in Mtwara city, only guesthouses.  
50 Interview, Businessperson, Mtwara Chamber of Commerce, Mtwara, 10.07.2018.  
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Politics played a considerable role in this construction to link the gas industry to 
regional industrial development. One of the major events that catalysed the imaginaries of 
what natural gas can provide was the 2010 general election, which occurred during the 
exploration period where considerable gas deposits were being found offshore. The most 
extreme of these imaginaries, and one that was repeated throughout fieldwork, was that 
‘Mtwara will be like Dubai!’. Slogans like these massively shifted expectations on what gas 
could bring to the region by comparing it to one of the richest regions of the planet, and in 
doing so, altered imaginaries of the future to one of extreme prosperity. In essence, the 
imaginaries of rapid industrial development would have not occurred in Mtwara without the 
government exacerbating these perceptions with promises that seem almost outlandish in 
nature.  
The rapid pace of development of infrastructure in Mtwara highlights that the 
promise of gas for development in the region was not just based on rhetoric but had begun 
to be put in place. The gas industry quickly became more than just an industry for the region, 
it was imagined to be the key to unlock industrial development and gain government 
attention in a region where there had been strong feelings of neglect. The gas industry was 
perceived as central for this reversal in fortune. From this perspective, gas represented not 
just a direct financial opportunity, but rather the catalyst of economic development that 
could employ people beyond the immediate gas industry. Because of this, the gas industry 
became synonymous with development itself, and early on became tied to the wider 
economic performance of the region. Electoral politics allowed for the binding of an imagined 
prosperous future and the gas sector to construct a resource sub-nationalism in Mtwara that 
saw both as indistinguishable.  
4 Pipeline Protests and Riots 
The Mtwara pipeline protests were a series of protests from December 2012 to June 
2013, and it ended in violence and several deaths. Plans for constructing a pipeline from the 
land-based gas sector in Mtwara to Dar es Salaam for electricity generation had been 
discussed since at least 2011, as a part of the government’s five-year plan (GoT, 2011a). The 
pipeline itself was 542km in length and was built to a cost of approximately $1.22bn, which 
includes the construction of a gas processing plant in Dar es Salaam for electricity generation. 
Construction was done by the China Petroleum and Technology Development Company. The 
project was also marred in a corruption scandal whereby $600m was lost both in China and 
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Tanzania (The Citizen, 2016). While protests began in December, riots over the pipeline 
occurred in two stages, first in January, and then on the 22nd May 2013, after it was 
announced in the national budget that the pipeline construction would be going ahead. This 
was a protest purely against the government, rather than IOCs. While there were issues 
between the local communities and IOCs operating in the region, IOC officials who were in 
Mtwara during the protests said they were not worried about their personal safety.51  
 The decision around the pipeline should not be underestimated, as it dominated the 
day-to-day life of those situated closest to the gas industry. The majority of respondents 
interviewed from Mtwara objected to the construction of the pipeline. This was to such an 
extent that even the traditional greetings in Mtwara changed from As-salamu alaykum 
(‘Peace be upon you’, a traditional Arabic greeting), to inatoka au haitoki? (it [gas] comes out 
or not?).52 The clampdown ‘resulted in death, beatings and fighting’,53 with some of those 
interviewed having to flee their homes out of fears of their lives,54 and one respondent even 
subjected to torture by government forces for his role in the protests.55  
 At its core, the clampdown this was due to the government perceiving the protests 
as a direct challenge to their authority. Government discourse throughout the protests and 
riots centred around the idea that gas is a national resource rather than a sub-national one. 
During the crisis, Kikwete reiterated a discourse that natural gas is a national project, claiming 
that:  
‘I believe it is something unacceptable that national resources can be restricted only to the place 
where they are found…it has never happened in any country of this world, there is no such policy 
anywhere, and it cannot start from Mtwara’ (Kikwete, 2013, found in Balile, 2013). 
CCM officials blamed local politicians, claiming that they are ‘myopic’, ‘selfish’ and are 
‘inciting the population against the government’ (Wall Street Journal, 2013). In this regard, 
the localism of the utilisation of gas contrasted with the government rhetoric that gas was to 
benefit the whole country. The one nation discourse even indirectly questioned the 
citizenship of the protestors, with the energy and minerals minister, Sospeter Muhongo, 
claiming that ‘anyone who opposes this pipeline is not one of us’ (Reuters, 2013a).  
 
51 Interview, IOC Engineer 1, Dar es Salaam, 22.02.2018; Interview, IOC Engineer 2, Dar es Salaam, 
02.03.2018; Interview, IOC Engineer 3, Dar es Salaam, 28.06.2018. 
52 Group Interview, Mtwara City, Mtwara, 07.07.2018. 
53 Madimba Group Interview. 
54 Interview, Cashew Farmer 1, Ruvura Village, Mtwara, 23.07.2018 
55 Mtwara City Group Interview. This made national headlines and the interviewee showed both the 
newspaper headlines and the scars made during the torture.  
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 The government and CCM officials argued that the protests were a party-political 
issue.56 However, the actions of the local population suggested otherwise. This can be seen 
with the demonstrations themselves; the demonstrations were organised by eight 
opposition parties,57 and publicly claimed that ‘natural gas comes before political party 
affiliations’ (The Citizen, 2013b). While these were organised by opposition parties, the 
protests also obtained the support from the CCM MP for Mtwara Urban, Hasnain Murji, and 
the Mtwara-Mikindani CCM Chairman, Ali Chinkawene (The Citizen, 2013c). Furthermore, 
such a sentiment was expressed by the protestors themselves, with protestors holding 
placards saying, ‘Gas first, parties later, here nothing [gas] goes’ (Figure 8), and ‘gas remains 
or we divide the country’ (Figure 9).   
 Even with a discourse of portraying the protestors as selfish and un-Tanzanian, the 
government also utilised the same imaginaries that aided the construction of the Mtwara 
sub-nationalism in the first place to appease the protestors; former President, Benjamin 
 
56 CCM Regional Administrator. 
57 These were Chadema, NCCR-Mageuzi, SAU, TLP, APPT Maendeleo, ADC, UDP and DP.  
Figure 8: ‘Gas first, parties later, here nothing [gas] goes’ (The Citizen, 2013b). 
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Mkapa, himself a Makonde from the southern region, came to the region to calm tensions in 
January (The Citizen, 2013a), with promises of jobs and industrialisation, which included 
promises of 57 factories in the region (The Citizen, 2013a). Alongside this, Kikwete, despite 
his hard stance towards the protests, still promised that 84% of the gas would remain in 
Mtwara (Kamat, 2017). In this respect, the Tanzanian government was promising the same 
imagined future that it promoted before the announcement of the pipeline. This still centred 
around keeping natural gas in the region, but more importantly, keeping the promise of 
industrialisation (and accompanying jobs) that the gas was supposedly to bring.  
4.1 Misunderstandings? 
 Many interviewees, particularly those that had been directly impacted by the 
protests, claimed that the riots were a misunderstanding between the protestors and the 
government. Central to this misunderstanding was the friction between two resource 
nationalisms; the government believed that the protestors wanted to keep the gas for 
themselves, which is antithesis to a resource nationalism that looks to provide development 
for the entire state. On the other hand, for the people of Mtwara, construction of the pipeline 
was the material confirmation that gas would be taken away from the area to be processed 
in Dar es Salaam, and with it removing the catalyst for economic development in the region.  
 The construction of material infrastructure in the form of an export pipeline was 
removing the sub-regional imaginary of development being led by a gas industry, and the 
Mtwara protests and riots were the most visible example of the friction between competing 
Figure 9: ‘Gas remains or we divide the country' (The East African, 2013). 
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resource nationalisms. Thus, the entire foundation for an imagined prosperous future that 
had been allowed to flourish and promoted by the government years before was going with 
it. One respondent during a group interview highlighted in hindsight the how the politics of 
gas furthered the misunderstanding between the two nationalisms:  
‘During the exploration activities they promised milk and honey to everyone in Mtwara, then the people this 
saw milk and honey is being taken to Dar es Salaam. In short, we demanded to see if it will be possible to that all 
the gas extracted in Mtwara can be processed in Mtwara, so that we can benefit from the whole process, then 
we can transport it to Dar es Salaam as a finished product. But the political leaders thought that the Mtwaran 
people were being selfish and did not want to share the resources found.’58 
The risk of jobs that had not yet materialised, rather than the physical presence of 
gas, was the main concern of protestors. Hence, it was not just the gas itself that was being 
taken away, but also the imagined future of industrialisation. The pipeline thus became a 
symbol of removing development from the region. Steven Graham and Simon Marvin have 
argued that infrastructures are seen to be ‘instigating waves of societal progress’ (Graham 
and Mavin, 1996: 42). In this case, the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline suggests the opposite. 
The imaginaries of future prosperity and industrialisation were being taken away with the 
gas to Dar es Salaam, and with this came the removal of the perceived promise of jobs and 
industrialisation which were central to the image of a developed Mtwara.  
As noted by Larkin (2013), infrastructures are not just technical projects, they also 
operate on a level of fantasy and desire. Before the construction of the pipeline, and the 
surrounding protests, it was clear to see both of these factors with the political promises of 
industrial development. Yet the realities of the industry and government strategy changed 
matters. With the construction of an export pipeline, the materialities of the now-existing 
gas industry were working against the imagined future constructed years before. The 
construction of the pipeline massively changed the resource sub-nationalism that emerged 
in Mtwara. Alongside this was a delegitimization of protestors demands through the prism 
of national development; as Ferguson argues in The Anti-Politics Machine (1994), discourses 
of development imagine futures and can delegitimise popular demands. As the government 
portrayed the project as essential for national development through electricity generation, 
it in turn questioned the loyalties and citizenship of the protestors for the nation to develop. 
In this respect, the imagined future of a prosperous future of Mtwara was portrayed as being 
in contrast to national development, and therefore success.  
 
58 Madimba Group Interview.  
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5 Piping Away Development 
The construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline rapidly changed the 
relationship the Mtwara population had with both natural gas and the government. While 
the government achieved its aim of constructing the pipeline for electricity generation, the 
strategy behind the construction alienated and frustrated those closest to the project. With 
Tanzanian resource nationalism claiming to utilise natural gas for the development of the 
whole country, it is paradoxical that it reinforced historical imaginaries of neglect within 
Mtwara, and in particular, industrial development in Dar es Salaam.  
5.1 Reimagined Futures 
With the construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline being completed in 
2015, the post-protest period of Mtwara has seen a change in the imaginaries of what gas 
can provide to the region, and therefore a change in the resource sub-nationalism present. 
While the protests have ended, they have provided a change in the social interaction with 
the gas industry; shops in Mtwara now close on the anniversary of the riots,59 and there is a 
‘scar’ of distrust between government forces and the people,60 which has led to some of the 
respondents to feel that they are not Tanzanian, rather they are Kusini (southern).61 Despite 
this, there was no separatist sentiment encountered during my time in Mtwara. There has 
also been a change in the political landscape, where the Hasnain Murji, CCM MP for Mtwara 
Urban, lost his seat during the 2015 election to CUF. A number of CCM wards for the 
municipal council were also lost, chiefly to the CUF party.  
Such imaginaries of modernity being taken away has occurred in previous resource 
booms (Ferguson, 1999), and Mtwara presents another such example, albeit through 
infrastructure development rather than commodity price crashes. In the past, the resource 
sub-nationalism of Mtwara had been one of positivity; the industrialisation of the region, the 
provision of jobs and improvement of livelihoods was seen to be unlocked because of the 
gas. Unlike the construction of roads and hotels, the level of industrialisation in the region 
occurred at a far slower pace. When asked about hopes, past and present, tied to the gas 
industry, one Mtwara farmer stated:  
 
59 IOC Engineer 1 Interview. 
60 Group Interview, Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO (Group), Mtwara, 11.07.2018 




‘Our hopes were high and got higher after the politicians came and talked to us. Mostly, our hopes were on 
factories which came along with the gas industry, for example: a potential fertilizer plant. From these, we hoped 
there will be several different employment opportunities created.’62  
These responses centring around industrialisation were common, and comments 
surrounding employment, factories, electricity generation, and other supposed economic 
benefits were communal from respondents. In this respect, gas was to power, or provide raw 
materials, for industrialisation for Mtwara.  
While the promises of rapid industrial development have failed to occur, there has 
been minor progress to industrialise the region. At the time of writing, there is only one major 
factory near the city – the Dangote cement factory. This stands in contrast to the 
petrochemical zone planned for the city, and the political promises made after the protests 
for more factories to be based in Mtwara. It fell far below expectations. When asked about 
expectations of the gas industry, respondents in a group interview in the village of Madimba 
claimed ‘we cannot see what we were promised by our leaders’,63 and that: 
‘Mtwara is part of Tanzania and we want factories because we understand what kind of development they will 
bring to our society. But I see the current government does not give Mtwara greater attention and the gas 
industry keeps on deteriorating. They have been quiet on this matter of gas and its situation for a long time 
since they have been in power.’64 
These imaginaries which were catalysed by political discourse have now been taken away by 
the same political party. While ‘Mtwara will be like Dubai’ is now routinely mocked, there are 
still hopes that industrialisation can occur, although the pace of such progression has been 
diminished.  
With the Tanzanian gas industry seeing little progress in Mtwara, it appears that the 
initial optimism and imaginaries created by the gas would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
replicate if the industry returns. Currently, there is negativity or apathy towards the gas 
industry in Mtwara. One interviewee claimed that:   
‘There are no hopes for the industry. In short, we do not see any hope for now because it is hard to know what 
can happen to bring same energy and desire seen during the exploration period. Maybe if there are new 
discoveries, we can hope they will not take whatever they found there to Dar es Salaam, maybe then we might 
develop because of the gas industry.’65  
 
62 Interview, Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO Employee 2, Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO, Mtwara, 
15.07.2018 
63 Madimba Group Interview. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Group Interview, Msimbati Villagers, Mtwara, 18.07.2018 
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‘All the hopes for the industry are completely dead, there is no good faith in anything, our expectations turned 
into a disaster. Many of us in Mtwara expected that we would have a better economy like Dar es Salaam or 
other parts of Tanzania, but it turned out to be protests, riots, disappointment, fighting, lies and political 
commotion, especially during 2013. All of this was because of the gas.’66 
Such feelings were common with respondents, some of whom wished gas was never 
discovered.67 Here one can see how central the pipeline was in removing the resource 
imaginary of gas-led development and enshrined a resource sub-nationalism centred around 
grievances towards the core of the country. In this respect, the event of the riots and the 
collective memory around them have forever changed the social interaction with the gas 
industry: Rather than gas providing development, it represents the shift between the 
imagined future of an industrialised Mtwara and the reality that little immediate change to 
the region was going to occur. Fuelling this is the pipeline itself, which is physically removing 
the gas, and the assorted imaginaries of development with it, to the economic core of the 
country.  
5.2 Resource Nationalism and Political Marginalisation 
As previously mentioned, one of the largest causes of the Mtwara resource sub-
nationalism had been the neglect of the southern regions in comparison to the more affluent 
north and Dar es Salaam.  While the resource imaginaries of a more prosperous future may 
have subsided in the region, the regional inequalities have persisted, and attitudes towards 
the northern regions of the country, particularly Dar es Salaam, have become exacerbated as 
it has been perceived that the pipeline has taken the development to the city: 
‘Northern Tanzania benefits more than the south because big development projects always start on the 
northern side of Tanzania or from Dar es Salaam and then come to the southern side. Mtwara is also part of 
Tanzania and gas was supposed to bring us the same development. But they took it to Dar es Salaam, and 
currently there is a big new project of installing gas pipes for domestic use in houses. That project was supposed 
to start in Mtwara, not somewhere else.’68 
For many interviewees, the government’s discourse of nationalism and treating the 
whole nation equally rings hollow when it comes to development practises and natural 
resource management. This can be seen with electricity. In an attempt to placate local 
frustrations over the pipeline, efforts to increase electrification increased after the protests 
 
66 Mtwara City Group Interview. 
67 Madimbia Group Interview. 
68 Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO Group Interview. This gas project is a pilot scheme to test the 
viability of installing pipes to provide cooking gas directly to homes. During my time in Mtwara, this 




(Fernández, 2017). Nevertheless, the construction of the planned power plant has not yet 
come to fruition, and projected electricity generation of the new plant has gone down to 
400MW, from a previous 600MW (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2016: 18).  
Adding to this is the fact that the southern regions have yet to be connected to the national 
grid. In this respect, natural gas development from Mtwara has failed to arrive, and instead 
is generating electricity that the region itself cannot access.   
For many interviewees, there was anger over the perceived preferential treatment 
of Dar es Salaam over other regions, with one respondent claiming that ‘Dar es salaam is 
Tanzania’.69 This anger towards the core was less to do with the gas itself but rather the 
imaginary that was created that the gas industry would catalyse industrialisation and 
development. When asked about such regional economic inequality, one cashew nut farmer 
claimed:  
‘Compared to Mtwara, Dar es salaam is getting more from the gas industry. This is one nation, why should one 
city get more than any other town? Dar es Salaam is already a big city. Mtwara is struggling to become a city as 
well. One of things which could attract development to turn Mtwara from a small town into a city is the 
presence of factories. The gas industry could have brought a lot of factories which are connected directly or 
indirectly to the gas industry. Gas discoveries were supposed to be our blessing and to bring development to us, 
not to another place.’70 
Such a sentiment was common with respondents, who shared similar opinions regarding the 
gas industry. There is a concern within that the region will see very little or no benefit from 
the gas industry in Mtwara. In essence, Dar es Salaam is seen as the main benefactor of 
Mtwara gas, and the perceived benefits of the gas industry were going to the core of the 
country at the expense of the periphery.  
While the majority of respondents believed that ‘Dar es Salaam keeps on developing 
while Mtwara is going backwards’,71 this opinion was not uniform and included some 
disagreements between respondents in group interviews.72 However, while some 
respondents did disagree that the core has got more development and revenues from 
Mtwara, it was still grounded in the same resource sub-nationalism:  
‘Dar es Salaam is not getting more out of Mtwaran Gas. Dar es Salaam is the centre of development, and there 
is a lot of industries there that have a high demand for Mtwaran gas. What we did not want is for the 
government to transport raw gas from Mtwara. We wanted the government to transport processed gas. 
 
69 Interview, Mtwara Resident, Mtwara, 10.07.2018 
70 Ibid. 
71 Cashew Farmer 1.  
72 Mtwara City Group Interview.  
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Mtwaran gas should be processed in Mtwara because by doing so, Mtwara would have got both the direct and 
indirect employment and benefit from the whole procedure.73 
As one can see, while there was an understanding that gas can provide a greater benefit for 
beyond the southern regions, but instead wanted a greater contribution to the development 
of the country. In this respect, the resource sub-nationalism in Mtwara was one that was 
centred around adding value, both to provide greater development to the region first and 
then the wider country.  In this respect, the government’s resource nationalism has fractured 
unity rather than reinforcing it. By staying with the rhetoric that natural resources are for the 
whole nation to a traditionally neglected region, the government caused friction with a 
resource imaginary and a resource sub-nationalism that it also helped create.  
Politically, the developmental promises for the gas in the region have been replaced 
by increased efforts in the cashew nut sector. Cashews are still one of the main agricultural 
sectors of the local economy, and Magufuli has ordered the army to buy cashews at higher 
prices offered in the private sector (BBC, 2018). This has been in part to aid the CCM electoral 
prospects in the region, which were severely hampered by the pipeline protests. This had 
ended poorly, with long processing times (The Citizen, 2018b), and delayed payments for 
farmers, putting many in financial stress (The Citizen, 2018c).   
The result of the pipeline has been a decline in the imaginaries of gas as the catalyst 
for industrialisation, and apathy and even regret towards the industry. Despite this change 
in the imaginary of gas development, frustrations remain over the government’s handling of 
the gas industry, which has fuelled resentment to more prosperous regions. Natural gas 
imaginaries altered perceptions of the future, and once the pipeline had been constructed 
this imagined future disappeared with it, disrupting plans to industrialise and develop.  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the evolution of resource sub-nationalism in Mtwara and the 
frictions between the Mtwara population and the Tanzanian government over natural gas. 
The discovery of trillions of cubic feet of gas at the height of the commodities boom fuelled 
imaginaries of a prosperous future for both the whole country and the southern regions. In 
this respect, it was not the direct temporalities of extraction that dictated actions of these 





gas wealth. These imaginaries were fuelled by the materialities of gas as a developmental 
resource that could be utilised both for industrial development and electricity production. 
However, it was the political involvement and electoral promises during the 2010 general 
election that raised expectations.  
The discourse for gas for national development allowed for two resource nationalisms 
to take place within the gas industry, one promoted by the government and the other which 
took the government’s discourse and was mixed with a historical memory of political 
marginalisation and neglect: the resource nationalism constructed by the government was 
national in character and scope, and utilised, at least in public discourse, the gas for state-
wide development, particularly focusing on electricity generation for the whole country. This 
was, and still is, coupled with a centralised bureaucratic structure around natural gas. 
Alongside this resource nationalism and sub-nationalism, were differing imaginaries of the 
future. While both imagined gas-based industrialisation and wider economic development, 
the differences were between the location of this development.   
At its core, the Mtwara resource sub-nationalism contains many of the tenants of wider 
Tanzanian resource nationalism and narratives, but it was further entwined with historical 
and geographical grievances. Imaginaries around gas were that it would not just provide fiscal 
benefits, but also rapidly industrialise the region, and to right the perceived wrongs of 
political and economic marginalisation. These were propped up by promises and statements 
by politicians that ‘Mtwara will be like Dubai!’. Because of this, the perceptions of the future 
rapidly changed, as well as the speed of which change takes place.  
The materialities of the gas industry eventually undermined the imaginary of gas 
providing local development. Central to this was the infrastructure that is required for natural 
gas. The construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline, and the resulting protests and 
riots saw a fundamental shift in the imaginary of gas. The materiality of the infrastructure 
was now not providing (imagined) development, but rather piping this ‘developmental’ 
resource directly to Dar es Salaam without any addition to its value. The result of this has 
been an imagined future taken away by the material reality of the gas sector.  
This was further fuelled by the government’s response to the protests, which suggested 
that the protestors were against wider Tanzanian development, and rather wanted to keep 
the resource for itself. The conflicting imaginaries between gas-led futures were as much 
developmental imaginaries as they were resource imaginaries. In this respect, the 
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government saw the control of natural gas as a control to one of the catalysts of economic 
development and acted on this perceived threat with violence.  
Respondent’s expectations for the future of the region have shifted accordingly; the 
expectations for rapid development have gone, and there is now little hope for 
industrialisation for the region. This has been exacerbated by core-periphery relations where 
the north and Dar es Salaam have been perceived as enjoying the benefits of the gas. In many 
respects, the imaginaries of the development of the region have reverted to a pre-gas 
situation where contemporary marginalisation continues to be the norm, and a revival of the 
gas sector offers little change to the future.  
In conclusion, resource nationalisms, and in this respect, the resource sub-
nationalism of Mtwara, are not static, but evolve through events and changes in the sector. 
Central to the evolution of the Mtwara resource sub-nationalism was the materialities of the 
gas sector. The government planned natural gas to be the catalyst for national 
industrialisation and electricity generation, while at the same time promising this to the local 
Mtwara population. This materiality of gas, one of a ‘developmental resource’, changed in 
Mtwara with the announcement and eventual construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam 
pipeline, which removed the gas from the region with little value addition, and in doing so, 






Chapter V: Extractive Frontiers: The 
Promises of ‘Booms’ and Going Bust in 
Mtwara 
1 Introduction 
The introduction of the offshore gas sector to the region of Mtwara caused considerable 
changes to both the local economy and the perception of the region from international and 
domestic actors. The modern onshore gas industry in Mtwara started on the 8th June 2006 
with the drilling in Mnazi Bay by the IOC Artumas, later known as Wentworth Resources 
(TPDC, 2019a).74 Yet the largest discoveries and investment has come from the offshore 
sector. It marked the first official foray into Mtwara as a gas frontier and introduced both 
boom and bust commodity cycles and project phase lifecycles into the region. It also 
introduced new forms of temporalities into the region; the introduction of the gas sector also 
introduced some of the temporalities that dominate the strategic decisions behind the sector 
such as commodity price cycles and the project lifecycle. For the region, the introduction of 
the sector also introduced the commodity cycle, in the form of anticipation and preparation 
for the supposed ‘resource boom’ that was to accompany the maturing of the sector.  
Preparations and anticipations of resource booms have been a small but growing part 
of literature examining the social effects of natural resources. For example, Frynas et al 
(2017), explores how expectations of resource booms have their own impact on the political 
economy of states. They demonstrate in STP and Madagascar, how, despite a lack of 
sustained exploitation of natural resources, the expectations of a boom allowed for certain 
elements of the resource curse to be exhibited in both countries. This was chiefly through 
economic effects, such as volatile growth and increased government spending, and 
governance effects, such as increased rates of corruption among national politicians and 
reduced perceptions of governance. The impact of resource boom expectations on the 
potential for conflict was weaker. While Frynas et al’s work explores the macroeconomic 
scale of anticipating resource booms, this chapter explores how anticipation for a ‘resource 
boom’ occurred at a local level, both within Mtwara city and villages surrounding the gas 
extraction sites.  
 
74 This alludes to on the ground presence of exploration conducted by IOCs Obviously, there had 
been bidding rounds and preliminary exploration done before this.  
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Economic booms, both real and anticipated (often) come with a bust. Mtwara is no 
different. Here, the current literature on how resource busts affect the local have not 
garnered the same attention when compared to case studies anticipating resource booms. 
Some exceptions include Walsh’s (2012) research into post-boom towns in sapphire mining 
in Madagascar, which highlighted both the positives and negatives of those living in this post 
boom period. However, there are many differences between this case study and the Mtwara 
case study; the sapphire boom in Madagascar was predominately artisanal led, which tends 
to have a wider impact on the local economy (Hilson, 2009). Secondly, the post-boom towns 
in Madagascar experienced considerable exploitation and saw the most available deposits 
exhausted. Mtwara has not. Rather, the boom was in construction and supply services in 
anticipation of the gas sector. In this respect, Mtwara awaited a resource boom that never 
truly materialised. 
As Tsing (2003) states, capitalist frontiers are projects in making geographical and 
temporal experiences. In essence, they reshape both space and temporality. In the case of 
Mtwara, the boom-and-bust cycle did not just place it on the global energy map, but also 
altered its local economy and society. The boom-and-bust temporalities of the gas industry 
before the offshore sector was established presents an interesting case study: high 
commodity prices promised Mtwara to be reshaped an energy frontier, but declining prices 
in turn hollowed out this frontier status for extractive capital. This was not just for IOCs, but 
as will be shown, also a frontier for domestic investment for supply services to the sector.   
The bust of commodity prices occurred before the offshore industries transition into the 
production phase, and this has seen the industry enter a purgatory of sorts; the location of 
major gas deposits is known, the reserves are estimated to account for 57tcf, yet the price of 
gas and national politics have seen little to no IOC activity in Mtwara since 2015. With the 
offshore export sector (and its linkages) no longer an exciting investment opportunity, the 
Mtwara gas industry has been reshaped to be a quasi-frontier. It is known on the energy and 
domestic capital as having ‘potential’, but at the same time due to political considerations 
and low gas prices, it is simultaneously ignored as a location for further investment. At the 
same time, the temporalities of boom and bust have concurrently made the region more 
vulnerable to international extractive temporalities than ever before, but with little financial 
or material gain at the local level to show for it.  
The end of the gas boom was not a singular event, but rather was dependent on the 
actors involved in the industry. For many residents in Mtwara, the end of the boom was the 
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construction of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline, as it became a signal for a shifting of 
investment away from Mtwara and towards Dar es Salaam. For some scholars researching 
Tanzanian extractives, it was the passing of the 2015 resource laws (Jacob and Pedersen, 
2018). For interviewed IOC personnel, they suggested the reason for the slowdown in 
operations was due to two factors: firstly, it was the governments hostility to extractive 
corporations, second was the fall in commodity prices at the end of the ‘commodities super-
cycle’. This chapter will focus on the local fallout of the latter.  
This chapter explores how two of the mainstays of extractive temporalities, the 
commodities cycle and project phase lifecycle, created anticipation for a resource boom that 
never truly occurred. Its arguments are twofold: firstly, it argues that the perception of 
continued high commodity prices left the population and domestic investors to anticipate a 
‘resource boom’. This anticipation both shifted expectations and actions of actors 
accordingly. Secondly, it argues that the commodity cycle reshaped Mtwara as a frontier, not 
just for international energy firms, but also for domestic capital that sought to invest in the 
region for the anticipated ‘boom’. In doing so, an economic boom did occur in Mtwara, but 
was driven more by domestic capital that sought to invest in hospitality and real estate 
services to supply the hydrocarbon sector. When the offshore sector hit a pause between 
progressing from exploration to development and construction, and gas prices in the Asian 
market dropped, the construction and real estate bubble that had built in anticipation of a 
boom had turned into a bust.   
This chapter is structured chronologically; it first explores the economic boom that 
accompanied the gas industry in Mtwara. It argues that the boom introduced economic 
temporalities in the form of project lifecycle phases and the boom-and-bust cycle. During this 
time, the region was in the middle of both the positive aspects of extractive temporalities; 
the high commodity prices led to a preparation of a resource-led boom and was accompanied 
by the early stages of the project phase lifecycle that requires the most direct and indirect 
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. It then focuses on the bust, which focuses 
on the sectors and livelihoods of actors that changed their behaviours in anticipation for the 
gas sector, and how they have changed due to the fact that the anticipated boom did not 
arrive. Furthermore, it argues that while the gas industry remains embryonic, some of the 




2 The Promises of Booms on the Frontier 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the discovery of commercial quantities 
of oil and natural gas across East Africa rapidly changed the oil and gas industries discourse 
of the region from a ‘backwater’ to a ‘frontier’. In Mtwara, this resulted in increased 
investment into the region, not just by multinational oil companies,75 but also investment 
from domestic private and public capital. This increased attention and influx of capital had 
profound implications on the development and economic performance of the region. Chief 
among these was the amount of capital invested in the region. This was in part due to the 
low amount (both in terms of quality and quantity) of infrastructure available in the region. 
The deep seaport in the city also saw increased traffic from IOCs during deep sea exploration, 
76 and was accompanied by investment by BG to improve the port in the early stages of the 
offshore sector (BG, 2013), and a $700,000 investment into the port in 2015 (The Citizen, 
2015a).  
While the gas industry was the catalyst for this boom, investment came not just from 
IOCs, but also domestic sources. The majority of the investment that affected the lives of 
those in the immediate area came from national investment both from the government and 
by domestic investors in land and construction. In essence, Mtwara became the frontier not 
just for international capital, but also a domestic frontier for Tanzania. This increased 
investment brought not just money, but new people and ideas to the region. However, this 
increased domestic investment rested entirely on high commodity prices to continue 
exploration and potential exploitation of natural gas.  
2.1 The Commodity Super Cycle and Mtwara 
The commodities super cycle was one of the main reasons for IOC exploration for 
hydrocarbons in East Africa in the first place, with increased and sustained demand from 
developing economies, particularly China (Erten and Ocampo, 2013). This was accompanied 
by bullish market analysists, who suggested that the idea of a commodity bust occurring soon 
will be exaggerated (Heap, 2005; Canuto, 2014), and suggestions that this cycle could last up 
 
75 This did not just include the international oil companies that directly extract gas, but also 
hydrocarbon supply services such as Haliburton and Schlumberger, both of which operated in 
Mtwara. While these companies do not have a direct stake in the oil and gas fields themselves, they 
are contractors that supply technical services to IOCs. At the time of research, Haliburton had left 
Tanzania. Schlumberger still technically had a base of operations in Mtwara, although they 
underwent a ‘silent refusal’ for my requests to interview personnel.   
76 Interview, Dockworker 1, Mtwara Port, Dar es Salaam, 18.02.2018; Interview, Dockworker 2, 
Mtwara Port, Dar es Salaam, 20.07.2018  
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to 35 years (Cuddington and Jerrett, 2008). Increased commodity prices allowed for MNCs to 
explore for mining deposits in regions seen as previously unsuitable, either due to geological, 
political, or economic constraints. This also coincided with technological advancement in the 
form of deep-sea drilling of oil and gas, which opened up areas up greater than 5000 feet in 
depth in ‘ultra-deep sea’ areas. Tanzania was a benefactor to both of technological 
advancement and high commodity prices.  
Unlike the oil industry, which is a truly global market, the gas industry remains an 
‘industry that stubbornly resists globalisation’ (Mason, 2015: 327). The desired market for 
Tanzanian gas was (and still is) the Japanese market.77 During these years, the price of gas in 
the Japanese market, rose from roughly $3 per MMBTU78 in 2000, to a height of $16 MMBTU 
in 2008. This price fluctuated in between $11 to $16 until late 2014 (Figure 10). Without the 
high prices of gas in the Japanese market, such exploration for deep sea gas would have been 
economically unviable. Because of this, Mtwara was opened up to new markets; while the 
region had traditionally supplied raw cashew nuts to the Indian market (see below), the gas 
industry allowed the region to be exposed to the Japanese gas market, a market that includes 
many East Asian economies, and is also historically tied to crude oil prices (CME Group, 2018). 
 
77 Until 2018, Japan was the world’s largest importer of natural gas (Reuters, 2018b). Imports have 
fallen due to the restarting of nuclear power plants after their shutdown during the Fukushima 
disaster in 2011. It has now been overtaken by China, with India the third largest importer of LNG 
(IEA, 2019b). This suggests that if Japanese demand continues to fall, Tanzanian gas is still in a strong 
geographic position to supply three of the world’s largest importers of LNG.  
78 One million BTU is approximately equal to a thousand cubic feet of natural gas (EIA, 2018). Unlike 
oil, which universally tends to be measured and sold in terms of barrels, gas can be measured in 
British Thermal Units (BTU), 1,000 cubic feet (Mcf), or 1,000 cubic metres. MMBTU was chosen for 






























































































































Natural Gas Price in Japan 2000-2016
Figure 10: Natural Gas Price in Japan 2000-2016 (data collected from IMF, 2019b). 
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Furthermore, it allowed for an industry that, as long as the market conditions are right, can 
generate revenues throughout the year. 
2.2 The Introduction of Gas Investment into Mtwara 
In the period between 2006 to 2014, Mtwara found itself in two of the most labour- 
and capital-intensive phases of the extractive industry. Firstly, commodity prices, including 
gas, were at their height. Alongside this are the lifecycles of gas wells, which were in the 
exploration and developmental phase for the offshore and onshore sector, respectively. 
These phases require both capital investment for equipment and construction of facilities. 
The use and purchase of equipment for the exploration phase offers little wider economic 
benefit for the region, as offshore equipment is highly technical and imported. Rather, the 
wider benefits from these phases come from the construction of facilities and employment 
(Darko, 2014). This is particularly true for the development phase in the onshore sector, 
which includes construction, to generate direct and indirect jobs and investment through 
construction activities and supply sector jobs, albeit temporarily.  
Due to the technical skills involved in offshore exploration and development, most of 
the direct local employment from the wells came from the onshore industry. For the onshore 
gas industry in Mnazi Bay, there had been opportunities to participate in the construction of 
gas wells, production facilities and the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline. These employment 
opportunities were temporary in nature; one Tanzania well manager interviewed told me 
that roughly 200 casual labourers were employed during the seismic stage and 100 during 
exploration, and this did not include semi-skilled labourers that would have worked on site 
like drivers, plasterers and electricians.79 By the senior manager’s admission, this change in 
labour practises was not communicated effectively to those living nearest to the extractive 
site.80 Interviews of former labourers in Msimbati claimed that they were paid 12,000 
Tanzanian shillings per day.81 Because of this, many villagers living closest to the site 
expressed frustration at the opportunity, and removal of employment, which is explored in 
greater depth below.   
Geographers and anthropologists have focused on the poor economic returns and 
increase in social hardship the introduction of extractives industry have in areas near the 
extractive site (e.g., Fentiman, 1996; O’Rourke and Connolly, 2003; Bush, 2008). However, 
these concerns were not noted in interviews. Instead, respondents in both the villages and 
 
79 Interview, Well Manager, Mtwara, 17.07.2018.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Msimbati Group Interview. This is roughly $5.  
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in the city of Mtwara were positive about the initial introduction of the gas industry into 
Mtwara, particularly around the growth of the local economy. On the one hand, this is logical; 
considerable promises of development were made to local villagers, both in the form of 
infrastructure development and job opportunities. 
Initial positivity over the sector is backed up with economic growth of the region: 
Official statistics recorded 40% annual GDP growth of the region between 2009 and 2010, 
the first year of gas exploration by Ophir and BG (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015).82 While 
this jump is extremely high and there could be discrepancies within the economic 
calculations, GDP growth in the region does appear to have grown significantly. Official 
statistics report that GDP growth grew at an average of 13.70% per year between 2012 and 
2018, although this is consistent with the national average GDP growth of 12.98% (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2019).83  
One of the ways the anticipated boom altered the local economy in Mtwara was 
through a change in the perception of the cashew sector. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Mtwara before the discovery of deep-sea gas was an economy chiefly based on the 
cultivation and export of raw cashew nuts, primarily to the Indian market. In this respect, the 
business cycle of the region was one dominated by the cashew nut industry, and therefore 
economic and social temporalities were often cyclical in nature; the region’s harvest season 
is from October to February and occurs at a time where prices are at a peak due to the fact 
that it stands in contrast with other national cashew nut harvests (Figure 11).  
For the city of Mtwara, the cashew harvest season meant an increase in income and 
trade during from October through to February. However, preparations begin before the 
initial harvest in October. This influenced my own experience in Mtwara in the form of 
housing; when arriving in early July 2018, multiple hoteliers and middlemen often 
commented that I arrived at the right time, for if I arrived a month later when preparations 
for the cashew nut harvest were occurring, I would have struggled to find housing, or would 
have to pay prices two or three times higher than I paid. A quick search online for prices 
 
82 Authors own calculation based on data from National Accounts of Tanzania Mainland 2007-2014 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The recording of GDP in African contexts is difficult and may 
have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Furthermore, this is from official statistics, which may also be 
influenced by politics, as Tanzania has had recently been criticised for unreliable statistics by the IMF 
(Financial Times, 2019c).   
83 Author’s own calculation based on data from National Accounts of Tanzania Mainland 2007-2014 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Note that the national average excludes Zanzibar.  
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suggested they were right.84 While there is some harvest of cashews around the city of 
Mtwara, most of the harvest occurs inland in the regions of Lindi, Ruvuma and Mtwara. 
Rather, it is the port of Mtwara that is central to the cashew sector in that it is used to export 
cashews. Alongside this, the city of Mtwara is used by traders, usually from India, as a 
warehouse location to store cashews and as a location to purchase cashews.   
Anticipation and predictions of the future alter the behaviour of actors in the present. 
This can be seen with the altering of economic planning due to the anticipation of resource 
booms, which is historically common (Drelichman and Voth, 2009; Frynas et al, 2017).85 This 
also occurred in Mtwara, both in terms of economic planning at the administrative level and 
became apparent that such a mindset occurred in residents interviewed. Imaginaries of gas 
led industrialisation changed both the perception of the future and cashew harvest in the 
immediate area around the city of Mtwara and villages near the extraction site. It is worth 
noting that recent macroeconomic literature has suggested that extractive resource windfalls 
affects agricultural productivity within Africa (Dorinet et al, 2020). While this is not a 
substantive account of the local Mtwara cashew sector, comments from respondents suggest 
that the cashew sector was indirectly impacted from the introduction and expansion of the 
gas sector. 
The gas sector changed the imagined economic future of the city and the region. This 
both came in the form of actions on the ground and changes in policies to maximise potential 
 
84 Fieldwork Diary, Mtwara, 02.07.2018. 
85 An in-depth discussion of industrial plans around natural gas can be found in the next chapter.  
Figure 11: Cashew Nuts Favourable Harvest Period (Awadh, 2018). 
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revenues from gas extraction. A new master plan for the region was implemented (Mtwara 
Regional Administration, 2017: 2-3), in which altered the previous Mtwara-Mikindani Master 
Plan (2008-2028) to better accommodate economic and demographic changes caused by the 
gas sector and to attract ‘support of the oil and gas industries and ensure that pragmatic, 
organised and guided physical development of Mtwara area is achieved’ (Mtwara Regional 
Administration, 2017). It is worth noting that there is little discussion of agriculture within 
this updated master plan, and no mention of major cash crops, such as cashews. The 
government changes in discourse and encouragement to enter the sector inadvertently 
discouraged attention to the cashew sector, which was increasingly been seen as a sector for 
the elderly (The Guardian (Tanzania), 2016). As one city respondent, a young man who had 
emigrated to Mtwara city from the rural area of Mtwara told me:  
‘Before gas, cashew nuts were the business of Mtwara. After the gas came cashew nuts became less of a 
concern compared to gas and one of the promises was that gas will be the alternative economy [instead of 
cashews].  The economic priority was to be given on factory and industrial development, employment, and 
investment in Mtwara and all of these were to be boosted by gas industry.’86 
Alongside changes in administrative planning was a change in local perceptions of 
sources of economic growth. One respondent in a group interview claimed that the gas 
industry made people in Mtwara ‘ignore’ cashews.87 The gas sector encouraged rural to 
urban migration, which is covered in greater detail below, and cashew farmers noted a 
reduction in the potential workforce (The Guardian (Tanzania), 2016). In this respect, the gas 
industry directly influenced and changed local working patterns and aspirations, which in 
turn indirectly affected the cashew nut industry. In political discourse, this perception of 
economic change was exacerbated by political slogans and promises that ‘Mtwara will be like 
Dubai!’. This change in focus was noted by local NGO workers that focused on poverty 
reduction in Mtwara:  
‘The gas industry affected the cashew agricultural cycle…When gas exploration activities started, the 
cashew nut industry was out of many Mtwaran’s minds. People started to focus more on gas sector and 
investing in indirect opportunities which come alongside with gas. Because of several reasons such as politicians 
exaggerating on the benefits of gas, people believed that cashew nuts were not paying enough and so on they 
decided to shift towards gas with the high expectation of getting more benefit than in cashew nut sector.’88 
The direct and indirect supply side of the gas industry presented an opportunity to 
allow for a greater and more sustained income than what was considered possible with small-
 
86 Mtwara City Group Interview. 




scale cash crop agriculture. While this was started with the introduction of the gas industry, 
this movement was catalysed by political promises and statements that were outlandish that 
spoke directly to the populace. The introduction of greater investment was coupled with 
government initiatives to promote the industry and included local content initiatives. Local 
content initiatives, although poorly implemented in the beginning,89 did hire some local 
population; people that had worked in the sector, either through construction or other roles 
such as drivers, noted that they obtained their respective roles through local employment 
initiatives.90 It is worth noting that those in Mtwara who were interviewed are no longer 
employed in the sector.  
The positive economic effects of the commodities boom and the exploration phase, 
combined with the election period of 2010, meant that the government neglected the 
possible negatives of capital temporalities, such as a drop in gas price or the change from the 
construction phase to the production phase, which in turn would decrease employment 
opportunities. There was little explanation of the temporary nature of the jobs provided 
during the construction phase.91 Investment into the supply side of the sector both allowed 
for the rapid change of the local economy and made it more vulnerable to global variables in 
the process.  
The promises of a resource boom in the near future allowed a new business cycle to 
emerge in the city of Mtwara; it had changed from one that operated seasonally with the 
cashew nut industry, to one that revolved around the gas industry that operated throughout 
the year within a rapid pace of time. In this respect, two of the main temporalities of 
extractive capital – the commodities cycle and the extractive well lifecycle, catalysed 
domestic investment as well as investment from IOCs. While this industry is capital, rather 
than labour intensive, it did not stop people from being employed either directly or indirectly 
in the industry. This changed the business cycle of one that would see business plans and 
financial strategies around the gas industry, which, at the time provided a more sustained 
income than the seasonal business and labour cycle of cash crops. In many respects, it 
demonstrates the power of the temporalities of extractive capital whereby the agricultural 
business cycle was quickly surpassed by outside capital, leading to a region’s economy quickly 
becoming dependant on an anticipated boom that would occur in the near future, rather 
 
89 Local Content Director, Mtwara, 13.07.2018.  
90 Interview, Former IOC Construction Worker, Mtwara, 10.07.2018; Interview, Former IOC Driver, 
Mtwara, 12.07.2018.  
91 Well Manager Interview. 
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than the cashew nut economy which was largely dependent on natural phenomena like 
weather cycles, which in turn timed the cashew market cycle in India. However, the region 
lacked planning in preparing for the sudden reversal of demand that comes with change of 
project phases, a downturn in gas prices, or the lack of advancement of PSA negotiations 
between the government of Tanzania and IOCs.   
2.3 Mtwara as a National Frontier: Economic and Social Factors  
As mentioned before in the previous chapter, Mtwara has often been neglected by 
both colonial and postcolonial governments, in part due to the lack of infrastructure 
connecting the region to the economic core of the country as well as continued failed colonial 
and post-colonial experiments in development. The discovery of commercial deposits of gas 
changed the perception that the region was ‘looked down upon by the rest of the country’,92 
and rather the region was now seen as having economic ‘potential’.93 This was not just within 
the economic sense, but also within social interactions. Mtwara as a frontier was not just for 
international capital and multinational corporations, but also for Tanzanians outside of the 
region. The introduction of the gas industry allowed both for greater investment, but also 
social interactions with other Tanzanians, and ensured that Mtwara was not just a frontier 
for international capital, but also the frontier of Tanzanian investment.  
In this respect, the gas boom in Mtwara allowed for a more positive image of the 
region than had traditionally existed within the country. Rather than traditional views of the 
region, it had changed to a potential investment destination. This was mainly focused on the 
real estate and construction sectors,94 causing an investment boom, but also involved 
increased government attention and expenditure, particularly within the construction of 
roads and increased electricity generation. The real estate boom was the most visual change 
of Mtwara’s status. The cost of land rose exponentially within the boom period, and people 
were selling their plots of land for a ‘huge’ amount.95 This was heavily promoted by CCM 
politicians and opposition alike, with opposition MP Zitto Kabawe claiming that:  
‘Lindi and Mtwara regions had for long been lagging behind in development, but with the recent 
discovery of huge new gas field, the story will soon be rather than later be quite different…PPF [Tanzania’s 
public pension fund] must move quickly and scout for land and start planning on different pension projects’ 
(Tanzania Daily News, 2012). 
 
92 Mtwara Chamber of Commerce Interview.  
93 Senior Mtwara Local Government Officer Interview.   
94 Interview, Mtwara Economic Planner, Mtwara Municipality, Mtwara, 09.07.2018.  
95 Member of Parliament, CUF. The interviewee claimed that plots of land were selling for up to 300 
million shillings (roughly $130,000). However, this cannot be verified. 
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I could not find out what investments had been done by PPF, however, land was 
brought by the Bank of Tanzania for a new office and housing in the city.96 VETA also had a 
new regional headquarters constructed. As shown in the next chapter, large scale industrial 
projects were also promised. There were other factors that were influenced by increased by 
the gas industry, such as increased reliability of electricity generation, and many residents 
hoped that this would encourage further investment in the region.97 
Many of the private investments by Tanzanians were in services required for the gas 
industry that did not exist in the area before the discovery of commercial gas. Before the gas 
discoveries, there were no internationally certified hotels, and many executives flew out 
from Dar es Salaam to Mtwara by helicopter rather than staying in the area (Tanzania Daily 
News, 2012).98 The result of this investment was that Mtwara was seen as more of a ‘business 
town’.99 Many interviewees from Mtwara, both businesspeople and villagers alike, noted that 
the increase in population resulted in greater cash circulation. The increased level of business 
involvement in the town could be summed up by the statements of two businesspeople:  
‘Before 2010, there were little businesses in Mtwara, after the coming of the gas industry, the number 
of businesses expanded. There are now 500 odd business members [in the Mtwara chamber of commerce]. 
Before that, there were very little members, about 250. Most of these businesses came from people outside to 
invest in Mtwara...Historically, it [Mtwara] was an economic backwater. When the projects came, he building 
industry expanded my new homes and hotels were built. These were mostly lodges and guesthouses. Before the 
introduction of the gas projects, there were only three banks, now there are now eleven.’100 
‘The gas industry had brought a lot of people from Dar es Salaam, as well as other regions. They tended 
to invest in guesthouses etc. Lots of people got encouragement to build or renovate houses, and the 
government encouraged investment, particularly in housing, guesthouses and rentals for both property and 
vehicles. People came here and built things out of their own pocket.’101 
Here one can see the transition from backwater to frontier of international and 
domestic capital; there are now more SMEs operating within the region than before the 
discovery of gas. Alongside this, the increase in the number of banks operating in Mtwara 
has (in theory at least) allowed for an ease of access to capital in the form of obtaining of 
 
96 Fieldwork Diary, Mtwara, 02.07.2018.  
97 Many interviewees appeared to equate modern infrastructure with the key to outside investment, 
this was particularly evident when discussion electricity generation, which was seen as the main 
roadblock to factory construction.   
98 This was also confirmed to me with many discussions of the state of Mtwara with IOC and NOC 
personnel in Dar es Salaam.  
99 Interview, Businessperson 1, Shopkeeper, Mtwara, 24.07.2018.  
100 Mtwara Chamber of Commerce Interview.  
101 Interview, Senior Manager, NAF Beach Hotel, Mtwara, 02.07.2018.  
123 
 
loans for residents in Mtwara. The catalyst for this investment boom was international and 
temporal; commodity prices and an anticipation of a ‘resource boom’ in the near future 
encouraged domestic investment.  
Alongside this investment was an increase in migration towards the region. Migration 
to the city from surrounding rural areas, which had begun before the discovery of gas, 
increased after the announcement of gas discoveries (World Bank, 2014a). Migrants were 
primarily from other areas of Tanzania.102 Whilst no regional population data before or after 
the discovery of the gas has been found, the increase in the population since the discovery 
of gas was said to me from a multitude of interviewees of different social classes and from 
those that live in Mtwara city and the surrounding villages near the gas wells. The increase 
in population has caused long-lasting changes for the city and the surrounding area. Business 
elites, as well as market vendors in the main market of Mtwara, generally found this increase 
in migration to be a positive, with many stating that the influx of people brought changes in 
business practises in the area:  
After the gas industry was established, people came from all over the country to the region. This has 
changed the way to do business. Many business practices from Chagas103 were adopted such as opening a store 
in the early morning, which caused the locals to do the same…The gas industry has brought a lot of changes [to 
business practises]. 104 
They [market members] have learnt many things. First, they learnt from organizations, but they also 
have learnt many from the people who came to Mtwara because of the gas. Personally, I believe that my 
members have learnt most from the new businesspeople who came in Mtwara, who had a similar 
determination of gaining a profit from the gas industry. Before gas exploration activities, Mtwaran’s used the 
same traditional ways of business every day of, which, in hindsight, were not good enough, but the influx made 
Mtwaran’s change the way of doing business and became more competent.105 
The increase in population therefore, for the interviewees, brought in new business 
practises that were seen to be as positive. The image of the frontier is one of space open to 
 
102 While Mtwara is just roughly 40km away from the Mozambique border, interviewees said that 
migrants coming to Mtwara were often Tanzanian nationals or foreigners associated with the gas 
sector, rather than people from bordering states. This may be due to the issues of language or the 
lack of infrastructure at the border, with a bridge connecting the Mtwara region and Northern 
Mozambique only completed in 2010, however, there is no paved road on the Mozambiquan side of 
the bridge (Global Construction Review, 2018). Furthermore, northern Mozambique also has 
undergone its own resource driven economic boom, fuelled both by natural gas and coal (Wiegink, 
2018).  
103 Chagas are an ethic group from the north of Tanzania. They have a reputation in the country of 
being effective businesspeople.  
104 Mtwara Chamber of Commerce Interview. 
105 Interview, Mtwara Market Association, Mtwara, 13.07.2018.  
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capital expansion, and in the respect to Mtwara, the region was not just opening in the 
traditional way scholars have seen frontier (i.e., the expansion of capital to exploit 
‘untouched’ land and natural resources for global markets), but also domestic capital, which 
has seen a change in business practises and a greater incorporation of the region into the 
domestic economy. However, migrants were blamed for a rise in crime and for increasing the 
rate of HIV/AIDs in the region, although rates differ between studies exploring the infection 
rate in the region, suggesting that this is difficult to quantify whether this is true.106   
In this respect, Mtwara was as much of a frontier for domestic as well as international 
capital. It was a ‘traditional’ frontier in the sense that the introduction of IOCs would extract 
‘untouched’ natural resources and utilised and exploited by international capital. Whilst the 
majority (in terms of sums invested) was from international capital, the biggest effect for the 
city of Mtwara was the introduction of domestic capital, which resulted in an increase in the 
population, the circulation of money and the number of businesses operating. Whilst the 
domestic investment had more of a visual impact with the number of businesses competing 
in the region, the fact was that this was a boom that started because of international 
extractive temporalities. Because of this, the boom in Mtwara and resulting domestic 
investment was vulnerable to price shocks and changes in the gas well lifecycles. With an 
economy in Mtwara that was both embryonic in nature and heavily reliant on the gas industry 
for both investment and change in perception, the ‘bust’ part of the commodity cycle would 
hit the city hard, as the next section will show.     
3 Going Bust 
The collapse in gas prices from 2014 onwards, combined with the tensions in 
negotiations between the government and IOCs has led to a pause in the advancement of 
the Tanzanian offshore sector. Alongside this pause in the offshore sector, was the transition 
from the development phase to the production phase for onshore sector, and the end of the 
construction of the contested Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline. Compounding this further is 
the fact that no new onshore wells are being planned in Mnazi bay.  These events were put 
forward to me by a variety of respondents for the reason for the slowdown in Mtwara. The 
one thing that was clear was that the anticipated ‘resource boom’ had failed to materialise, 
 
106 Bringing disease and crime is a common complaint against migrants globally. Furthermore, 
resource boom towns with migrant populations are considered high risk locations for HIV 
transmission in Tanzania and in Africa more generally (Desmond et al, 2005).   
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and instead, those that had invested into the region to benefit from the boom were now 
entering a business environment that was closer to an economic ‘bust’.  
Much like with the growth of the gas industry in Mtwara, the stagnation of the deep 
sea industry coincided with a contraction of gas prices, whereby Japanese gas market, 
alongside the German market, started to sharply decline in 2015 (IMF, 2019).107 The 
Tanzanian deep sea would have been considered one such market that would have turned 
economically unviable, at least in the short term, due to the high costs associated with the 
deep-sea exploration and production.108 The last exploration for gas in the deep-sea sector 
occurred in 2018 by Equinor (The Citizen, 2018e), although this appeared to have been done 
with the insistence by PURA, arguing that Equinor had to do it to fulfil its contractual 
obligations, rather than a meaningful attempt to find more hydrocarbon deposits.109 The last 
exploration by the other IOCs, Shell, Ophir and Pavilion Energy, in the region occurred in late 
2016 (Ophir Energy, 2016).  
This coincided with the exploration phase of the extractive lifecycle was also coming 
to an end, and the beginning of the development phase, which in theory would allow for a 
brief increase in employment with the construction of associated infrastructure and supply 
side industries. However, given the nature of the offshore sector, it is questionable whether 
there will be much employment on the construction of the rigs due to the special skills 
required. Instead, the lack of advancement of the Mtwara gas industry has resulted in a 
situation whereby Mtwara was an economic frontier in name only; the temporalities that 
had allowed for Mtwara to be reconfigured as an energy frontier had gone, and the fall in 
prices ensured that continued exploration was economically unviable. With the most labour 
dependent part of the lifecycle finished, combined with the fall in gas prices, the economy of 
the southern regions found itself in a period of economic contraction and stagnation, not just 
in terms of the economy, but in terms of the hydrocarbon industry itself.  
 
107 The gas industry is more regionalised in terms of market prices than the oil industry due in part to 
the cost of natural gas export infrastructure, either in the form of transnational pipelines or LNG 
plants. Prices are measured by three major natural gas consumers that are geographically distant 
from each other: Germany, Japan, and the United States. The US gas prices for this time period were 
low due to the shale gas revolution occurring in the country, and thus were independent from the 
rising prices experienced in Germany and Japan from 2010-2014. Tanzanian gas is intended for the 
Japanese market, and thus is central to IOC concerns. It is worth noting that the natural gas industry 
is currently moving towards a more global gas price in the same vein as the oil industry (for more 
information, see Bridge and Bradshaw (2017).  
108 The breakeven cost of LNG is covered in the next chapter. 
109 Retired Senior TPDC Executive.  
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While the offshore industry has entered a purgatory of being in between the 
exploration and construction phases of the lifecycle, not all of the Tanzanian gas industry has 
stagnated in transition from exploration to development. The land-based industry, based in 
Mnazi Bay, started production in 2006. Unlike the deep-sea gas industry, which is planned to 
supply gas to the East Asian market, the land-based gas sites in Mnazi Bay supply the 
domestic market for power consumption, and thus the collapse in gas prices have had less of 
an impact. This is due to the fact that the sole customer of onshore Mtwara gas is the 
Tanzanian government (or specifically, TANESCO) for electricity purposes.110  
3.1 Changes in the Local Economy  
 The resulting changes in the economic situation resulted in a change in business 
strategies in companies that had shaped their business model around supply services of the 
gas industry. The failure of an economic boom driven by the offshore gas sector has had a 
knock-on effect for the entire city and wider region. When asked by development in the 
region, interviewees from all social strata would often say that development in the region 
has gone back to ‘normal’, 111 or in essence, back to a pace of development experienced 
before the discovery of gas, or even regressed as there is ‘nothing now’.112 Much of the 
construction had stopped, and infrastructures previously created for the gas industry, such 
as warehouse storage, had proven to be ‘white elephants’.113  
Chief among those business sectors that suffered the most were the major 
benefactors of the boom period: the real estate and the hospitality industry. This was visible 
to those who visit Mtwara. While some of the evidence of the boom period was present with 
paved roads and newly built banks and offices completed with a modern glass aesthetic, 
there are also visible signs of the bust phase in the city, with the coastline of the city having 
numerous construction sites of half-built hotels and houses. Inside those hotels that were 
constructed, and operational, further evidence of previous boom times could be seen in the 
high-class hotels, all of which were quiet. As one would expect, the stagnation of the gas 
industry has had serious repercussions for business activity. When asked about the gas 
industry in Mtwara to senior members of staff in two of the upmarket hotels in Mtwara, they 
claimed:      
 
110 Group Interview, IOC Executives 2, Dar es Salaam, 28.03.2018.  
111 Mtwara Dockworker 1 Interview.  
112 Interview, Businessperson 2, Shopkeeper, Mtwara, 02.08.2018. 
113 Ibid.  
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‘When constructing this [hotel], it was because of the feasibility study we had done. The hotel was needed for 
mzungu’s and future businesses. Now the gas has gone we remain just another hotel. A minimum of business 
which was expected has not materialised. The feasibility study became a fiction. The expectations we had were 
not real. The hotel industry collapsed here, there are 25 unfinished hotels, with 16 unfinished hotels next to the 
beach alone. To make matters worse, land prices are decreasing.’114 
‘The aim of this hotel was for gas and oil workers. Most guests back then were foreigners, company guests, 
now it is locals. There is no business there now, so there is no need to cater for that kind of customer. 
Previously, it was 300,000 shillings for one night.115 The lowest price now is 110,000.116 ‘Normal’ people are 
becoming the customer. The oil and gas period included larger companies…Before you’d get no room if you 
didn’t work in the gas sector. Back in the day we would get 200 to 300 million shillings a month.117 Today, 
reaching 50 million shillings is a success.118 Even restaurant sales have dropped as they used to supply food to 
the oil and gas companies.’119 
 The sudden reversal of the gas industry in Mtwara brought changes in business 
practises which has not resulted in the same amount of investment as before. Some of the 
businesses that were created to service the gas sector suddenly switched to the more 
seasonal cashew harvest for business.120 However, this change in business strategy and has 
questioned the long-term viability of certain suppliers, particularly hotels. This has chiefly 
been for two reasons: firstly, alongside the change in industry has been a change in the 
clientele that dominate the industry. Gone are the technical and business personnel of the 
IOCs, instead, individual and community cashew traders are the new clientele. This has 
presented new challenges for some of the more luxurious hotels in the city:  
‘When you come to the cashew market, most buyers are Indians. They are very tight with money. One 
Indian will purchase lots of cashews and means there are less people here when compared to the gas industry. 
You cannot compare cashew season and the oil and gas industry. If the season is bad, buyers are directly getting 
less than they expected, and they look to cut costs. Before they reach here [Mtwara] they get local people to 
find houses for them, so they are not using hotels.’121 
 Combined with this change in clientele has been a shift from the all-year-round 
presence of the gas industry to the seasonal cashew sector. The shift from a business focus 
from all year to just a few months of the harvest has had severe repercussions for the 
economy of Mtwara as service sector employees have been made redundant since the 
 
114 Tiffany Diamond Hotel Interview. 
115 Roughly $130.  
116 Roughly $48.  
117 Between $87,000 to $130,000 a month. 
118 Roughly $22,000.  
119 Tiffany Diamond Hotel Interview.  
120 Tiffany Diamond Hotel Interview; NAF Beach Hotel Interview; Mtwara Chamber of Commerce 
Interview.  
121 Tiffany Diamond Hotel Interview. 
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stagnation of the gas industry. Alongside this, there is a reliance on weather patterns to 
ensure a successful harvest. This was summarised by one hotelier:  
‘The cashew nut industry is the backbone of Mtwara. On season and offseason, we have to wait to be in 
business for a very short amount of time. They are looking to get a cashew processing plant into the region. We 
will be able to break even.’ ‘Employees don’t benefit with such a seasonal economy. We don’t get reliable and 
full-time employment. As a hotel we only host big buyers.’122 
As with the wider economy of Mtwara, this switch in clientele has also changed the business 
patterns of hotels in the region. The re-emergence of the cashew industry has not just 
affected hotels, but it has also affected the entire business cycle of the region down to 
individual’s livelihoods.  
 For cashew farmers, they claimed that the 2012/13 riots were the reason for the 
poor cashew exports in the following years. This was explained as they argued that it gave 
the impression that the region was unsafe and put off foreigners arriving in the area to buy 
cashews.123. This affected personal incomes in the process. Furthermore, with the shrinking 
of the cashew industry during the economic boom, the cashew farmers present today have 
been struggling in the immediate post-boom economic landscape.124 The impact of this 
should not be underestimated, as one cashew nut farmer told me:  
‘When gas was discovered, all of our focus, effort, investment and expectations were directed towards the gas 
industry. The cashew nut industry was forgotten. When the gas industry went down then there was nothing, we 
all went down with it.’125 
 It is worth noting that the ‘our’ mentioned in the quote above refers to the village of 
Msimbati, a village in close proximity to the gas processing plant and an important area for 
domestic gas production. As mentioned before, the city of Mtwara and surrounding areas 
business practises sought to shift from one of a seasonal agricultural economy to one that 
was buoyed by the hydrocarbon industry, and in the process shifted one from of economic 
insecurity to another. The resultant change to international extractive temporalities resulted 
in major shocks for the local economy, whereby strategies reliant on the oil and gas sector 
had to suddenly reverse to the smaller, seasonal economy of cashew nut harvest and export. 
 
122 NAF Beach Hotel. 
123 Interview, Cashew Farmer 2, Ruvura Village, Mtwara, 23.07.2018. 
124 Interview, Cashew Farmer 3, Ruvura Village, Mtwara, 23.07.2018. Since my time at Mtwara, this 
has appeared to change for the farmers, in the short term at least. Magufuli has ordered the army to 
buy cashew nuts from farmers at the government approved rates, after complaints that the prices 
offered by private traders were too low (BBC, 2018). Opposition members have accused Magufuli of 
playing politics due to the fact that Mtwara is a CUF held area.   
125 Interview, Cashew Farmer 4, Msimbati Village, Mtwara 10.07.2018.  
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Such a change altered labour patterns and revenue streams, whereby the gas industry 
offered continuous business compared to the cashew industry, which is seasonal in nature. 
Because of this reversal, there are only a few months of the year where the local economy 
sees an uplift in business and increased circulation of hard currency.  
 In this respect, the bust stage of the boom-and-bust cycle has complicated the 
concept of Mtwara as a frontier. On one hand, the region still has the potential for gas 
extraction, with quantities of deposits known and the technology required to extract it. 
However, this process is incredibly expensive, and the region is very much a geological 
frontier as much as an energy frontier. In other words, while the gas is there, it is too 
expensive to extract and export. The retreat away from the gas industry has meant that, at 
this current point in time, Mtwara remains a frontier in name only. It is not just the presence 
of natural resources and MNCs that make the frontier, but also the economic temporalities 
that accompany the sector determine whether a deposit is worth the investment for 
extraction.  
3.2 Remnants of the Boom 
With the economy hit hard by the sudden stagnation of the gas industry, the expected 
changes to local livelihoods did not materialise. In many respects, some of the more negative 
aspects for the poorest in society, such as increased land and food prices, have remained, 
but the more positive aspects like increased investment from IOCs, domestic investors, and 
the government, as well as increased formal (albeit often temporary) job opportunities, have 
gone, furthering the drop in economic development. In general, respondents claimed that 
the level of poverty in the area has gone up since the pause of the offshore gas industry, and 
issues like the rise of the cost of living and lack of employment opportunities were common 
amongst interviewees in both the city and the surrounding villages.   
One of the groups of interviewees who are still feeling the negative effects of the boom 
are those closest to the villages. The construction of infrastructure to extract, transport and 
process natural gas has resulted in land being cleared from the immediate area. This, and the 
resulting infrastructures created have altered the immediate geography of the area through 
two factors: physical removal to make way for infrastructures, and pollution resulting from 
gas extraction. Land clearance, in the form of removal of shelter and cash-crops like coconuts 
and cashews, to free up space for infrastructure, were often a major complaint amongst 
villagers interviewed. Alongside this, wastewater from the gas field and increased 
temperature emitting from pipelines and extraction infrastructures were also blamed on the 
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gas industry.126 During a group interview in the village of Ruvura, the village closest to the gas 
extraction site,127 one respondent claimed that:  
‘They [IOCs] took farms and demolished houses, cutting down cashew nut trees, coconut trees, mango trees in 
the process and building gas plants. We were expecting the equivalent or more benefit than the cost our 
community incurred because of gas extraction, but all of a sudden, the gas industry faced a downfall which 
caused it to slowdown. All of our expectations, especially on benefits that we would get from gas, evaporated. 
There is now a slow implementation of development projects in Mtwara as well. In general, no one is interested 
in investing in Mtwara as they were during the gas exploration.’128 
The compensation for the seizure of land and the destruction of cashew and coconut 
trees was another source of frustration for many village interviewees, with many feeling they 
were not compensated enough.129 There were social pressures to take the compensation, 
one woman claimed that ‘this [gas] development is for the benefit of the whole community 
and village. So you can either take the compensation money and if you resist we will take it 
by force.’130 In a village further away from the industry, one villager in Madimba, claimed that 
problem was not compensation, but rather financial education as ‘they spent all that money 
without a plan or investing it’.131 It could be a case that living in Madimba, one of the villages 
interviewed furthest away from the infrastructure, there could be a case of village rivalry, or 
jealousy over the lack of compensation in Madimba. Nevertheless, many village interviewees 
expressed their frustration either for no or (for their point of view), a poor amount of 
compensation:   
‘I gave my land to be used for gas development projects. Many coconut and cashew nut trees were cut down in 
order to let the construction of a pipeline to take place. Those plants belonged to me and I was not well 
compensated…. I was promised reasonable benefit and good compensation. Up to today my life is still the 
same, and no benefit has occurred as promised. We expected better social services in terms of health and 
 
126 A microclimate of higher temperatures around the extraction sites were an incredibly common 
complaint from villagers. While gas infrastructure in the form of pipelines and flaring do have the 
capacity to increase temperatures around their proximity, there has been little research on whether 
this specific claim is true. It could be possible that another factor was involved that has led to the 
death of cashew trees. Furthermore, some claims around wastewater were rebutted by other 
members of the group interview after the interview was conducted, claiming it was an overuse of 
pesticides that resulted in the death of farmland. However, this does suggest that many of the 
agricultural problems facing the community are, correctly or incorrectly, blamed on the introduction 
of gas extraction.   
127 In one case the extraction point is directly on the road, with the new road circumventing it.  
128 Ruvura Group Interview. 
129 Madimba Group Interview.  




education in return. We did not get what was promised and now we cannot get it since the government is 
focusing on implementing other big projects since the gas industry is no longer the big issue.’132 
‘Many people lost their farms, their houses were demolished and some of them were compensated less [than 
they thought] and some were not compensated at all. After the gas exploration activities begun and the 
international oil companies came and seek for investment in Mtwara, there was a high level of demand for land, 
which was mostly owned by the people of Mtwara. According to the national law, “you can own the piece of 
land, but if there are any natural resources beneath it such as gold, oil, or gas they belong to the 
government”.133 So most of time, the original owner of that land will be compensated by the government. In 
most cases, it under compensates.’134  
In addition to the short-term fall in the gas industry, the construction of the gas site 
also meant the reduction of long-term sources of income; some fishermen complained that 
fishing was harder than before.135 Cashew nut and mango trees which were cut down and 
needed to be replaced, can take two to three years to grow and mature, while coconut trees 
can take up to a decade, and this has allowed for a removal of both food and income. In many 
respects, the stagnation of the gas industry has resulted in communities closest to the 
extraction site being felt forgotten by both the private and private sector. The slowdown in 
the industry caused by international extractive temporalities has resulted in those living 
closest to the extractive site having their lives worsened with little benefit in return 
materialising.   
In essence, with the slowdown of the industry, an unwritten social contract appears to 
have been broken; ‘sacrifices’,136 such as removal of sources of income and shelter for the 
promise of an equal or improved life did not materialise. Instead, the economic 
vulnerabilities of a weak local economy exposed to international extractive temporalities 
allowed for a reduction in development. Here one can see the interaction between the global 
and microlocal; the commodities cycle had a big impact on the progress of development in 
the region, to the point where many interviewees have said things have regressed.137 
Furthermore, while the drop in prices was over a short period of time, the long-term negative 
impacts of the boom, such as the removal of cash crops, have taken a far longer time to 
recover.138 
 
132 Cashew Farmer 3 Interview.  
133 This is a reference to the Constitution of Tanzania.  
134 Ruvura Group Interview.  
135 Interview, Fisherman 1, Ruvura Village, Mtwara, 24.07.2018; Cashew Farmer 2 Interview.  
136 Interview, Fisherman 2, Ruvura Village, Mtwara, 24.07.2018. 
137 Ruvura Group Interview; Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO Employee Interview 1. 
138 During a tour of Ruvura Village, one of my guides wanted to show me the locations of the dead 
cashew and coconut trees. Having seen them, they do appear to be in a cluster located near gas 
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With the stagnation of the industry, many respondents felt that economic growth and 
development had slowed down considerably. As mentioned before, this has had a 
considerable impact on business plans, but it also has impacted local communities’ 
development strategies and chances of improving their livelihoods. As one Mtwara NGO 
worker told me:  
‘In everything that is, nothing can prepare you for being poor. All of our plans were designed for being 
more developed. We hope that gas brought change. Planning for poverty? Nobody plans for poverty.’139 
 The boom and exploration phase of the Mtwara gas industry distorted imaginaries 
of the future considerably and this has caused economic planning, such as the updated 
Mtwara Master Plan (2017), made during this time redundant. Plans were made with the 
expectations of high gas prices for a longer period of time, rather than the sudden fall they 
experienced in 2014. The exploration phase of the industry had left the region vulnerable 
and remove productivity from other sectors in the region. Despite the pause, a majority of 
Mtwara interviewees, in particular young adult men, stated a desire to work in the industry 
either directly or indirectly. This corresponds to a majority of interviewees stating a desire 
for the industry to ‘return’ to the region.140  
4  Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the introduction of the hydrocarbon sector introduced 
the commodities cycle and project phase lifecycle to the region. The introduction of the 
sector transformed the region to that of a ‘frontier’. Mtwara, which had typically been in the 
margins of the global economy, acting as a supplier of raw cashew nuts for the Indian market, 
suddenly changed into a ‘energy frontier’, opening up the region to an international industry 
with considerable capital for investment. The reterritorialization of Mtwara to a frontier was 
not just for international capital, but also for domestic capital that sought to capitalise on the 
predicted ‘resource boom’. Scholarly focus on frontiers, suggests a reterritorialization of 
 
infrastructure.  Hence the complaints about dead cash crops years after the completion of the 
infrastructure is true, however, what is the exact determinant of the deaths, remains unknown to 
me.  
139 Interview, Mtwara Poverty Reduction NGO Employee 3, Mtwara NGO, Mtwara, 17.07.2018. 
140 While, at the time of writing, no IOCs had left the Tanzanian oil industry, although there are 
rumours that ExxonMobil is looking to sell its stake in Block 2 (Reuters, 2018a). There is no further 
activity in the region until the signing of the PSAs. No IOC had an office left in Mtwara, while there 
was only a Schlumberger warehouse near the port to suggest any presence of a potential 
hydrocarbon industry left in the city. It was different in the gas producing areas where extraction is 
currently taking place; extraction sites are visible and easily accessible, and there is a gas processing 
plant near the sites.  
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space to better accommodate capital (e.g., Tsing, 2003; Rasmussen and Lund, 2018). This also 
reconfigures the temporalities of the space in question. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Frynas et al (2017) argues that anticipation of 
resource windfalls can provide effects of the resource curse. While this chapter does not 
engage with the resource curse debate, it does highlight that projected resource windfalls do 
influence the politics and economics of the state. As this chapter demonstrates, the same is 
true for the local economy and society. This is highly localised and dependent on the nature 
of the industry and the location. For Mtwara, the introduction of the gas sector brought with 
it new forms of temporality that are tied to both capital and labour. The commodity cycle, at 
its height during exploration, allowed for the reterritorialization of Mtwara to a frontier, but 
also brought with it an anticipated resource boom that would occur in the region in the near 
future. This predicted resource boom promoted investment into supply sectors, 
infrastructure, and construction, creating a construction boom, but not a resource boom. In 
this respect, Mtwara’s status as an energy frontier encouraged international and domestic 
investment in anticipation of a future that will bring strong financial returns to the 
investment. In doing so, it replaced cashew nuts as the main economic focus for the local 
administration and investment, with local labour, particularly from young men, seeking 
employment in the supply sector of the gas industry.  
Coinciding with the commodity cycle was the well lifecycle for both the onshore and 
offshore sector. The phases of these lifecycles were in the exploration and development 
phase, the latter of which is the most labour-intensive phase throughout the well’s lifecycle. 
This provided a temporary boost to employment and money circulation. These cycles allowed 
for economic growth and development of the region. This indirectly also served to enhance 
the imagined future of Mtwara as a gas town, as employment was being provided. Poor 
communication about the temporary nature of the employment served to create an 
impression that more direct jobs in the sector would continue.  
The projected ‘resource boom’ and imagined future of a prosperous Mtwara has proved 
to be a mirage. The failure of the prediction of the boom stopped the investment into 
construction and introduced the ‘bust’ phase to Mtwara. The fall in gas prices resulted in a 
considerable reduction in investment both by domestic and international actors. This was 
combined with a transition of phases both in the onshore and offshore sector; for the 
onshore sector, which is now in the production phase, the most labour-intensive phase is 
now over, and instead there is little unskilled employment available. In this respect, Mtwara 
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has been reterritorialized once again as a region that promises little return for investment. 
The effect this has had on the local is one where the effects of boom and bust are still felt 
but are no longer seen.  
Remnants of the boom, such as half-built hotels, increased food prices and a more 
reliable electricity supply remain, but many of the jobs, both in terms of quality and quantity 
have gone. Furthermore, the environmental effects of the industry, such as pollution and 
destruction of cash crops, has added to the frustrations of the villagers that an unwritten 
social contract has been broken. For the offshore sector, its impact on Mtwara has been the 
removal of IOCs directly operating in the region. As a result of this, the main industry 
established during the boom phase, the hospitality industry, has suffered immensely, with 
many high-end potential hotels half-built and those that have been opened changing 
business strategies towards the cashew nut industry, a seasonal industry with a different 
clientele and far less money. The result of this has been that Mtwara has reverted to a 
‘normal’ pace of development, once again reliant on the cashew nut sector. While gas no 




Chapter VI: Infrastructures and Time: 
Conflicting Temporalties in Hydrocarbon 
Megaprojects 
1 Introduction 
Global developments in the energy sector have seen a ‘transformational growth’ in 
energy infrastructure (Bridge et al, 2018: 2). Central to this has been the re-centering of 
national development within projects. Tanzania has been no exception to this, and within the 
hydrocarbon sector, the country has two megaprojects that are essential for the exports of 
hydrocarbons: EACOP and the LNG plant. This chapter focuses on the temporalities behind 
both projects.  While they differ in terms of technicality and timescale of construction, both 
are central to the government’s aims for the hydrocarbon sector. However, both projects 
have failed to progress, leading to questions about why this is the case. Specifically, this 
chapter focuses on how the conflicting short-, medium- and long-term strategies have 
allowed for a lack of ‘synchronicity’ within the project. The idea of synchronicity in extractive 
projects is not a new concept (D’Angelo and Pijpers, 2018; Jordheim, 2014). Synchronicity in 
extraction means ‘organizing temporal levels, speed and rhythms of production, as well as 
producing temporal narratives that support or contest such organization’ (D’Angelo and 
Pijpers, 2018: 216). Both synchronicity and non-synchronicity are a result of active work by 
social actors to establish or maintain ‘temporal regimes’ (Jordheim, 2014). In essence, 
competing time horizons and priorities have been different between the government, the 
IOCs operating in the country and even between the IOCs themselves.   
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the EACOP project is a planned 
electronically heated pipeline that will transmit crude oil from Hoima, Uganda, to Tanga in 
Tanzania. It is essential for the transport of Ugandan crude oil for export, as it is considered 
cheaper and safer to the alternatives of transporting the oil by either road or rail (EACOP, 
2020b). With data collection focusing on the Tanzanian portion of EACOP, this chapter 
focuses on the temporalities of the Tanzanian side of the project, and why it has resulted in 
suspension. The reasons why are intertangled with the Ugandan oil industry, but the data 
from this section primarily comes from Tanzanian sources. 
At an estimated cost of $30bn, the LNG project in Tanzania would be one of the 
largest capital investments in Africa (Pedersen and Bofin, 2019). The construction of the plant 
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is essential for export to Asian markets. The LNG process first removes impurities such as 
dust, water, and heavy hydrocarbon chains, then condenses the gas into a liquified state by 
cooling it at -160oc, making the volume of this liquid state roughly 600 times smaller than its 
gaseous form (EIA, 2020b). The alternative to exporting gas from LNG would be to export gas 
in its gaseous form through a pipeline. While there could be a domestic and regional market 
for gas, the regional demand and lower gas price would not justify the extraction of deep-
sea gas, nor the construction of either a land or sea-based pipeline. Hence, this physical 
change is essential for intercontinental export. According to the Tanzanian government, work 
on the project is expected to start in 2022 (Reuters, 2019b). Although scholars and analysists 
remain sceptical on this timeline (Mihalyi and Scurfield, 2020).   
For Tanzania, export of gas to the Asian market has been deemed essential to justify 
the cost of the plant. However, there has been growing distrust between actors and 
conflicting strategies that have paused the negotiations. This chapter explores the 
temporalities behind the LNG and EACOP projects. It focuses on the negotiations and 
legislation, as well as the surrounding political context, to explain how the actors that are 
involved in both projects time horizons have changed, and what are the causes of these 
changes. As it will be shown, these changes in the government and the IOCs are not 
monolithic, with different priorities within government and between IOCs allowing for a lack 
of ‘synchronicity’ for the project. Adding to the issues of progression has been the 
technological and financial changes in the global energy supply, revealing contrasting 
opinions over the viability of the projects. This chapter will argue that it is the competing 
perceptions of the future, which take legislative and market changes above into account, as 
well as mid to long term political and business strategies, have allowed for de-synchronicity 
within the project. 
This chapter specifically engages with the second and third sub-questions of this 
thesis, as well as the overarching research question. For the second question, which is 
seeking to understand how time is utilised in extractive resource governance, it engages with 
the new legislative changes and negotiations have changed both the government’s and IOC’s 
perspective of the future in regard to hydrocarbon infrastructure development. It highlights 
how the delays in the progression have also caused schisms between the IOCs over the 
direction of the LNG project. It also highlights the political factors behind such legislative 
change, as well as how the political time horizons of both the Tanzanian government and 
IOCs have affected progression of the projects. It engages with the third sub-question by 
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examining how technological change in the gas sector has altered the materiality of natural 
gas, and how this has altered the time horizons of state and private actors.   
This chapter is organised as follows: first, it will bring a spotlight to the project’s 
respective timelines and the IOC strategies, highlighting competing long-term visions of 
LNG’s benefits. Section three expands on the build-up and progress of negotiations to the 
present day, highlighting that while there have been difficulties, there have been noticeable 
exceptions, particularly in issues around land. The succeeding section explores the 
temporalities behind these issues, arguing that that there has been a lack of synchronicity 
between the different actors, which have aided the current impasse. However, these have 
been at different spatial levels for both projects. Section five concludes.  
2 Timelines and Strategies 
Project timelines allow for a clear, linear, and planned structure of the future, with each 
phase providing a list of required events and processes to occur to transfer to the next phase. 
These are often presented in clean diagrams in investor documents and hide the often messy 
and disjointed process to progress through the various stages. It is not uncommon for 
projects to be delayed (e.g., Olaniran et al, 2015). Various factors in the early stages, from 
the geological, to the economic to the political can either disrupt or cancel extractive projects 
altogether.  
Such megaprojects also play an important role in political, economic, and business 
strategies. This is both for state strategies and IOC business strategies. IOCs utilise such 
strategies for both economic and political purposes; the transport of refined or unrefined 
hydrocarbons is essential to sell petroleum products, and oil companies, both of the IOC and 
NOC variety, have participated in projects for geopolitical and business strategic reasons 
(e.g., Volman, 2003). For states, the completion of energy megaprojects can be for energy 
security reasons (e.g., Bahgat, 2002), but can also shape and limit national imaginaries (e.g., 
Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Howe et al, 2015). As Larkin (2013) notes, infrastructures exist ‘as 
forms separate from their purely technical functioning’ and ‘they emerge out of and store 
within them forms of desire and fantasy and can take fetish-like aspects that sometimes can 
be wholly autonomous from their technical function’ (Larkin, 2013: 329). In essence, 
infrastructures can be equally symbolic as they are practical.  
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2.1 Project Timelines and IOC Strategies 
2.1.1 LNG 
Even though the projects were planned at different times, the EACOP and LNG projects 
are currently at similar stages in their respective timelines, with both projects currently in 
discussions for a host government agreement (HGA), and neither project is close to a final 
investment decision (FID). Discussions over the LNG started in 2012, after quantities of gas 
were sufficient to justify a plant for export (Financial Times, 2012). At the time, the projected 
date for production was 2020 (IMF, 2012). HGA negotiations over the key terms started in 
2016 (Pedersen and Bofin, 2019). Discussions for the EACOP project started after the pipeline 
route was decided in 2016, with the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), already signed 
between the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments.  
An LNG plant in Tanzania is estimated to cost $30bn spread out through the four to five 
years of the construction phase. Once the HGA key terms are agreed and the pre-front end 
engineering design (FEED) and FEED have been resolved, construction on an LNG project will 
take approximately four to five years (Shell, 2018b; Equinor, 2018) (Figure 12). In short, this 
means that the LNG project could take up to a decade to reach the production phase, and 
thus start to recoup the investment made. Considering the current annual GDP of Tanzania 
is at an estimated $58bn (World Bank, 2020),141 the investment potential of the LNG is huge; 
during the construction phase of the project, economists from the Tanzanian central bank 
estimates that the project will increase the annual GDP of the country by two percentage 
points (Reuters, 2019b). If this project progresses, it is expected to be one of the most capital-
intensive infrastructure projects in the history of the African continent (Pedersen and Bofin, 
2019).  
 
141 Obviously, there are considerable difficulties in estimating the GDP of African countries. Hence, 
this figure needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. For further literature on the difficulty of calculating 
GDP of African states, see Jerven (2013). For measuring the economic performance of Tanzania, see 
Jerven (2011).  
Figure 12: LNG project schedule (Equinor, 2018). 
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 LNG has become an increasingly important part of IOC operations. It is important to 
recognise the energy trends of the late 2000s and the forecasts for natural gas and LNG 
during this time period to understand why IOCs invested in Tanzania and desire an LNG plant. 
Since 2000, growth in demand for natural gas has been the fastest out of all hydrocarbon 
sources. Between 2015 and 2030, Shell predicts that global demand of gas would increase by 
2% a year, while LNG would rise between 4 to 5% a year, with most of this demand from Asia 
(Shell, 2017), while ExxonMobil expect LNG volumes to more than double by 2040 to meet 
demand (ExxonMobil, 2017).  In essence, natural gas, and in particular LNG, is growing, and 
companies have sought deposits in countries which could supply the Asian market.    
Political factors have contributed to this rise in demand. Chief among these is 
government policies, particularly in Europe and China, that have set targets to lower carbon 
emissions. IOCs have presented natural gas and LNG as a short to medium term solution to 
lower carbon emissions (e.g., Shell, 2018a; Equinor, 2020a). Despite ‘greenwashing’ claims 
(Stephenson et al, 2012), natural gas is portrayed as a ‘bridging fuel’ in the transition to low 
carbon energy supply by IOCs.  
It is within this backdrop of growing gas demand, political policy changes and growing 
gas prices, help explain why Tanzania became an investment destination for natural gas 
exploration and site of a potential LNG plant. For example, BG Group, one of the first IOCs to 
explore in deep sea Tanzania, strategic focus was on both exploration and LNG (BG Group, 
2012). LNG strategy focused on shifting away from supplying LNG to the USA, to the Asian 
market, and in particular China (BG Group, 2013). While the company at the time desired an 
LNG plant in Tanzania, their chief focus for LNG development was based in Australia (BG 
Group, 2013). Shell’s purchase of BG Group in 2015, was in large part to further diversify into 
natural gas, deep sea fields, and LNG (Financial Times, 2015; Reuters, 2016b). In a similar 
vein, Equinor considered Tanzania one of three potential ‘offshore clusters’, whereby the 
company ‘holds operatorships and has a mix of assets in different stages of development….to 
achieve greater economies of scale, capture synergies and thereby increase profitability’ 
(Equinor, 2012: 7-8).  
It is worth noting that, while the initial sums of investment are large in a Tanzanian, 
and in some respects, an African context, Tanzania was, and remains, a small part of IOCs 
business portfolios. This can be seen within the capital expenditure of some of the major 
firms that operated in Tanzania. For example, BG’s capital investment in Tanzania for 2013 
and 2014, at that time one of the largest investments in Tanzanian gas, was reported at 
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$0.4bn and $0.3bn, respectively. This is out of a total annual capital investment of $11.2bn 
in 2013 and $9.4bn in 2014. In sum, Tanzanian exploration at its height accounted for 3.6% 
of BG’s capital expenditure in 2013, and 3.2% in 2014 (BG Group, 2013; 2014).142  
In this respect, for the IOCs covered in this section, while the Tanzanian fields were 
a growing asset during this time, they were never a vital asset to any company’s portfolios. 
Tanzanian gas was part of the ‘diversification’ of global hydrocarbon assets, with their 
geographical position, are seen to be potential suppliers to Asian markets for the future. In 
this respect, East African hydrocarbons are a small part in larger medium-term strategies of 
supplying Asian markets and reducing carbon output in an ‘greening’ global economy. This 
would change if the LNG project went ahead. Rather than a small investment (by IOC 
standards), a Tanzanian LNG plant would require considerable funds and borrowing to begin 
construction.  
There has been little progression in the advancement of the LNG project, bar the 
seizure of land required for the project in Lindi (Pedersen and Kweka, 2017), which will be 
explored in greater depth below. At the time of writing, key terms for the project have not 
yet been agreed. The LNG project is currently in discussions for an HGA and awaiting an FID. 
Issues around the project, which are explored below, have made some industry insiders 
sceptical that the project would go ahead at all (Petroleum Economist, 2020). The work on 
the project itself is very technical in nature and requires specialised manufacturing and skills, 
further questioning the probable start date of the project.  
2.1.2 EACOP 
Compared to LNG, EACOP’s original timetable is considerably shorter. The projected 
timeframe of EACOP was four years from its inception to first oil. The time from FID to the 
completion of the project was to be two years. Due to the fact that there are two countries 
included in the project, the project requires two HGAs, as well as an IGA, which is explored 
in greater detail below. Hence, while there may be more time spent negotiating, there is a 
short timeframe for construction. Compared to the LNG plant, construction is simpler, with 
the potential for greater participation of domestic business and labour, which is covered in 
greater detail in the next chapter. Alongside negotiation, the biggest factor for the project’s 
 
142 Percentage calculations are authors own calculations. 
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success is tied into the projected date of Uganda’s ‘first oil’, a term used by IOCs when oil is 
first extracted for commercial use.143  
EACOP has a shorter construction period but is expected to cost $3.5bn, spanned over 
two years in both Uganda and Tanzania (Figure 13). With roughly 80% of the project going 
through Tanzania, and the oil jetty being constructed north of Tanga, most of the expenditure 
will be located in Tanzania. Considering the short timeframe, and the amount of investment 
the project could bring into the country, it would appear that the project could provide a 
short-term boost to the economy, as well as providing opportunities for business and labour 
participation.  
As it will be shown, the delays currently seen in EACOP is less to do with the project 
itself, but rather issues in the Ugandan upstream sector over the farming down of a stake in 
the industry between Tullow Oil and Total (Reuters, 2019c). These tax issues have been 
exacerbated with ongoing low oil prices. Hence, while there have been pressures on both 
governments to push ahead on the project, disagreements with the Ugandan government 
and the IOCs present there have ensured that the project will not start in a timely manner. 
Therefore, the Tanzanian government is at the whims of the wider issues within the Ugandan 
oil industry and is entirely dependent on the date when Uganda reaches ‘first oil’.  
2.2 Tanzanian Policy and Strategies for LNG 
Tanzanian strategies around the use of gas has been consistent throughout both the 
Kikwete and Magufuli administrations. As mentioned in chapter four, this centres around 
directing gas towards the domestic market for development, particularly in petrochemicals. 
This can also be seen in the 2013 draft natural gas policy, which stated that the government 
 
143 The route to ‘first oil’ is highly uneven and is dependent on a variety of factors such as the nature 
of the state, the amount of capital required and the technical difficulty to extract oil (Weszkalnys, 
2008; 2014; 2015). Despite this, the amount of time it has taken from discovery to ‘first oil’ in 
Uganda has taken a considerably long time (Polus and Tycholiz, 2016).   
Figure 13: Original EACOP Schedule (EACOP, 2017). 
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shall ‘ensure that domestic market is given first priority over the export market in gas supply’ 
(GoT, 2013: 9). Alongside this, under the PSAs with the IOCs, a portion of the production from 
LNG projects is reserved for the domestic market (World Bank, 2014b). Market analysists 
suggest that it would be a difficult balancing act to both pursue domestic and export 
commitments (World Bank, 2014b).     
One of the most striking differences in the responses over questions about the gas 
industry between private and public interviewees was where their geographical focus for in 
their answers, even for similar questions.144 For public officials, discussion around gas would 
centre around domestic consumption and local development. Interviews with the private 
sector, on the other hand, would focus on the need for international export and the 
construction of infrastructures to ensure this happens. While export of natural gas remains 
an official position of the government (GoT, 2015b), it is clear that alongside export is a 
demand that natural gas aids domestic development. This was summarised by a retired TPDC 
executive: 
Deep sea gas, given location of gas and pipelines, it is very expensive to exploit. The LNG is a huge project, and 
the politicians think LNG equal’s export. If there is a domestic use of the gas, why should they export? They 
need a big project to stimulate local demand to generate revenue. However, gas is not able to be exploited 
without LNG. Once export is made, domestically it will take a long time to develop infrastructure to be used 
domestically. You can’t use Tanzanian gas without high costs.145 
In this respect, while negotiations for the LNG are ongoing, the core focus for the 
government is what gas can do domestically. Tanzania has planned to use the LNG plant as a 
project that could aid industrial development in the country (GoT, 2016a). One of the ways 
this is being attempted is through local content initiatives; although early into the project, 
local content has been described as a ‘sticking point’ in discussions.146 Disagreements over 
local content and wider industrial policy reflect common IOC opposition talking points to 
stringent local content measures: that they are hard to achieve, they do not want to go into 
joint ventures, and that it should only apply to the higher tiers of tenders.147 This in part is 
due to the fact that the ‘one-project’ skills required for construction are incredibly 
specialised, and are not conductive to aid wider local content aims.148 Though construction 
 
144 There are of course methodological issues to consider. While I looked to tailor questions to 
people’s expertise, the questions asked about the future of the industry garnered the different 
responses. 
145 Retired Senior TPDC Executive Interview. 
146 Group Interview, Oil and Gas Bank Executives, Dar es Salaam, 22.02.2018.  
147 Interview, State Senior Executive 1, Dar es Salaam, 21.03.2018. 
148 Oil and Gas Bank Executives Interview. 
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of this project is in the short- to medium-term, the skills required for technical aspects of 
plant construction require considerable time to learn, and will only need to be utilised during 
the construction (Mokhatab et al, 2013). Despite IOC opposition, the 2017 local content 
legislation (GoT, 2017b), which significantly strengthened local content requirements across 
the petroleum sector, allows for a variation of local content requirements for the LNG project 
if required so by the minister. This suggests that local content is less of a ‘sticking point’ than 
IOCs and financiers suggest.  
LNG being used for domestic development is better seen with the project domestic 
demands for industrial development and electricity generation. This balancing act can be 
seen around the number of trains the LNG plant will use. LNG trains liquify and purify the 
natural gas, and therefore increasing the number of trains increases the production capacity 
available. Due to its domestic commitments, the Tanzanian government desired two trains, 
which would allow for international export and domestic use (GoT, 2015b). Indeed, the 
projected domestic and export demand of LNG (see Table 7) was based on two trains, 
claiming that if three trains are built, domestic results will be minimal, while at four trains, 
the projected exports and domestic demands could not be made simultaneously (GoT, 
2015b). These domestic demands, as well as the lower number of extractable reserves, have 
made the break-even price of LNG higher than neighbouring Mozambique, at an estimated 
$7 per MMBTU (World Bank, 2014b).  
Table 7: Summary of Projected Gas Demand 2025-2045 (GoT, 2015b).  
Much like the wider industrial strategy discussed in chapter four, Tanzania’s gas 
strategy revolves around the domestic use of gas for industrial development. LNG is central 
to this for the supply of gas to a projected domestic industrial sector. Unlike EACOP, the end 
product, rather than local content during the construction process, is perceived as the 
catalyst for industrialisation. While local content requirements are in place in the 2017 
legislation, the laws also include a clause allowing for the raising or lowering requirements 
for the project. The largest example on how the LNG project is projected to aid national 
development has been through the projected domestic demands of gas in the country. 
 
149 Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles. 
 Domestic Demand Export Total 
User Electricity Household Institutions CNGV149 Industries Petrochemicals Iron 
and 
Steel 
LNG Pipeline  
Demand 
(TCF) 
8.8 0.5 0.1 0.6 3.6 4.3 1.1 11.1 3.1  
Total 
(TCF) 
19 14.2 33.2 
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Despite being a megaproject for export, LNG is viewed as a direct part of domestic 
industrialisation, either through piped offshore gas or LNG re-gasification to supply gas for 
wider developmental and industrial benefits. In this respect, the government is planning to 
use LNG beyond its intended use of generating export revenues for the state. The planned 
use of the LNG project should not be a surprise to other actors involved on the project, as it 
fits in with the imagined future of gas as tool for Tanzanian development.  
3 Negotiating Infrastructure Projects 
With both projects currently unable to progress without an HGA in place, one must 
explore the reasons behind why the project has not progressed in the negotiation phase. 
There are a multitude of reasons for this, some of which apply to both projects, and some 
that apply to just one of the projects. This section explores both issues shared by projects, as 
well as individual factors which are, or have, affected negotiations. Much of these tactics and 
desires of both the IOCs and the government relate back to strategy and competing visions 
of the future for the LNG project.  
3.1 Obtaining Land 
Historically given configurations of land ownership can both either inhibit or 
encourage extraction (Fine, 1994; Capps, 2012). Under the Land Act, the president holds land 
officially on the behalf of all its citizens (GoT, 1999). While foreigners cannot officially own 
land, individuals and corporate bodies can own land under the Tanzania Investment Act (GoT, 
1997). This is in the form of a lease for 33, 66, or 99 years (GoT, 1997). As land is owned by 
the government, the seizure of land, including village land, can be authorised by the 
president. Because of the land ownership model of Tanzania, the acquisition of land for the 
LNG project and EACOP proved to be a quick process.   
At the beginning of the LNG negotiations, the IOCs wanted a floating LNG (FLNG), 
which would have been an LNG plant based offshore (Songhurst, 2016). This is the form of 
LNG plant that is currently under construction in neighbouring Mozambique. Such a plant 
was considered advantageous in the Tanzanian context due to the fact that the gas fields are 
dispersed over a wide area offshore, and a FLNG can develop offshore fields and later be 
towed towards different fields when the original one is depleted (Financial Times, 2017). 
There is also the issue of risk, as it could be harder to become a target for potential insurgents 
or militias when compared to a static land-based plant.150 The Tanzanian government 
 
150 This has not stopped attacks on FLNG staff in Mozambique (Financial Times, 2019b).  
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opposed such a measure, instead wanting a land-based LNG plant (Songhurst, 2019). This 
was in part due to the government wishing to establish sovereignty over the project 
(Pedersen and Kweka) and is also an example on how infrastructures can be symbolic in their 
use. Section 149 of the Petroleum Act, enshrined this position into law, stating that ‘all gas 
processing facilities shall be located onshore’ (GoT, 2015d: 82). Alongside land for the LNG 
plant, the government has seized land next to the plant for an industrial park for 
petrochemicals (Pedersen and Kweka, 2017). 
The issue of obtaining land was seen as a ‘major bottleneck’ for the progression of 
the project.151 Yet, as mentioned before, the president owns the land on behalf of the 
Tanzanian people. Hence, the government has seized the land. Similar actions have occurred 
in the mining and gas industry (Lange, 2008; Kamat, 2017). Much like these land seizures, the 
grabbing of land in Lindi has not been without controversy. This process has become a point 
of consternation for IOCs: 
‘We want the resettlement to be handled cautiously for the two or three very good reasons. One is 
that the project is very early stage, the government does not want to hear it, but the project will only go ahead 
if it is economically viable, and we have not reached that stage yet. As far as the IOCs are concerned, we are in 
pre-planning stage. We still need to go through pre-FEED, FEED, financial closure, and only then we’ll see if the 
project is viable. Only then would really like to see the resettlement plan go through.’152 
In this respect, while the government has cleared one of the ‘bottlenecks’ of the 
plant, it has acted prematurely. International loans will be needed for the project, and these 
mean that International Finance Corporation (IFC) standards will need to be adhered to in 
regard to compensation.153 This is a potential complication because while the land has been 
obtained, it may have not been obtained to the standards required to access loans to fund 
the LNG project, as companies from the global north need to ensure that due diligence has 
been applied to land acquisition (Pedersen and Kweka, 2017). The land deal was finalised in 
2016 (Reuters, 2016a). In this respect, the geographies of the project itself has been resolved 
before the project has officially begun; the space of control for the LNG project has been 
established for the construction of the plant as well as its planned export.  
For EACOP, the importance of land acquisition for the pipeline was paramount to 
advance in Tanzania. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, land cost for the project 
 
151 Interview, Senior Engineer, Dar es Salaam, 24.11.2017.  
152 Interview, IOC Senior Executive 1, Dar es Salaam, 04.12.2017.  
153 A similar issue has arisen in regard to the EACOP project, whereby villagers on the route have 
claimed they were not compensated enough.  
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was a large factor in the choice of route. The control of land for the project was paramount 
for both governments and IOCs. This could be best seen with article three of the IGA:  
‘Each state party shall take all the necessary actions to ensure the acquisition and grant of land rights in its 
territory to, and the maintenance and possession of such land rights by, the project company and to protect 
such land rights (whether in relation to land rights over such state parties land or public or private land) under 
fair, transparent legally enforceable and clear commercial terms and conditions in favour to the project 
company’ (Emphasis added) (GoU and GoT, 2017). 
In this respect, the government model of land ownership has not just brought 
decreased costs for the company, but the government has also ensured the project company, 
in this case EACOP, is given preferential treatment in the case of disputes of land ownership. 
It serves to highlight the importance of the project for both countries, but also how issues 
between local communities and EACOP will be resolved in the latter’s favour to ensure quick 
project implementation. Furthermore, it highlights how both governments, which have been 
characterised as hostile to IOCs, will align with IOCs interests over local populations when it 
is beneficial for the progression of extractive sectors. This is common in states that have 
pursued resource nationalist agendas (e.g., Veltmeyer, 2013; Laing, 2020a). In terms of 
controlling the surrounding space for EACOP, international capital and government’s agenda 
are united.  
Like the LNG plant, there are issues surrounding compensation in EACOP. The 
method for villagers to make a complaint is either through direct contact with pipeline 
workers and representatives, or through the EACOP office, which is in Dar es Salaam (EACOP, 
2020a). Both of these methods limit people’s ability to complain about land acquisition as 
there is considerable distance between Tanga and Dar es Salaam, and the way to make an 
official grievance to pipeline workers would be during the construction of the project. This is 
furthered by the fact that, while there are systems to report grievances to the company, 
these have not been advertised to residents closest to the project.154  
Issues around land have already occurred in Tanga. As mentioned in the 
methodology section of this thesis, my movement in the region was limited out of fear of 
being fed ‘incorrect information’ by a ‘plant’ on the pipeline.155 It is hypothesised that this 
was around the issue of land compensation to villagers whose land were seized for the 
 
154 Group Interview, Chongoleani Villagers 1, Tanga, 18.09.2018; Group Interview, Chongoleani 
Villagers 2, Tanga, 19.09.2018. I explained the procedure to those interviewed, using the Swahili 
version of EACOP’s website.  
155 Fieldwork Notes, Tanga, 14.08.2018. 
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pipeline as this was reason for not allowing my visit to the villages near the site by local 
government officials. Much like the LNG project, compensation for land has already been 
processed before the FID. The rate of compensation for the land was Tsh 2,000,000 per 
hectare,156 which some villagers felt was not enough. Some villagers had not been 
compensated at all and some have not been able to build new homes to restart their lives.157  
IFC standards, which need to be adhered to for loans to ensure the project goes 
ahead, state that compensation should be for loss of assets at replacement costs, which is 
defined as ‘the market value of assets plus transaction costs’ (IFC, 2012: 1). Given the 
concerns of the local government about my presence and research, it could be possible that 
the compensation process was not in line with IFC standards. There are already pressures 
from NGOs over not to finance the project due to compensation not meeting IFC standards 
(Banktrack, 2019). Furthermore, land compensation occurred before the completion and 
publication of the Tanzanian portion of the Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) 
(EACOP, 2020b).  
The interaction of land acquisition and progression of the projects are intertwined: 
For EACOP, because of the relative progression of the project, combined with the political 
pressure exerted by both the presidents of Uganda and Tanzania, the project was 
synchronised to progress at the planned pace of the original timetable. For the LNG project, 
while it was a benefit to the project overall to obtain land, the methods used may create 
problems for the future. While there was little concern presented by EACOP representatives 
over the method of land acquisition,158 the complaints by villagers over issues of 
compensation suggest such issues come under the scrutiny of IFC regulations in the future.  
The centralised land ownership model of Tanzania, where land is owned by the state, 
has allowed for both a competitive advantage for obtaining EACOP and an acceleration of 
the project’s progression; this is due to the fact that the land ownership model of Tanzania 
allows for the bypassing of negotiation with multiple landowners, instead just negotiating 
with one party – the Tanzanian government. For both projects, particularly EACOP, this land 
model was considered favourable towards extractive capital due to lower costs, particularly 
when compared to the private land model of Kenya. In essence, while the land ownership 
model is discouraged in neoliberal governance and appear hostile to foreign capital, in 
 
156 This is roughly $875. 
157 Chongoleani Group Interviews 1 and 2.  
158 Interview, IOC Senior Executive 2, Dar es Salaam, 12.03.2018. 
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practise in the hydrocarbon industry it has allowed for a faster progression of project 
timetabling when compared to more liberal forms of land ownership. The speed of land 
acquisition can be seen by the fact that it is one of the few areas of both projects that has 
progressed, although paradoxically it could all be for naught due to the fact that an FID has 
not yet taken place for either projects.  
Due to the model of land ownership in Tanzania, the act of acquiring land has not 
been difficult. While there has been issues over the handling and compensation of land 
acquisition from the IOCs, the government’s actions to seize land has allowed one 
‘bottleneck’ to be removed for the LNG project. Furthermore, taking into consideration the 
IGA between Uganda and Tanzania, the interests of the governments and the IOCs are 
parallel; the land earmarked for use in hydrocarbon infrastructure projects will take 
precedence over local issues and potential objections. In this respect, the issues of control of 
space have been resolved, with land required for the project obtained and the government 
additionally using this procedure to, in their view, reinforce sovereignty. The questions 
around the delays are more temporal in nature, and relate to cyclical markets, shifting time 
horizons, and global technological changes in the sector.  
3.2 LNG Divisions 
Compared to the rest of the negotiation process for both projects, the acquisition of 
land has been smooth. For the LNG, HGA negotiations over the key terms started in 2016 
(Pedersen and Bofin, 2019), and are still ongoing at the time of writing. Much like EACOP, 
Magufuli publicly called for the LNG project to be sped up (The East African, 2016b). This did 
not happen. Interviewing IOC personnel, three factors appeared to behind both the erosion 
of trust between the government and IOCs and were to blame for the lack of progression in 
negotiations: the change in the president, the parliamentary investigation into hydrocarbon 
PSAs, and the passing of the 2017 new resource legislation. IOC personnel interviewed felt 
that the LNG project is not a priority for the government, pointing to the fact that there was 
not a full-time team at either the ministry of energy or TPDC focusing on LNG negotiations.159  
To see the negotiations at an impasse due to a lack of political will, or inexperience 
by the government, would be simplistic description of what is occurring. As it will be shown, 
the legal changes and Magufuli’s tactics have eroded trust between the government and 
IOCs. There are, however, other factors at play, all of which have contributed to the lack of 
 
159 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview; Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. This was confirmed to me by a 
retired senior TPDC Executive. 
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progress of negotiations. Discussions with Tanzanian government personnel highlight a zero-
sum mentality when it came to LNG negotiations. This is combined with a more domestic 
agenda around utilising the hydrocarbon sector for development. Catalysing the delays has 
been the IOCs themselves in that they are not united within their strategies to progress the 
project and how to distribute the benefits of the project in the future. 
The election of Magufuli brought about considerable changes to both the priorities 
of the government and changes in personnel throughout most of the bureaucratic structures 
of the government. For the LNG project, this has been more in changes of rhetoric and tactics 
rather than an overall departure from a domestic gas agenda set out during Kikwete’s tenure. 
This change in priorities, rhetoric, and tactics have hampered negotiations.160 IOC personnel 
interviewed felt that the new resource laws had both eroded the trust between the 
government and the LNG group, as well as setting new parameters for the government 
negotiating team. The passing of multiple resource legislations in 2017 have been attributed 
to the exacerbation, but not the cause, of delays for the LNG project (Sørreime, 2019). 
The beginning of the negotiation process consisted of exchanging two term sheets: 
one from the IOCs, and one from the government.161 This was considered by one IOC 
representative to be a unique approach by IOCs.162 The idea behind it was to combine the 
term sheets into a singular document through the negotiation process.163 The first meetings 
did not prove fruitful; the IOCs handed over their sheets in March 2017, however the 
government negotiating team did not due to the fact that they had to revise their terms to 
fit in with the 2017 legislative changes that was set to be passed and alter the governance of 
the sector significantly.164 These new resource laws would prove to dominate discussions. 
Two IOC respondents, both from different companies, described how the legal changes 
affected the negotiation process: 
‘The IOCs submitted the draft term sheet [for the LNG] in March of this year, the government side responded in 
September. The ‘changing of the rules of the game’ occurred even within the government; the negotiating team 
were ready to come with their counter-timesheets before July, but with the new laws that were being put in 
meant they had to move it back to make sure it conforms with the new laws. How are we going to negotiate at 
the end of the day?’165  
 
160 Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
161 Ibid.  
162 Senior Engineer Interview 
163 Senior Engineer Interview; Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
164 Senior Engineer Interview; Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
165 Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
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‘When we arrived at the meeting, the government negotiating team announced they would not provide 
responses to our questions, they were now more interested in discussing what approach we are going to take to 
combine the two documents. There was a lack of ownership within the government negotiating team, they 
could not really own, as civil servants, the terms. They were obliged to review their draft, to align with the law. 
But they had not had the audience with the authors of the law, to get a clarification or to understand what the 
spirit of the law was, what the thinking was, and in particular how it impacts the negotiations with the IOCs for 
the LNG project. They were put on the spot, and they attempted to respond to the many questions that we had. 
I believe there is a dark cloud hanging over [the negotiations].’166  
These legal changes were viewed as ‘non-inclusive and non-consultative’.167  
However, these legal changes are not guaranteed to affect the project. The IOCs desire a 
project law in the HGA to govern the project, and therefore protect it from potential future 
issues or new administrations and ensure legal stability. The HGA will define the fiscal and 
operational framework of the investment, as well as establishing a group of laws under a 
‘project law’ that will govern everything on the project, ranging from local content to fiscal 
issues, such as tax exceptions (Pedersen and Bofin, 2019). Because of this, if the project does 
proceed, portions of the new resource laws may not be in the final document. 
The recent legal changes therefore are not the final word on the matter for the LNG 
project. This is supported by the fact that some Tanzanian interviewees involved in the sector 
have stated that the laws are ‘living’ or ‘guiding’ documents that can be changed.168 IOC 
personnel were more adamant in their responses to the laws, with one executive claiming 
that if the laws were applied to the LNG project or the wider offshore sector, there would be 
no LNG.169 This was compounded by the fact that extractive projects, including the LNG, could 
be opened up at any time for renegotiation if the terms were considered ‘unconscionable’ 
(GoT, 2017d), the removal of international arbitration (GoT, 2017a) and placing money 
required for the project into domestic banks (GoT, 2017a). The temporalities of these acts 
are analysed in chapter eight of this thesis.   
Alongside legal changes, priority was given to examining the PSAs signed between 
previous governments and MNCs, this strategy to do so has been in the form of parliamentary 
investigations.170 The parliamentary investigation into the PSAs started on 2nd of January 
2018 (The Citizen, 2018a), and follow on from similar investigations into the gold mining 
 
166 Senior Engineer Interview. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Interview, Member of Parliament, CCM, Dar es Salaam, 16.02.2018; Senior State Executive 
Interview 2. 
169 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview. 
170 These investigations have not affected the EACOP Project.  
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industry, which resulted in a temporary export ban and considerable fines for Acacia mining 
(Financial Times, 2018a). Negotiations were paused by the government in mid-2018 to allow 
a review of the PSAs (East African, 2019). While the investigations into the PSAs involve all 
IOCs currently operating in Tanzania, there was the feeling that these investigations were 
targeting the ‘LNG group’ of IOCs.171 One respondent even suggested that the investigations 
were written by the Tanzanian secret service, and that the parliamentary report was just a 
façade.172 This obviously could not be verified, but it nevertheless highlights the high level of 
mistrust between the IOCs and the Tanzanian government.  
Whilst the above would suggest that the IOCs are united in their response towards 
the government on the LNG project, the opposite is true. There are divisions over the strategy 
and how to move forward between IOCs on the LNG project. The IOCs of the ‘LNG group’ 
rarely meet to organise a collective response, and this has made negotiations harder.173 This 
is combined with the fact there is a disagreement over the financial fundamentals of the 
project between the IOCs.174 This has been chiefly between Shell, the project’s head 
contractor, who have experience in the construction of LNG plants across the world, and 
Equinor, who do not have the same level of experience in LNG, with Tanzania being their first 
LNG project outside of Norway (Equinor, 2020b). 175 This ensures that the perceptions of the 
future of the LNG project for Equinor are fundamentally different to that of Shell; Equinor 
has sought to speed up the progress of the project with their team,176 however Shell has been 
adamant that the project should go forward with all parties together, at a slower pace.177 
Alongside strategy, compounding this difficulty has been the fact that there is 
different PSAs for the different gas blocks, with different agreements and demand. For all 
companies to join on the LNG project, they have to agree the specifics, such as who will get 
first revenues.178 This has not been agreed, neither has the strategy on how to approach the 
government and present a unified front. Interviewees from IOCs, the government, and 
independent analysts all noted the division in the LNG group.179 
 
171 Senior IOC Executive 3 Interview. 
172 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview.  
173 Interview, Independent IOC Lawyer, Dar es Salaam, 18.03.2018. 
174 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview; Independent IOC Lawyer Interview. 
175 Independent IOC Lawyer Interview. 
176 Senior State Executive 1 Interview. 
177 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview. 
178 Ibid. 




During fieldwork, there was suggestions that a smaller LNG project with Equinor as 
the head of the project might break the deadlock and fast-track the project. According to 
Shell, this project would ‘kill any other [LNG] development’, 180 as this LNG would primarily 
service block two, Equinor’s block. It would not be financially viable to construct another 
smaller LNG plant for the remining three blocks. Since fieldwork, Equinor has opened its own 
negotiations with the government over a smaller LNG project, (Reuters, 2018c), although 
current progress has been minimal. If this goes ahead, a larger LNG will become economically 
unviable, leading to questions over the remaining blocks that Equinor does not have a stake 
in. This development highlights a potential synchronicity between Equinor and the 
government; Equinor desires speed up progress on LNG discussions to construct an LNG plant 
outside of Norway and is prepared to make a smaller plant to service block two. This would 
fit into the government’s developmentalist agenda, whereby a smaller plant would allow for 
some gas to be used domestically.  
The lack of unity between IOCs has been a factor behind the lack of progression of 
talks. Whilst the government has delayed negotiations through the investigation into the 
PSAs and legal changes, the differing strategies, and attitudes towards the LNG project 
between IOCs has ensured that there is a lack of unity on the IOC side of negotiation. Central 
to this has been the time horizons of the IOC actors; Equinor has looked to speed up the 
project to fulfil their own corporate strategic goals, whereas Shell, the LNG project head, has 
attempted to combat the legal changes that were passed in 2017. This has denied potential 
synchronicity and delaying the project further. This is similar to the synchronicity of the 
project as a whole; multiple parties have failed to harmonise desired timescales for the 
projects future, and despite the importance of the project to the gas industry as a whole, has 
created an impasse in negotiations.  
4 Conflicting Cycles 
Considering the fact that both projects are officially recognised as important to the 
development of the country, combined with the fact that land has been acquired to ensure 
the project goes ahead, the question remains why have both projects struggled to progress 
beyond the HGA stage of their respective timescale. To understand why, one must look at 
the diverging interests that have caused a lack of temporal synchronicity both projects have 
experienced. These have been frictions between the main actors on the project, chiefly, the 
 
180 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview. 
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government and the IOCs. However, the causes behind the difficulties in negotiation for both 
EACOP and LNG have been different; with the former struggling due to disputes between 
Uganda and IOCs. However, both projects have been facing market pressures both in the 
form of commodity prices and technological change. For the LNG, while there has been 
growing questions over financial viability of the project due to market pressures and 
technological innovation, there has been an additional pressure through the political cycles 
that have led to a lack of prioritisation on behalf of the government.  
4.1 External Pressures 
4.1.1 Ugandan Resource Nationalism, Oil Prices and EACOP 
 Upon arrival in Tanzania, there was considerable excitement towards the EACOP 
project, with little signs on the surface, either in the media or with interviewees, that the 
project would be facing delays. One senior contractor, with considerable experience in the 
Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector, claimed that ‘Total have got all their paperwork ready to go 
on the pipeline. They just need the political go ahead and signatures.’181 This, obviously 
proved to be premature. Within Tanzania, Magufuli publicly called for the project to be sped 
up to ensure completion by 2020 (The East African, 2016a). 
Pressure to start the project chiefly came from the presidents of Tanzania and Uganda 
and the IOCs operating in Lake Albert. It was clear that this project is important for both the 
presidents of Tanzania and Uganda, as their personal intervention in the intergovernmental 
agreement proved to be invaluable for the progress of the pipeline.182 The Ugandan 
government requires the project to ensure export of crude oil from the Lake Albert region 
and IOCs have desired a quick construction to ensure a quicker rate of return on their 
investment not just on the pipeline itself but also for the investment in the Ugandan oil 
industry as a whole. The main driver for the urgency for these actors has been financial; the 
faster the project is completed, the faster the export of crude oil can occur and thus revenues 
can be generated. This is true for all the actors directly involved in the pipeline company.  
There are also domestic pressures in Uganda to consider. The pipeline project is 
considered ‘the most important infrastructure project for Uganda in the past eighty years’.183 
 
181 Interview, Businessperson, IOC Services Supplier, Dar es Salaam, 31.01.2018. 
182 Interview, State Lawyer 1, Dar es Salaam, 21.11.2017; Interview, Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
EACOP Planning Coordinator, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 27.11.2017; Interview, 
Ugandan Diplomat, Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 15.03.2018. While there 
appeared to be a degree of praising the boss in these interviews, the stories they told were all very 
similar and media reports suggested the same.  
183 Ugandan Diplomat Interview. 
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There is considerable pressure to finalise oil production in the country, and this driver to 
export is not just to increase revenue, but also to enhance Ugandan patronage networks 
(Hickey and Izama, 2017). There have also been political promises that oil production will 
occur in the current electoral cycle, which in Uganda ends in 2021 (Economist, 2016). 
However, at the time of writing, Uganda is yet to begin extracting oil, and the industry in 
Uganda has a history of delays (Polus and Tycholiz, 2016), which have resulted in estimated 
date of production to be in 2022 (Reuters, 2019a), 16 years after commercial quantities of oil 
were first discovered in 2006.  
In spite of the apparent desire to complete the project on time, since the 4th of 
September 2019, all technical work on the EACOP project has been suspended. Even during 
the height of interest in EACOP, some risk agencies questioned whether the project timeline 
was feasible, suggesting that it is more likely to be completed by 2023 (Assaye Risk, 2018). In 
2019, Assaye Risk updated their risk calculation on the pipeline, suggesting that the biggest 
risk for the project was rising project costs and delays in the FID (Assaye Risk, 2019).184 
However, for the Tanzanian portion of the pipeline, the largest risk was out of their control: 
evolving disagreements between actors over the progress of the Ugandan oil industry.  
Alongside political issues in Uganda over tax, there has been wider issues around 
global oil prices making Ugandan crude economically unviable. There was some 
acknowledgement of low oil prices could affect the pipeline project by Ugandan officials.185 
According to Ugandan personnel, the projected breakeven price for Ugandan crude would 
be roughly $50 to $60bbl186 (Patey, 2015). However, independent analysists suggest that the 
breakeven price would be $75bbl (Henstridge and Page, 2012). Neither prices are likely for 
the foreseeable future. This price would have been deemed acceptable during a time of high 
oil prices, but not in the current investment climate.  
This is exacerbated by the quality of Ugandan crude: Ugandan crude is regarded as 
‘heavy’ and ‘sour’. In oil terminology, ‘sour’ crude is when the oil has high sulphur content, 
with low sulphur crude being described as ‘sweet’. It is more desirable to have ‘sweet’ oil as 
it is easier to produce. ‘Heavy’ crude is when the oil is dense compared to water. Heavy crude 
 
184 The other risks mentioned in the report were political disagreements, problems with construction 
contractors and competition from Kenya’s Turkana-Lamu pipeline, with the latter considered the 
least risk to the project. Since this report was published, the risk of political disagreements has 
subsided due to the passing of the HGA mentioned in this chapter. Issues around contractors and 
local content are covered in chapter seven.  
185 Ugandan Diplomat Interview. 
186 Bbl is shorthand for per barrel.  
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is more expensive to produce at refineries due to the length of the hydrocarbon chains. This 
is particularly applicable to Uganda’s oil which requires a heated pipeline, as at room 
temperature the oil will solidify. In short, Uganda’s oil is of poor quality and will be expensive 
to extract, transport, and refine into petroleum products during commodity booms, let alone 
during slumps in oil prices. 
For Tanzania, there is little that the government can do to aid the progression of the 
project without a resolution of the tax dispute in Uganda. Magufuli has publicly called for 
Museveni to ‘sacrifice short term gain and go for long term gold’ (Independent (Uganda), 
2019), but the reality there is little the Tanzanian government can do at this time. Publicly, 
at least, Ugandan ministers have been positive that the project will still go ahead (Observer, 
2019a). One of the roadblocks to the project that is under control by the Tanzanian 
government, the HGA, cannot be fully completed due to the fact that under the IGA, there 
are certain sections of the agreement, such as local content, that must be harmonised (GoT 
and GoU, 2017).  
In this respect, the delays of EACOP have been outside of the Tanzanian 
government’s control; both the tax disagreement and global oil prices have made the short 
to medium term viability of the Ugandan oil sector questionable. Whilst the HGA for both the 
Ugandan and Tanzanian governments and IOCs have not been signed, there was little 
presumption of difficulties in the negotiations between the Tanzanian government and Total, 
as it was just viewed as ‘a port for transport’.187 In this respect, the HGA cannot be signed 
between the Tanzanian government and the oil companies operating in Uganda due to the 
frictions between the Ugandan government and the IOCs.  
4.1.2 Technological Change and LNG Market Price 
International pressures to push the project ahead come from market forces, rather 
than domestic intervention. The first widely publicised estimate of LNG revenues in Tanzania 
ranged from $3 billion to $6 billion per year (IMF, 2014). Yet, since 2015, annual LNG capacity 
addition has outstripped demand growth (IEA, 2020), and more established competitors have 
changed the global and Asian market for gas. This comes from the LNG project progressing 
in neighbouring Mozambique, as well as other nations that could serve the Asian market well, 
such as Qatar and the United States of America (Petroleum Economist, 2020).  
 
187 Interview, Planning Officer, Dar es Salaam, 28.02.2018. 
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Considering these changes in the global market. if the LNG project starts operating 
in the 2020s, the break-even price of LNG would have to be between $7 to $8 MMBTU 
(Petroleum Economist, 2020). Price forecasts suggest that the Japanese LNG price between 
2020 to 2030 will be roughly around $7.50 to $8.50 MMBTU, with the latter figure forecasted 
for 2030 (World Bank, 2019).188 At this projected price, some analysts question the long-term 
economic viability of the project altogether (Scurfield and Manley, 2017). Peak revenues 
have adjusted accordingly, with revenues ranging from $3.5 billion to $5 billion per year 
(Henstridge, 2018; Scurfield and Mihalyi 2019). Because of current and projected declining 
prices, Henstridge (2018) argues that the key determinant to the success to the LNG project 
is time: the longer it takes to get the project to production, the smaller economic benefit for 
the country. In this respect, it appears that changing market forces are making both projects 
economically unviable.  
Despite concerns from MPs that the fast progression of the sector in Mozambique is 
being used as a reason to increase the pace of development in Tanzania,189 for IOCs and 
former TPDC officials, the main international concern from international events was not the 
progression of Mozambique, but rather shale fracking, particularly from the US:  
Mozambique is moving towards the project. But will that affect Tanzania as such? I think in the short term; 
Mozambicans will surely win. It would be good if we were ahead of them, but at the end of the day it is the 
market that matters, I don’t think that Mozambique will be able to satisfy the entire market. Number one, 2025 
is far down the road, number two, is a steady growth in the market. I think we should be more worried about 
the Americans, with their fracking.190  
American LNG exports from shale gas to the Japanese market started in 2016 (Forbes, 2020), 
and have risen from an initial 11,137 million cubic feet (mcf) in December 2016 to 32,280 mcf 
in January 2020 (EIA, 2020a). The US is predicted to become the world’s largest LNG exporter 
within the next four years (Forbes, 2020). In this respect, for the IOCs, Mozambique is less of 
a concern than the technological advances in the sector and the growing globalisation in gas 
markets, combined with technological changes. Hence, the main international issue the LNG 
project must contend with are market focused and are combined with technological change.  
 
188 This was by far the highest LNG price forecasted by the World Bank, with European prices 
estimated between $6 to $7 MMBTU, and American prices fluctuating between $2.9 to $4 MMBTU. 
Note, that due to the threat of recession caused by the 2020 coronavirus outbreak, as well as the 
collapse in oil prices caused by a dispute between Saudi Arabia and Russia, these price forecasts may 
be out of date. 
189 CCM MP Interview.  
190 Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview.   
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Technological advancement of the fracking industry has lowered regional gas prices 
considerably, particularly in markets where there is little supply of conventional natural gas. 
While Japan has seen little advancement in fracking,191 neighbouring markets, such as China 
and Australia, have utilised fracking both for domestic use and international export (Chang 
et al, 2012; Bubna-Litic, 2015). Hence, due to technological advancement, the perceptions of 
the future of the Tanzanian gas sector by the IOCs have become narrower. For IOCs, there 
appears to be a shorter timeframe the country’s hydrocarbon sector can be utilised for 
international export to the Japanese gas market where the price can command the 
investment required in Tanzania. It appears that the government is oblivious to the 
technological changes occurring in the gas industry surrounding shale fracking, one former 
senior TPDC member stated that:  
The politics behind the industry is unfortunate – everyone is an expert in oil exploration. The world is changing, 
shale gas in the US is cheaper than deep-sea. We could be missing a window of opportunity. The issue is getting 
the opportunity instantly when making a discovery. What we need is to understand the industry, especially in 
decision making. Yet the decision makers don’t see it that way, the perception is to let resources stay where 
they are and exploit tomorrow [sic]. You can do that with mining and minerals, but not with oil and gas. They 
are seeing oil and gas as a mineral, not as energy. The government doesn’t want to explore any more now, they 
want to wait for the future.192 
As highlighted throughout the thesis, the perception of the future has dominated the 
Tanzanian government’s strategy with regards to deep sea gas exploitation and domestic 
development. The desire to wait to exploit to obtain greater developmental benefits from 
the gas may be admirable, but also may not happen due to the changing market dynamics of 
the gas sector. In this respect, commodity prices and global gas networks are changing 
through technological innovation, whist being in a ‘bust’ phase.  
Advances in shale technology, despite their controversy in many countries, is cheaper 
to exploit than deep sea offshore gas. In this respect, the market dynamics of gas has changed 
since the discovery of Tanzanian hydrocarbons in the early 2010s. The advancement of shale 
technology has allowed for cheaper extraction of gas in the US, which has fundamentally 
altered the future of the gas market in Asia. This has created uncertainty over whether the 
current gas reserves of Tanzania may become economically unviable in the near future. This 
 
191 Discussions with market and hydrocarbon experts that specialise in Japan suggested that there is 
little fracking activity occurring within Japan itself. A search of English news sources that focus on Japan 
suggest that there has been little activity in the sector, with the latest news about fracking activity in 
Japan occurring in 2014 (Wall Street Journal, 2014). Japanese news sources were not searched as a I 
do not understand Japanese.  
192 Retired Senior TPDC Executive.  
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highlights the ways that the technologies of extraction can alter the temporalities of the 
natural gas market; the economic viability of Tanzania’s gas reserves have been discovered 
and expanded upon using deep sea extraction technology from IOCs, yet technological 
advancement may take away that economic potential in a similar fashion. The technologies 
that shape the materialities of gas are changing, and not in Tanzania’s favour. The perception 
of gas as a mineral, rather than energy has meant that it is perceived as something that can 
wait to be exploited, regardless of the market conditions and technological advances. 
4.2 Domestic Pressures 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, considering the fact that EACOP is a project 
to transport Ugandan crude, there is little the Tanzanian government can do to aid the 
resolution of the dispute between the government of Uganda and the IOCs operating in Lake 
Albert. Whilst there are domestic pressures to pursue EACOP, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, these pressures are more on the distribution of tenders and local content initiatives. 
There is also the ESIA to consider; the ESIA on the Ugandan portion of the pipeline has not 
been well received, with Ugandan NGOs criticising the report for legal and methodological 
issues (Observer, 2019b; Daily Monitor, 2019). Nevertheless, as shown in the subsection 
above, the majority of the issues facing the EACOP project are outside of the control of the 
Tanzanian government. 
Central to the challenges of the LNG project is the conflicting long-term imaginaries 
of the natural gas itself. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals and TPDC employees 
commented on the materiality and static geography of the gas, whereby it is still in the 
ground, and therefore there is little concern to with the pause in developments:  
‘It is a process; we have to be patient. It is difficult to manage, and we have to manage expectations. We’re 
moving slow, slow but sure. On most occasions, we are not happy with the progress. We could take this at a 
high speed but then we could be a loser. We have to make sure that the terms are right. We give room to make 
opinions, but the IOCs are not happy. They are not giving room. These are our resources; can we rush it? We 
need to optimise the government take. We can go at high speed but at the end of the day, we lose!’193 
In essence, this viewpoint could be seen as the fact that the gas is not going 
anywhere, so why rush development and, in the viewpoint of the government, get a bad 
deal? What is striking is that many of these comments from government technocrats were 
uniform, suggesting there is some long-term strategy to ensure that the government does 
not feel cheated in hydrocarbon negotiations. This fits into the rhetoric of Magufuli’s 
 
193 Senior State Executive 2 Interview. 
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administration, one that has sought to be tougher on MNCs in many sectors after the more 
liberal years of Kikwete.  
For a number of senior Tanzanian technocrats working in the sector, the reasoning 
behind the slow advancement has been twofold; firstly, there has been an indirect impact on 
the research the ‘resource curse’ has had on the process. A variety of interviewees have 
claimed that the poor experience of managing hydrocarbon revenues by other African states 
has been a contributing factor in the process to ensure that the negative aspects of the 
resource curse could be countered. Secondly, discussions with senior IOC officials presented 
a pattern of long-term thinking with regards to the hydrocarbons themselves: 
‘An Omani oil and gas consultant once told me: never hurry with energy, energy will be needed in fifty to a 
hundred years’ time, you don’t want to be laughed at with the deals.’194 
‘As the gas sector is concerned – we still have it. I hold the thought that these hydrocarbons are there and 
they're not going anywhere. There should be no pressure to say ‘Hey this let’s extract today. You know I want to 
be there tomorrow. So, we should not feel the pressure to move very fast, but we should feel the pressure to 
put our house in order. You should not be too hasty to mess up the insistent value. This first foot forward is very 
critical, and this first foot forward is the readiness in terms of human capacity institutional capacity.’195 
As mentioned above, there is a perception of utilising gas as a mineral rather than an 
energy source. The statements above encapsulate this mindset. In this respect, one can see 
the strategy behind ensuring benefits from gas; gas is not renewable, so therefore there is a 
single chance to benefit from hydrocarbon extraction and associated infrastructure. The LNG 
project is paramount to this, and therefore the government has sought to ensure a 
comfortable pace of progression.  
Domestic pressures and contrasting cycles have been behind the lack of progress in 
the LNG plant. As stated in the previous sub-section, the market pressures to pursue an LNG 
plant are becoming increasingly difficult due to technological change in the gas sector and 
changing exporters due to this change in technology. Beyond the new laws affecting 
negotiations, central to the lack of progression of the LNG plant has been contrasting time 
horizons between the government and the IOCs (and, as shown before, contrasting time-
horizons between the IOCs themselves). Although Tanzania currently has a large number of 
infrastructure projects both in the planning and construction stage (e.g., Economist, 2019; 
Tanzania Daily News, 2020), these projects are chiefly focused on improving domestic 
 
194 Interview, Acting Managing Director, TPDC, Dar es Salaam, 26.03.2018. 
195 CCM MP Interview. 
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infrastructure rather than international export. The focus on other projects was not lost on 
officials with an interest in the sector:  
‘Nothing has moved, main reasons for this are that the government has not prioritised the LNG project and 
there is poor government support in the sector. They instead are looking to implement other projects.’196  
‘There is no sponsor of the project on the government’s side, nobody with a drive and passion for the project. 
Nobody has a personal stake in the project, so nobody cares, there is no political gain for anybody. [The LNG 
project] can’t be done in one presidential term’197 
The lack of sponsor on the governments side is best reflected by the lack of a full-time 
negotiating team on the project, as well as the slow progression of the project overall. While 
this has been a common complaint by IOCs, there is also a political reason behind the lack of 
progression on the project: leadership terms and election cycles. 
For IOC personnel interviewed, one of the biggest obstacles for the progression of 
the project had been the timescale of the project itself and how it interacts with other cycles, 
in particular the international commodities cycle and the national electoral cycle. In this 
respect, due to the long-term nature of LNG construction and investment, combined with 
the low prospect of considerable local content, there is a lack of short-term political capital 
to be gained from pushing forward the LNG project. Furthermore, the project carries political 
risks for the government; with the current discourse of blaming previous governments for 
getting, in their viewpoint, ‘poor deals’, the government is putting itself in a ‘safe position’, 
as ‘if the government makes a mistake, that means Tanzania loses out’.198 This long term view 
to ensure the project moves slowly to make sure that no perceived mistakes are made are 
combined with the electoral cycle; with general elections in Tanzania occurring every five 
years, issues with the extractive sector have been prominent in both 2010 and 2015 general 
elections (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018).  
The LNG project, with up to eight years of construction, does not allow for 
considerable political capital within one presidential term. While this project offers a 
considerable sum of capital investment for the country, it does not offer the jobs and 
development opportunities that have been advertised alongside other infrastructure 
projects. It is telling that the EACOP project has received greater public interest, despite 
offering roughly a tenth of the investment. The largest concern with two of the IOCs 
 
196 Oil and Gas Bank Executives Interview.   
197 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview.  
198 Planning Officer Interview.  
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personnel interviewed was the lack of engagement the LNG project lifecycle has with the 
national political cycles:  
‘The political cycle in Tanzania is five years. We need someone who is willing to take a 10/15/20 year focus, in 
order to organise the people and resources required to take you from discovery to first gas. Most of the 
discoveries were found during the previous president’s Kikwete’s second term. The last major discovery was in 
2014, by that time there was enough gas to justify an LNG plant. But up until the time he was leaving office in 
2015, he had not been able to stop negotiations on partial terms in order to move the project through to 
development.’199 
‘If the LNG project fitted comfortably into the political cycle then it would have been finalised already.’200 
The long-term nature of the project that does not guarantee short term gains within a 
singular presidential term has been a large contributing factor to the stalling of the project. 
This short to medium term mindset behind the government was acknowledged by one MP 
who stated that ‘We are a young nation, we think in terms of administrations: we have 10 
years, if we are lucky, we’ll be back in power in 10 years.’201  
This contrast highlights frictions within the government over long term imaginaries 
of gas development and short-term political demands. In limiting the perception of time 
within administrations, such a project planning would have to run smoothly throughout to 
ensure that the project could be completed on time. Due to the legislative changes in the 
sector combined with the PSA investigations, as well as declining trust between parties and 
differing time horizons between IOCs, such progression has been difficult.   
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to understand the temporalities of extractive infrastructure 
projects and how the temporalities have interacted with different actors. As the chapter 
demonstrates, there are frictions between both the state and IOCs, and between the IOCs 
themselves over the direction, and therefore the future, of the projects. Both EACOP and the 
LNG project share similarities and differences, but ultimately, they have both resulted in 
delays around the same conjuncture: the HGA. At the surface, this appears to be a surprise, 
both projects will bring in billions of dollars of investment for construction, as well as further 
income in the form of LNG export and oil tariffs. The scale of investment would suggest that 
 
199 Senior IOC Engineer Interview.  
200 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview. 
201 CCM MP Interview. Note that there is an assumption that Magufuli will win the 2020 election.  
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both projects will be a priority for the government and would look to be fast tracked. Despite 
Magufuli’s calls for the pace of both projects to increase, this has not happened.  
EACOP highlights how, in certain respects, hydrocarbon infrastructure projects are 
outside of the power of the state. With Tanzania not supplying the oil required for the 
pipeline, the progression of the project rests on the negotiations between the government 
of Uganda and the IOCs present in Lake Albert. The tax dispute between the government and 
Total and Tullow have hampered the midstream operations and have been further 
exacerbated by projected oil price forecasts for the short to medium term.  
The LNG project, on the other hand, has been in a negotiation purgatory of sorts. Like 
EACOP, land was quickly seized, although the project has not been finalised. The long-term 
nature of the project has worked against its progression. In this respect, the perceived lack 
of political will in the country is caused by the political cycle; the absence of electoral gains 
by the LNG plant project within one political cycle in Tanzania has ensured that there is little 
short-term political gain for the project, leaving LNG in limbo. 
This is compounded by the general level of distrust between IOCs and the current 
administration. The conflicting interests of the government, market demands, project 
timescales, IOCs ambitions and the governments priorities has resulted in friction. A core 
reason for the lack of advancement of the LNG project has been competing strategies and 
projected futures of what benefit the LNG can provide. For the Tanzanian government, the 
LNG project is not viewed solely as a mechanism for export, but also an infrastructure to 
supply gas for domestic development. This is in contrast with IOC strategies to utilise natural 
gas to supply LNG for the growing Asian market. However, the IOC actors of the LNG group 
are not monolithic, and they themselves have differing strategies and priorities over the LNG 
project. Chief among these is between two of the largest IOCs involved in Tanzania: Shell and 
Equinor. Shell has wanted to combat the resource laws to ensure they do not disrupt the 
project, while Equinor has sought to quicken the pace of the project and is now in the process 
of negotiating a smaller LNG project that could both satisfy domestic concerns for the 
government and Equinor’s wider objectives.  
The cause of this is different expectations of the future. Corporate drivers, such as 
market forecasts, have made both the Ugandan oil sector and the Tanzanian offshore gas 
sector less of an economic prospect than it was during the initial discovery. This is combined 
with an uncertain hydrocarbon market, which has made large scale infrastructure 
investments in an area not associated with energy a high risk. Combined with this is a 
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declining reward; the push of resource nationalist policies in Tanzania and Uganda has 
provided additional pressures on IOCs to fight these legal changes, often threatening to leave 
if they apply to them. Hence, for IOCs, the expectations of the future of the East African 
hydrocarbon sector are less than they were during initial discovery, and strategies between 
the IOCs themselves have diverged over the pace and progression of the project.  
While certain aspects of the government have worked well with extractive 
temporalities, such as obtaining land. The desire to obtain greater fiscal benefits has resulted 
in a pause. While on paper both projects are still going ahead, technological advancement in 
shale gas, as well as continuing market forecasts which suggest that hydrocarbon prices will 
be relatively mild in the upcoming decade, suggest that the chief driver of exploration in the 




Chapter VII: The Politics of the Temporary: 
Local Content in the East African Crude Oil 
Pipeline 
1 Introduction 
In April 2016, the Ugandan government announced that Tanzania was to be the 
chosen route to export Ugandan crude oil, beating two potential Kenyan routes in the 
process (Daily Monitor, 2016). This route will take oil from its source in Hoima, Uganda to the 
Tanzanian port of Tanga (Figure 14). While this had wider political ramifications for the East 
African region, it also provided the catalyst for improved local content regulations and to 
encourage Tanzanian businesses to enter the hydrocarbon supply-side sector. Since the 
announcement of the Tanzanian route, there has been a marked increase in interest over 
participating in the EACOP project in both countries (Daily Monitor, 2018; The Citizen, 
2018d). 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, EACOP is now its own registered 
company, although ownership of the project is divided between five partners. The first two 
are the NOCs of the nations which the pipeline passes, Uganda, and Tanzania. These are the 
Figure 14: EACOP Pipeline Route. 
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Ugandan National Oil Corporation and TPDC, respectively. The other three partners of the 
project are IOCs currently operating in exploration and production of Uganda’s oilfield in Lake 
Albert: The French Supermajor Total, the Anglo-Irish medium sized oil company Tullow Oil 
and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, owned by the People’s Republic of China.  
Project management for the whole of the pipeline is being handled by employees 
seconded by Total, with NOCs aiding the project in terms of legal and technical support within 
their respective borders. Unlike similar large-scale infrastructure projects on the continent 
(e.g., the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, see Pegg, 2006), there is no funding coming the Bretton 
Woods institutions or the Chinese government or their respective state-owned enterprises. 
Rather the project is being financed through bank loans. Although these loans have yet to be 
finalised, the joint arranger and advisor for the funding of the project is Stanbic Bank Uganda 
and Japan’s Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (The East African, 2018b).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, despite the initial optimism over the project, and 
the public announcement by Magufuli that the project should be ‘fast tracked’ (Tanzania 
Daily News, 2017), EACOP is currently being delayed. While it was originally planned for 
completion in 2020, in time for commercial oil extraction of Lake Albert (EACOP, 2017). Risk 
assessments included local content as a minor potential threat to the delaying of the project 
(Assaye Risk, 2019). While the IGA was signed in 2017, stalled discussions for the HGA 
between the two nations and the IOCs involved in the project combined with FID delays have 
both been seen as the major contributors to the overall delay of the project (Assaye Risk, 
2019). 
This chapter focuses on the temporalities of local content policies in the EACOP project. 
Since the announcement of the Tanzanian route, there has been a marked increase in 
interest over participating in the EACOP project in both countries. Interest in local content 
has both been within the private sector and the wider public. However, this interest has 
highlighted conflicting temporalities on different spatial scales, all of which have had an 
impact on the project. It is the role of this chapter to unpack these frictions and uncover some 
of the various forms of temporality that have influenced Tanzania’s local content policy on 
EACOP.  
While the pipeline has served to catalyse local content at a national level, this has been 
focused on businesses and industries based in Dar es Salaam, rather than local communities 
and population centres closest to the pipeline route. While the Tanzanian route contains no 
extraction or transport of Tanzanian hydrocarbons, it is central to the government’s local 
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content strategy for the extractives sector. Interest has been both in the domestic private 
sector and within the general public, either as a worker or as a contractor. It is worth noting 
that local content can be a broad term, ensuring both skilled and unskilled employment, but 
also supply-side services to the hydrocarbon sector which can include both technical and 
non-technical services. Tanzania’s local content policy seeks to ensure both, and this chapter 
will focus both on the focus on employment and on encouraging businesses to successfully 
enter the supply chain on the project.  
This chapter seeks to contribute to the thesis by exploring the role temporalities have in 
the political economy of extractive industrial policy, in this case local content on a major 
pipeline project. EACOP was chosen as the case study due to the fact that the Tanzanian 
government and Total have used this project as an experiment in local content, and the fact 
that the project promises an enormous amount of capital to be invested in Tanzania and 
Uganda over a short period of time. This creates an interesting set of temporalities which 
have influenced actors seeking to enter the supply chain of the project.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, it will explore the background of local 
content policies in Tanzania. It will chart how the movement towards local content policies 
on the continent have influenced Tanzanian local content, as well as the country’s previous 
attempts to install a successful local content policy within its domestic extractive sectors. It 
will then focus on the EACOP project itself, highlighting how the project has provided the 
catalyst for updates in local content policies in the country. After this, it will move onto the 
politics of urgencies that have emerged out of Tanzanian local content policy, exploring the 
contrasting politics of urgencies that different actors have undertaken and arguing that the 
creation of a politics of urgency in local content has benefited those with the capital and the 
connections to seize opportunities quickly. Following on from this, the chapter will take a 
greater focus on local content policies in Tanga, highlighting the differentiation of local 
content application between the economic core and periphery of the country, and 
showcasing the different paces of local content implementation across geographic space. The 
concluding section will round up the information on different temporalities in the previous 
sections for a greater understanding of the unique temporalities of local content and EACOP.   
2 Local Content Implementation in Tanzania 
Considering the small size of the onshore gas industry, and the paused status of the 
offshore sector, there has been considerable research into Tanzanian local content policies 
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in the petroleum sector. Some of the current research has explored how previous 
experiences in the mining sector have shaped local content in the petroleum sector (Lange 
and Kinyondo, 2016); stakeholder’s hopes and scepticism with current local content policies 
(Kinyondo and Villanger, 2017; Kolstad and Kinyondo, 2017); the elite level politics behind 
local content implementation (Hansen et al, 2016); and preparation by local businesses for 
the arrival of the sector (Anderson, 2016; Calingnano and Vaaland, 2017; 2018). Much of this 
is due to that fact that there has been great anticipation for the policies and legal changes.  
Recent research has explored the relationship between the government and its 
engagement with local communities (e.g., Kamat et al, 2019; Poncian and Jose, 2019). Local 
content, like the rest of the extractive sector in Tanzania, is at the direction of the state, 
rather than local communities, and this has had a harmful impact (Poncian, 2019c). With this 
centralisation, there is little community participation in the local content decision making 
process (Poncian, 2019c). Despite this, the government’s engagement with the wider 
industry has proved to be an electoral calculation as much as an economic one, with local 
content being a part of a package of resource nationalist policies that have proved to be 
popular (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018; Poncian, 2019b). Local content thus is an important 
political tool in Tanzania as well as a developmental one. As this section will show, application 
of local content has proved to be frustrating in both the mining and the gas sector. In this 
respect, the introduction of EACOP has been seen as a project that could reinvigorate a 
Tanzanian local content policy that could then be applied to other sectors, particularly the 
gas sector.  
2.1 Legislating Local Content in Tanzania 
In Tanzania, local content policies can be traced back to the history of the mining 
sector, and in particular, the gold mining sector. During the time of Ujamaa, while legislation 
to ensure local participation was in place, the mining sector lacked foreign investment and 
was dominated by artisanal and small-scale mining (Emel et al, 2011). By the time structural 
adjustment policies were enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, one of the conditionalities were 
the removal of what would today be classed as local content policies within legal frameworks. 
The gold mining sector has been contentious in the country and contributed to dissatisfaction 
within the local communities over the way both the state and mining companies have acted 
(Lange, 2011; Carstens and Hilson, 2009).  
The (often negative) experiences of the mining sector and the lack of local 
involvement in the gold sector during the era of structural adjustment greatly influenced the 
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Tanzanian gas sector. Many in the business community and the government saw the gas 
industry as another chance to enact local content correctly. Reginald Mengi, the former 
chairperson of the Tanzanian Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) claimed that:  
‘Tanzania should not now shy away from this golden opportunity which will wipe our years of agony 
caused by the mining sector in this country. We have been blessed with a second chance and let us fully utilize it 
to create sustainable local participation that will benefit future generations. (Mengi, 2013, cited in Lange and 
Kinyondo, 2016: 1102). 
This ‘second chance’ for local content in the gas sector has not been successful. While 
community relations between the multinational corporations and local communities lack the 
animosity experienced in the mining sector, local content in the gas sector has been low, with 
complaints that IOCs have not been hiring Tanzanians or skirting regulations commonplace 
(Kinyondo and Villanger, 2017). This is partially due to the fact that preparations by the 
Tanzanian government were slow to enact local content policies. Alongside this is the fact 
that all local content provisions were enshrined in PSAs with IOCs and therefore varied 
between companies and kept secret. Furthermore, not all PSAs contained local content 
provisions, with 90% of PSAs having some sort of local content.202  
In 2014, four years after the deep-sea exploration had begun in the country, a draft local 
content policy outlined much of the policy goals of local content (GoT, 2014b). Unusual for a 
local content policy, and unlike the definitions stated in the literature review, it defines the 
‘local’ in local content, characterizing it as ‘the Tanzania mainland and its people’ (GoT, 
2014b: iii).203 This should not come as a surprise, as the Tanzanian state views natural 
resources as national resources, with no special treatment for communities located within 
close proximity of the extractive site. Such a policy has resulted in rising community tensions 
in the past (Lange, 2011; Ahearne and Childs, 2018; Must, 2018). This draft policy was one of 
the ‘least rigorous’ in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the requirements ‘vague enough to be almost 
voluntary’ (Ovadia, 2016a: 27-28).  
The 2015 Petroleum Act (GoT, 2015d) made major changes in local content requirements 
and oversight. It split the oversight and promotion of local content between the newly 
formed PURA, which supervised the upstream sector, and EWURA, supervising the mid- and 
downstream sector (GoT, 2015d). TPDC also plays a role in drafting and implementing local  
 
202 Group Interview, State Local Content Coordinators (Group Interview), Dar es Salaam, 22.03.2018. 
The exception to this is the partially leaked PSA between the government and Equinor in 2014 
(Manley and Lassourd, 2014).  
203 Zanzibar have their own resource legislation and will not be included in this analysis.  
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content policies. However, it is questionable whether TPDC can undertake this role 
(Melyoki, 2017). The act called for a more aggressive indigenisation approach by promoting 
domestic capital interests and imposing stringent local content requirements (Jacob and 
Pedersen, 2018). Despite this, Lange and Kinyondo (2016) contend that the 2015 legislation 
was relatively ‘soft’ out of fear of losing investors. This would change in 2017.  
Alongside the Petroleum Act, there are a variety of wide-ranging legislation that impacts 
local content implementation. In 2011, the government passed the public procurement act 
(GoT, 2011c). This act encouraged the separation of contracts to increase local participation. 
In the same year as the petroleum act, the government passed the non-citizens act, which 
ensured that any company employing foreign nationals will come up with succession plans 
to train Tanzanian nationals for the eventual replacement of the foreign worker (GoT, 2015c). 
This act covered all sectors of the economy, not just the extractives sector. These acts scratch 
the surface of the considerable amount of legislation towards both the supervision and 
enactment of local content policies in the extractives sector (see Scurfield et al, 2017; Ovadia, 
2019). Implementation and participation are still essential for the success of any policy. In 
this respect, there has been little progress of Tanzanian businesses entering the hydrocarbon 
supply chain. Despite the legal requirements for international firms to partner with local 
firms, current uptake on joint ventures has been low (Calignano and Vaaland, 2017; 2018). 
However, some of the lack of progress of the policies can be attributed to the lack of overall 
progress in the hydrocarbon sector. 
In 2017, the government passed the Petroleum (Local Content) Regulations act (GoT, 
2017b). Unlike previous legislation, the 2017 local content regulations came with substantive 
quotas as well as strong demands on IOCs for the provision of local content. While this 
legislation does not affect current PSAs in the upstream sector, the Natural Resources and 
Contracts Act 2017 allows for the renegotiation of PSAs if the terms are considered 
‘unconscionable’ (GoT, 2017d). Tanzania’s own experiences of the difficulties of 
implementing local content, alongside other countries experience from a multitude of 
differing developing countries, have served as inspirations, and contributed to the 
construction and passing of the 2017 local content regulations. Because of this legislation, as 
well as the EACOP project, the demand for local content has risen even further within both 
the business elites and the local communities situated near the pipeline. Unlike previous 
legislation, the 2017 local content regulations came with substantive quotas (Table 8 and 9), 
as well as strong demands on IOCs for the provision of local content (GoT, 2017b).  
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Table 8: Local Content Timetable for the Upstream Sector (GoT, 2017b). 
Table 9: Local Content Timetable for the Midstream and Downstream Sector (GoT, 2017b). 
As one can see from tables 8 and 9, the local content targets are ambitious in nature. 
Interviews with bureaucrats tasked with the writing of the new law suggested that the quotas 
above, with the timescales set, would be unachievable.204 However, as it will be shown, the 
EACOP project has advertised that it will follow the mid- and downstream targets set by the 
legislation.    
While quotas suggest that direct employment is the goal of the new local content law, 
the reality is that there has been a shift away from direct local content, to a ‘multi-sectoral’ 
local content strategy.205 This is where focus is shifted to enhancing supply sectors such as 
agriculture, construction and services in the goal to raise entire sectors and businesses to 
international standards, either for further supply-side projects in the extractive industries, or 
to aid the wider development of the country.  
Local content in Tanzania has been ‘hampered by inconsistency, confusion and under-
coordinated donor interventions.’ (Ovadia, 2019: 81). Oversight of local content has seen 
 
204 Interview, State Lawyer 2, Dar es Salaam, 19.03.2018.   
205 Interview, State Local Content Coordinator (Single Interview), Dar es Salaam, 18.04.2018.   
Upstream 
Staff Type Start 5 Years 10 Years 
Management Staff 10% 15% 25% 
Supervisory Staff 15% 25% 40% 
Technical Core Staff 15% 30% 50% 
Professional Support Staff 30% 40% 60% 
Semi-Skilled 50% 60% 80% 
Unskilled 100% 100% 100% 
Midstream and Downstream 
Staff Type Start 5 Years 10 Years 
Management Staff 15% 30% 50% 
Supervisory Staff 25% 40% 60% 
Technical Core Staff 30% 50% 70% 
Professional Support Staff 50% 60% 80% 
Semi-Skilled 70% 90% 100% 
Unskilled 100% 100% 100% 
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overlapping mandates of various institutions. Alongside TPDC, PURA and EWURA mentioned 
above, the Ministry of Energy and the National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) all 
have some oversight of local content, leading to questions to how the different institutions 
will coordinate local content initiatives (Scurfield et al, 2017). TPDC, EWURA, the Ministry of 
Energy and NEEC have all have some form of oversight of local content on EACOP.  
Not all of the legislation above is directly linked to the project. However, they highlight 
the ongoing attempt by the Tanzanian government to obtain greater linkages towards the 
extractives industry, progressing to ‘harder’ forms of local content due to the lack of success 
of previous iterations. With the ongoing legal issues around the gold industry, and the lack 
of progress from exploration to development in the offshore gas sector, EACOP has 
presented an opportunity to obtain skills, expertise, and capital from the hydrocarbon 
industry, despite the project not transporting any Tanzanian hydrocarbons.  
3 Local Content and EACOP 
Given that the gas industry presented a supposed ‘second chance’ for local content, 
the announcement of EACOP has presented a short-term ‘third chance’ for Tanzania to 
establish a successful local content policy. EACOP’s local content strategy has been seen as 
an experiment both for the government and for IOCs; for the government of Tanzania, EACOP 
has provided the catalyst to encourage Tanzanian businesses to enter the hydrocarbon 
supply-side sector. The goal is to establish a sector that can then be applied to the wider 
Tanzanian gas industry in Mtwara and to help sectors develop and compete both regionally 
and nationally both inside and out of the extractives sector.206 For IOC partners, this project 
is being used as an experiment to apply to other projects in the future and to be used as a 
selling point to obtain tenders on other hydrocarbon infrastructure projects across the 
globe.207 The legal dimensions of the project will be in the HGA, including local content 
requirements.208 However, the 2017 local content legislation has had some influence on local 
content implementation in the project; EACOP has advertised its own quotas for different 
levels of staff (Table 10). These current quotas match the 2017 legislative quotas for the mid- 
and downstream sector (Table 9).    
 
 
206 State Local Content Coordinator Interview. 
207 Interview, IOC Local Content Coordinator, EACOP, Dar es Salaam, 12.03.2018.  
208 Senior IOC Executive 2 Interview. 
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EACOP Local Content Plan 
Minimum % of Tanzanian Citizens Year 0 Year 5 
Management Staff Management Staff 15% 30% 
Supervisory Staff 25% 40% 
Technical Staff Technical Core Staff 30% 50% 
Professional Support Staff 50% 60% 
Other Staff Semi-Skilled 70% 90% 
Unskilled 100% 100% 
Table 10: EACOP Local Content Timetable (EACOP, 2018a). 
Much of the work pre-construction constitutes technical work that requires expertise 
and experience of projects on a large scale that Tanzanian companies lack. These surveys and 
assessments pre-construction have unsurprisingly gone to MNCs. For unskilled labour, it is 
expected that Total and associated contractors will hire people from local communities 
across the pipeline route for temporary employment, while for semi-skilled and skilled labour 
it is expected that Tanzanians with the relevant qualifications and experience will undertake 
those roles.209 
The construction phase contains the largest amount of employment and supply 
opportunities to Tanzanians, with an estimated 30,000 skilled, semi-, and unskilled jobs 
available during the height of the construction phase (The Citizen, 2018d). This figure is just 
an estimate and includes indirect employment from supply services rather than direct 
employment from EACOP itself. For unskilled labour, it is expected that EACOP and 
associated contractors will hire people from local communities across the pipeline route for 
temporary employment, while for semi-skilled and skilled labour it is expected that 
Tanzanians with the relevant qualifications and experience will undertake those roles, 
although there is no guarantee that this will happen. 
Direct employment and tenders on the pipeline post-construction are largely 
technical in nature, with limited unskilled and non-technical jobs post-construction. There 
are only an estimated 1,000 direct jobs available post-construction, with most of these in 
skilled labour positions. In this respect, the long-term developmental impact on the 
immediate areas is minimal, with most of the employment going to more technical aspects 
of the pipeline and the majority of these jobs will most likely be undertaken by foreigners, or 
 
209 IOC Local Content Coordinator Interview. 
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Tanzanian urban professionals. Thus, the opportunity for wider development, both locally 
and nationally, rests in a small timeframe.  
Hence, while EACOP has published a quantitative local content plan, the figures only 
tell half the story; while the five-year plan seeks to increase the number of Tanzanian citizens 
directly employed at all job scales, these jobs that will be on offer will be in the post-
construction phase of the project. In this phase, the jobs that are available are lopsided 
towards more senior and technical roles. The timeline of the project has large discrepancies 
within the number of jobs available during the specific phases, and this has an impact on the 
application for local content on the project.  
This has led to the question whether EACOP will ensure that it will be third time lucky 
for Tanzania’s local content efforts. At the time of writing, this project has yet to enter the 
construction phase. Nevertheless, there has been a large degree of planning within the 
government for the upcoming project. Furthermore, throughout 2017 and 2018, local 
content for the pipeline has been heavily advertised by the government within English and 
Swahili newspapers, much to the frustration of Total employees.210 Both private and public 
sector actors see local content on this project as an experiment, albeit with different aims 
and goals.  
For the government of Tanzania, EACOP has provided the catalyst to encourage 
Tanzanian businesses to enter the hydrocarbon supply-side sector and to update laws and 
policies, which culminated in the petroleum local content regulations in 2017. The goal is to 
establish a sector that can then be applied to the wider Tanzanian gas industry in Mtwara 
and to help distinct sectors such as construction and service sectors to develop and compete 
both regionally and nationally. Within the business elites of Tanzania, umbrella local content 
organisations such as the Association of Tanzania Oil and Gas Service Providers (ATOGS) have 
formed to obtain tenders, as well as the TPSF promoting the potential for skills and business 
development in the project (The Citizen, 2018f). This has expanded public expectations 
further.  
For Total, it has sought to use this project as an experiment for local content policies 
as a framework to apply to other projects in the future. The main goal for Total in regard to 
local content and EACOP is to be used as a selling point to obtain tenders on other 
 
210 Field Notes, Dar es Salaam, 12.03.2018. 
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hydrocarbon infrastructure projects across the globe, particularly during a time of increased 
local content legislation. 
As chapter six highlighted, the original timeframe predicted completion of the 
project in 2020, but it has been pushed back to 2022 at the earliest. Therefore, the project 
phases have large disreprencies within the number of jobs available during the specific 
phases, and this has an impact in the application for local content on the project. The 
construction phase contains the largest amount of employment and supply opportunities to 
Tanzanians, with an estimated 30,000 skilled, semi-, and unskilled jobs available during the 
height of the construction phase (The Citizen, 2018b).  
The structure of local content on the project itself is divided into tiers (Figure 15). 
Under the 2017 local content legislation, EACOP as a company is not just responsible for the 
employment and joint ventures of direct contractors, but also the sub-contractors (GoT, 
2017b). At one local content workshop, the EACOP representative clarified that the tenders 
for the upper tiers (tier 2 and 3), will most likely be taken by multinational corporations, but 
Figure 15: Selected Job Opportunities on the EACOP pipeline (EACOP, 2018b). 
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these will most likely be subcontracted.211 Furthermore, the representative was quick to 
clarify that entering the supply chain on a lower tier does not mean that payment for such 
tenders will be low, adding that many of the lower tiers do come with a significant financial 
benefit.212  
On a long enough timescale, all resource extraction is ‘temporary’ in the sense in that 
the resources extracted are non-renewable, and mining and oil and gas extraction projects 
typically have lifespans measured in decades. However, EACOP has presented a unique 
project to study the temporalities of local content. With significant sums of money invested 
in the project, and the possibility of obtaining some capital and technology through local 
content policies, there appears to be a short term ‘window of opportunity’ for companies to 
obtain such capital and expertise, as well as a significant boost to employment and skills 
training. The government of Tanzania has attempted to utilise this window as a catalyst for 
longer term development not just of the extractive sector, but also of other sectors, adding 
potential developmental potential to the Tanzanian economy. This window of opportunity 
itself has created a sense of urgency to enact local content and to quickly obtain tenders or 
employment on the project. While longer term aspirations of development are one of the 
main goals of Tanzanian local content, the policy implementation has been short term in 
nature, chiefly due to the constructed politics of urgency, of which the next section will now 
explore.  
4 The Politics of Urgency 
With the majority of the investment and resulting jobs and tenders available in a 
short timeframe, EACOP has created an urgency to quickly implement local content policies 
successfully before or during the construction phase of the project, as many of these 
opportunities will not come again. However, the desire to use the project to expand local 
content provisions was secondary to completing the project on time. Hence, for local 
content, there was not just the narrow construction phase to contend with, but also the 
reduction in time to prepare and implement local content policies. These two factors created 
an urgency whereby to prepare a nationwide local content policy and then apply it rested in 
a considerably shortened timeframe.  
 




Urgency as a form of time has not been well researched in academia. A basic 
understanding of urgency can be understood as something that requires immediate 
attention and of being of great importance. Politically, urgencies can be understood as form 
of pressure used to argue that swift action is required, and that the government is ‘being 
seen to do something’, rather than reflecting and planning (Medd and Marvin, 2005: 44). For 
local content and EACOP in Tanzania, the shortened timeframe created an urgency where 
the government was seen to be acting on quickly implementing measures to ensure greater 
participation. However, due to the speed local content was being implemented, this has 
meant a separation between those with capital and connections, as well as a geographical 
separation between the economic core and periphery of Tanzania.   
4.1 Pressures from Above 
 Being a cross-border project financed by international capital, there are considerable 
pressures to ensure a quick completion of the project from IOCs, Uganda, and President 
Magufuli. This also fits Magufuli’s negotiation style as a direct deal maker in the extractive 
industries (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018). The domestic politics behind such completion of the 
project should not be underestimated; local content in EACOP ‘is something that sounds 
good politically’,213 and the increase in formal (albeit temporary) employment would political 
and electoral prospects for CCM. However, this rested on the project being completed on 
time.    
 Such an urgency became apparent during interviews with high-ranking technocrats 
working on the pipeline negotiations. When discussing timeframes for the project, one senior 
Tanzanian technocrat explained that:   
 ‘We are working on a tight schedule, which can be risky in terms of project scheduling. We don’t have 
all the time in the world, and we are very much in need to fast track the project. The fast-tracking of the project 
can be a big risk, but it is a necessary condition that we need to consider. It is certainly trying to mitigate the 
quality in a short space of time.’214 
Here one can see one of the core components of the competing urgencies within EACOP. 
There is an acknowledgement of both the need for speedy implementation of the project 
combined with the reality that such urgency could be a detriment to wider (albeit secondary) 
project goals such as local content. On the one hand, there is a desire both by the government 
and the population at large that Tanzanians should have a greater involvement in the project; 
 
213 Interview, State Local Content Coordinator 2, Dar es Salaam, 18.04.2018.  
214 State Senior Executive Interview.  
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both to increase the incomes of Tanzanian workers and local businesses, and to increase the 
standards and skills of organisations and workforces. This contrasts with the urgency at the 
highest levels of the Tanzanian and Ugandan government, alongside the IOCs, to complete 
the project within an acceptable timeframe to aid the logistical challenge to export Ugandan 
crude oil and to generate revenues for all parties involved.  
4.2 Speeding Up Local Content  
  Alongside temporal pressures to obtain the maximum amount of economic 
development out of the project in a short timeframe, there was the additional pressure to 
get local content ‘right’ after the failures of implementing the policy in the mining and gas 
industry. In this respect, while there were pressures to get the project completed quickly, 
there were contrasting pressures to successfully implement local content both quickly and 
effectively from a variety of domestic actors. The concern of local content provisions being 
left behind in EACOP was not lost on some politicians with an interest in the sector. There 
was concern that local content would be left behind. This was best seen with one prominent 
CCM MP, who was on the Parliamentary Committee for Energy and Minerals, claiming that:  
‘There is a pressure to do the project [EACOP] very quickly. There is also the danger of missing out on some 
critical things such as local content. When there is a rush, it becomes a complex scenario with deficiencies. 
Through the committee, my insistence to the government has been with this rush to complete this, also spend a 
lot of energy and pushing on local content, so that they work together at the same rate of haste and rushing. 
Make sure that you are going to complete the project up to par with the rate at which we are required to 
accomplish local content objectives. I'm afraid this project appears to be desired to be completed very quickly, 
which might mean the quality of local content attainment is low…the unskilled jobs won’t be there forever.’215 
There has been a desire, at least in some political quarters, to ensure that local content is 
‘sped up’ to the same pace of EACOP’s implementation. The sense of urgency was not to slow 
down the project itself, but to increase the pace of local content implementation to ensure 
that Tanzanian businesses and workforce were suitably prepared for the project to obtain 
maximum benefit.  
 This speeding up of the implementation of local content can be seen at the 
bureaucratic level with the creation of a local content database. The database was created 
in line with the shift of the responsibility to monitor and regulate local content of the mid- 
and downstream sectors in 2015 (GoT, 2015d), and was enshrined in law in the 2017 local 
content act (GoT, 2017b). The idea behind the database is that it allows IOCs and other 
international organisations to see an accessible list of suppliers for various goods and services 
 
215 CCM MP Interview. 
178 
 
for their local content requirements. Companies on the database would be given priority in 
obtaining tenders on the project (EACOP, 2018a). EACOP provided a catalyst to implement 
the database quickly because neither EACOP nor the government knew where potential 
businesses and workers were.216 Due to the commercial and industrial dominance of Dar es 
Salaam, it should come as little surprise that 87% of the companies currently listed on the 
database are based in the economic capital (EWURA, 2019).217 Respondents from Tanga 
often cited the difficulty of the application process, and the lack of help offered from the 
government and the private sector, as one of the main difficulties to participate on the 
project. 
 While the database has allowed for the potential of increased participation in local 
content initiatives, it has resulted in the geographical centralisation of businesses that have 
a greater opportunity to participate in the project. The increase of pace in the 
implementation of local content has allowed for those with the greatest amount of capital, 
political, and industry connections to organise quickly to try and enter the supply side of the 
project. In response to the EACOP project, new umbrella organisations to capture local 
content provisions were formed. One of these organisations currently boasts of members 
both directly involved in the sector, such as manufacturers and technical services, and 
organisations seeking for indirect involvement in the sector such as hospitality and catering. 
Tender information is distributed from the government and EACOP through these umbrella 
organisations and the TPSF to disseminate the information to their members. These groups 
also have political connections, with one of the groups officially partnering with the 
president’s office and currently has members of the government and the Governor of the 
Bank of Tanzania within its board of directors.218  
 Such connections between private and public organisations are not uncommon in 
Tanzania (Gray, 2013). There are, however, clear barriers to entry to the organisation, which 
are evident in the membership fees of the organisation; it costs $1000 to join as a member, 
plus an additional $100 a month for voting privileges.219 In part due to the capital required, 
the demographic composition of the organisation is less Tanzanian than you’d expect; having 
attended one of the member’s meetings of the organisation, there were a considerable 
number of non-Tanzanians present, both white migrant workers that work in senior roles for 
 
216 IOC Local Content Coordinator Interview.  
217 This is correct as of February 2020 and may be updated at the time of reading.  
218 Interview, Business Senior Executive, Dar es Salaam, 05.12.2017. 
219 Author’s notes at an AGM meeting for a local content umbrella organisation, 12th December 2017. 
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Tanzanian companies, as well as foreign firms, such as Kenyan companies present.220 In this 
respect, while the umbrella organisations created due to EACOP have  reacted quickly to 
obtain tenders on the pipeline, they have shut out SMEs from entering the local content 
process.  
Alongside the government, EACOP representatives were keen to emphasise the 
short-term nature of the project in seminars and workshops organised by them, with job 
advertisements and brochures all emphasising the short-term nature of the employment 
offered (EACOP, 2017). There appeared to be a genuine concern over the expectations that 
the project had:  
‘It’s a risk to see when you come to the project and the project is short in nature, and that’s it. Some may be 
unhappy at this, and it is something that has to be raised. We need to maximise everything, with 
communication between us and communities and the procurement process. There has to be a maximum of 
understanding [of the temporary nature of the project].’221  
For EACOP, local content has become an exercise in communication as well as required 
policy. In some respects, the temporalities of the EACOP project has ensured it is seen as a 
public relations exercise both to advertise employment opportunities but also to warn that 
the company will not be in the country beyond the completion of the project, and thus to 
subdue expectations both in terms of employment and tenders. It was clear, however, that 
such communication on the temporary nature of the project did not stop the general 
excitement and expectation for employment and tenders across businesspeople in Dar es 
Salaam.222   
 One of the core reasons the establishment of local content created friction with the 
desire to speed up local content implementation was due to that fact that establishing local 
content that is ready for EACOP takes time. To emphasise this, table 11 highlights a few 
selected jobs that are required for the EACOP pipeline. This data was provided during an AGM 




220 Author’s notes at an AGM meeting for a local content umbrella organisation, 12th December 2017.  
221 IOC Local Content Coordinator Interview.  
222 Author’s notes and discussions during AGM meeting for a local content umbrella organisation, 
12th December 2017, and local content seminar held in Dar es Salaam on 23rd February 2018. 
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Table 11: Selected Job Requirements on the EACOP Pipeline (See Appendix B). 
Within the table are unskilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled positions that are required for 
the project. All the jobs shown in the above table are for the construction phase of the project 
and offer at least 40 jobs at peak manpower. As one can see, the semi-skilled jobs in the 
construction of the pipeline require at least two to five years’ experience, with some jobs, 
such as welder, requiring further education to work on the pipeline, or the driver of heavy-
duty vehicles requiring a special certification to work in the hydrocarbon industry. 
Furthermore, while unskilled positions are on offer, these are not the majority of jobs that 
are available in the medium to the long term. Rather, they there are greater opportunities 
for work for semi-skilled and skilled level of jobs on the pipeline beyond the initial 
construction (Appendix B).  
 In this respect, to successfully implement local content policy on the EACOP pipeline, 
time is required to both train individuals up to the international standards required for the 
project, but also obtain the experience to participate on the project. This also does not take 
into consideration the time required to set up the bureaucratic infrastructure to aid local 
content mechanisms, like the local content database, or the time needed to train and bring 
VETA up to a standard that it can train those for the semi-skilled jobs available. In this respect, 
while on the surface the jobs are available, the demands by the project are out of reach for 
many Tanzanians, and the structures required to boost participation are not up to the 
required level to train Tanzanians to participate.   
  EACOP accelerated the implementation of local content, but in doing so, has allowed 





Oil and Gas 
Minimum Level 
of Education 






Skill Level (w/o 
experience) 





Required O-Level 2 to 5 N/A 0.5 Years 





Specific O-Level 0 to 2 N/A 0.5 Years 
Welder Welder (plate) 
Certification 





Required Higher Diploma 5 to 10 4 Years 1 Year 
Surveyor Engineer Civil Engineering Required Degree 5 to 10 4 Years 1 Year 
Civil Foreman Craftsman  
Certification 
Required UK3/EU4 10+ 2 Years 10+ Years 
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The speed of the construction of umbrella organisations, combined with the bureaucratic 
hurdles, have shut out many prospective businesses that could enter the project beyond 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour. In essence, contrasting temporalities between the 
international and domestic political pressures from above to complete the project in a 
shortened timescale are incompatible with the political goal and pressure from below to 
establish sectors that can successfully participate. The temporary nature of the project, and 
the political gains that can be achieved with local content policies have created a sense of 
urgency to establish local content as a tool to capture the large amount of capital invested 
over a short period of time.  
5 The Multiple Paces of Preparation 
The construction of urgencies in implementing local content policies has been 
geographically uneven with most of the preparations mentioned concentrated in Dar es 
Salaam. While it would appear to be logical to prepare areas in close proximity to the pipeline 
for local content, the reality has been that there has been little preparation for EACOP in 
these areas both in terms of training and dissemination of aid in obtaining tenders. As this 
section will demonstrate, there has been a (often geographical) partition of local content 
between obtaining business tenders and employment, and this has been reflected in the 
discourse around local content in Tanzania.  
5.1 From Local Content to National Content 
 On the global scale, as mentioned before, the understanding of what is local in local 
content policies is often ambiguous, but in the case of Tanzania, the local has become 
synonymous with national employment and businesses. Local content has seen a de facto 
division between ‘local’ content, also known as ‘national content’ which focuses on the 
nation, and ‘local-local’ content, which looks at the direct impact local content can have for 
the immediate community. 
 National content retains much of the characteristics and policies that one would 
expect from a contemporary local content policy and is primarily used to discuss business 
participation and more technical and senior employment opportunities. Local-local content, 
or ‘local community content’, on the other hand, is often associated with employment 
opportunities available to communities in the vicinity of the project site and is often 
associated with unskilled or low-skilled labour. This term has begun to be utilised by private 
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sector interests such as oil companies (Oguine, 2011) and companies that aid MNCs in 
implementing local content requirements (Warner, 2007).  
 EACOP has solidified the separation of local content between these two terms, with 
the former being used when advertising tenders and presenting local content information at 
the national and professional level. At the same time, EACOP has defined ‘local community 
content’ as ‘the part of the Local Content that applies to the local communities in the vicinity 
of work’s site(s) of execution’ (EACOP, 2018a), and has seen less preparation when compared 
to national content.223  
 The separation between local and local-local content has also allowed for a 
geographical division between the core and the periphery over what local content entails. 
This was noticeable in interviews with both IOC personnel and Tanzanian technocrats: local 
content would often mean discussing tenders and opportunities for businesses to enter the 
hydrocarbon supply chain, while discussions around local-local content would entail (often 
unskilled) employment for local residents. This was best summed up by one senior Tanzanian 
technocrat specialising in local content, who stated:  
‘For us, local content is at a national level, not ‘local-local’. There is an implication that priority will be 
given to the local community… They [the local community] want to ensure that farms and produce are from the 
local community, and they don’t expect local jobs to be taken from the local community. Tanzania is one nation, 
one people, and it is not fair to divide. If they want to participate that is great, but they will have to participate 
nationally’ [emphasis added].224  
The locality of the ‘local’ in local content has been relegated to a suggestion, with no 
guarantee to hire those closest to the project. It also emphasises a discourse of national unity 
that goes into Tanzanian nationalism that does not officially distinguish between tribe, 
ethnicity, or religion. Such a commitment has also been supported by EACOP.225  
5.2   Preparation on the Ground  
 To successfully implement local content policy on the EACOP pipeline, time is 
required both to train individuals up to the international standards required for the project 
and to set up the bureaucratic infrastructure to aid local content mechanisms. While there is 
a discourse of anticipation and preparation for local content on the pipeline route and has 
 
223 This thesis uses the term ‘local-local’ content when describing local content closest to the 
extractive site due to the fact that the term is commonly used in Tanzania while ‘local community 
content’ is not.  
224 State Local Content Coordinator Interview.  
225 IOC Local Content Coordinator Interview.  
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resulted in interest from the general public, this has not been matched with the policy’s 
application. While both the government and EACOP have been adamant of the promise of 
local content, the resultant differences between local and local-local content has ensured 
that there is a difference in the urgency of preparation between the core and the periphery.  
 Preparations by businesses within Dar es Salaam have been far stronger compared 
to other regions. This is in part due to the fact that Dar es Salaam has greater industrial 
development and therefore is able to obtain international standards more quickly, but it is 
also due to the fact that there have been little to no preparation at the local level done by 
the government. The lack of preparation in the periphery was apparent in Tanga.  
 While the government has aided the creation of an urgency around local content in 
Dar es Salaam with seminars, assistance to umbrella organisations and public 
announcements in an effort to create awareness and preparation, this has not filtered 
through to areas where the pipeline is passing through:     
‘Not much has been done by the local government to create awareness. Many people don’t know the 
opportunities – for example, farmers didn’t know about the standards and requirements needed to sell their 
goods to IOC’s. The standards are not known.’226  
This lack of preparation is just not in the obtention of tenders, but also the training of skilled 
and semi-skilled workers on the pipeline. As mentioned before, one of the central tenants of 
Tanzanian local content policy for EACOP is to use the project to aid in the development of a 
skilled workforce for the pipeline and to bring up skills to an internationally certified level. 
Because of this, the Vocational Education Training Authority (VETA) has been modernised to 
a level that can accommodate the desired skills by IOCs. In Tanga, this has not happened; 
multiple requests for interviews with both students, teachers and administration staff were 
rejected on the basis that no preparations had been made for the project.227 Overall 
information and knowledge about the project is low, with one participant telling me, ‘you’re 
in Tanga to talk about the pipeline – they [the local population] have no idea!’228  
This lack of preparation in vocational training was noticed by Tanga residents who 
knew about the demands for certification and experience required to work on the project.229 
 
226 Interview, NGO Executive, Environmental and Social Responsibility NGO, Tanga, 08.08.2018.  
227 Author’s fieldwork notes, 16th August 2018. It is worth noting that this may have been an excuse 
not to be interviewed. Furthermore, people from across the country can enrol in VETA and people 
are not limited to their home area for skills training.  
228 Interview, Businessperson, Tanga Chamber of Commerce, Tanga, 07.08.2018.  
229 Interview, Businessperson 4, Tanga, 18.08.2018; Tanga Chamber of Commerce Interview.  
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The current lack of preparation and training of people with the skills and certification needed 
has guaranteed that employment at the ‘local-local’ level cannot occur beyond unskilled 
labour; to be internationally certified at the level IOCs demand on the pipeline requires 
months and years of training, and in some cases, on-the-job experience.230 In this respect, 
the hiring of local workers beyond unskilled labour has already failed before construction has 
begun.  
The lack of preparations for local content and EACOP in Tanga stands in contrast to 
Dar es Salaam. Tanga has been relegated to local-local content, with a focus on unskilled 
labour and little aid to help Tanga SMEs obtain tenders on the project. Rather, there is a 
geographical separation that has been reflected in the changes of discourse around local 
content policies. In the case of EACOP, this process has been both temporal and spatial. The 
preparations that could have aided Tanga SMEs to participate in the project have not been 
established, reinforcing the perception that the region would just supply un- and low-skilled 
labour.  The one exception appears to be preparation in villages located near the planned 
jetty, where respondents noted a higher degree of knowledge about the project, and many 
aspired for both short- and longer-term employment from the pipeline, mainly for unskilled 
and low-skilled employment.231  
5.3 ‘Everything is skewed towards Dar es Salaam’: Local 
Content as a National Project 
With the division between national and local-local content, combined with the lack 
of preparation, there has been considerable frustrations by Tanga SMEs. Central to this was 
the information asymmetries experienced, which stand in contrast to the urgencies 
experienced in Dar es Salaam. The networks set up by the Tanzanian government and EACOP 
for knowledge transfers on obtaining contracts on the project have proved ineffectual for 
Tanga SMEs. This was in part due to both geography and the network established to 
distribute information:  
 ‘The problem with the contracts is that whenever they want to contact people for a meeting, they do 
it through the TPSF in Dar es Salaam. They do not contact us in Tanga. There is no coordination at all. They don’t 
use it to bring opportunities for the people. There is no delegation. In February 2017 in Dar es Salaam, the TPSF 
 
230 EACOP business skills requirements. Obtained during AGM meeting for a local content umbrella 
organisation, 12th December 2017. 
231 Chongoleani Villagers Group Interview 1 and 2.  
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outlined opportunities. During that meeting, there was a request by us to break down these opportunities. They 
haven’t done that before, and many people don’t have the capacity to understand the process.232  
With local content information being disseminated through umbrella organisations, these 
organisations hold considerable power in the local content process and hold information that 
could prove invaluable for businesses entering the supply chain. Much to the frustrations of 
Tanga SMEs owners interviewed, no umbrella organisation reached out to them to help their 
businesses enter the supply chain.233  
These information asymmetries about the process also aided the feeling of exclusion. 
This manifested itself not just in terms of frustrations at the lack of preparation as shown 
above, but also in terms of symbolism:  
‘We have had three meetings in Dar es Salaam, they need to bring these to Tanga. These companies 
don’t see the need for Tanga. Having the meeting here would mean that these people will have great 
opportunities to see what is going on, great opportunities for the people of Tanga and greater awareness.’234  
All seminars and workshops on local content and the EACOP project were held in Dar es 
Salaam, geographically excluding potential SMEs in other regions to participate. At one of 
these seminars, one Tanga resident put his frustrations bluntly towards local content policies 
by saying: ‘This is not Dar es Salaam content, this is local content!’.235  
Rather than being seen as a project that could enhance development in Tanga, the 
government’s local content policy has instead reinforced a perception that both EACOP and 
local content is a national and international project with little opportunity for advancement, 
either for SMEs operating in the region or for local development:  
‘I have always said local is not local, and I voice concerns at every forum. It's more international than 
local…We're just bystanders. Maybe we will attach on to a micro-local level, but I don't think there is much of a 
structure to allow people to grow with the project.’236  
‘The pipeline presents a lot of opportunities, but not for everyone...They talk about 10,000 jobs but 
we have had no jobs [offered]… At this current moment, this is a project for TPDC, IOC’s, and TPSF’237  
For SME businessowners in Tanga, the current structure of dissemination of information has 
led the perception that they are excluded from the project. The lack of chance or availability 
 
232 Tanga Chamber of Commerce Interview.  
233 Businessperson 4 Interview; Tanga Chamber of Commerce; Interview, Businessperson 5, Tanga, 
14.08.2018. 
234 Tanga Chamber of Commerce Interview.  
235 Authors notes at a Local Content seminar held in Dar es Salaam on 23rd February 2018. 
236 Businessperson 4 Interview.  
237 Tanga Chamber of Commerce Interview. 
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of information has caused many of the SME business owners in Tanga to give up on local 
content on the pipeline and carry on with business as usual, or to try and obtain some of the 
little spill overs in capital through the purchase of land around the route.238  
The urgencies around EACOP, combined with the information asymmetries around 
local content, has allowed businesses within the information network a ‘head start’. This has 
given them a greater opportunity to participate, which was especially important at the time 
due to the temporary nature of EACOP. In the process of this, it ensured that there could 
have been little time left for those to catch up. For SMEs in Tanga, this was a spatial practise, 
with little opportunity for Tanga businesses to participate beyond local-local content.  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to unpack some of the spatio-temporalities of local content 
policies on the EACOP project to present a way to greater incorporate both temporalities and 
spatialities into analysis of local content. The temporary nature of the project combined with 
the amount of capital invested into EACOP has created peculiar temporalities in Tanzania’s 
local content policy that establishes itself in different forms geographically. One of the core 
responses to the project has been a construction of urgencies. It is the urgency of obtaining 
access to local content information and tenders that have created spatial divides between 
those with access to the information, and those who do not. Larger local businesses with the 
capital and expertise to establish themselves quickly have been a driving force behind the 
urgency, presenting themselves as the go-to organisation for procurement.  
Adding to this has been the division of local content between national and local-local 
content, with the latter being limited in application to semi-skilled and unskilled labour. As 
shown in Tanga, regional SMEs have been bypassed in local content participation due to the 
quickness of larger corporations being able to mobilise resources to ensure they are in the 
best position for the start of the project. This, in turn, has relegated much of the region to 
just enact ‘local-local’ content, much to the frustration of SMEs owners interviewed that had 
been eager to participate.  Further lowering the amount of development that can be 
obtained from the project has been the lack of skills preparation at the regional level; even 
though in theory local-local content focuses on both skilled and unskilled employment, the 
reality is that due to the lack of preparation done at the local government level, there appears 
 
238 Businessperson 5 Interview.  
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little chance that local residents will have the qualifications nor the training to participate 
beyond unskilled labour.   
The result of these urgencies and local content divisions has been the implementation 
of local content at multiple paces. At the core, local content has seen a quick implementation 
both at the bureaucratic level and within national businesses. These businesses have been 
quick to join umbrella organisations and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles to ensure they are 
in a prime position to participate. This is in stark contrast with Tanga, with SMEs unable to 
enter the supply chain due to information asymmetries hindering the potential to be a part 
of the project. With the project being temporary in nature, time is essential, and those that 
were unable to quickly mobilise losing out. Nevertheless, the recent suspension of the project 
raises questions of whether the project itself will go ahead, and if it does, whether this extra 
time will allow excluded SMEs and regional training programmes to progress to a stage of 




Chapter VIII: Controlling Time: Pacing the 
Progression of the Upstream Gas Sector 
1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the current status of the Tanzanian 
offshore gas industry is at an impasse. With the planning and appraisal phases of the gas well 
lifecycle complete, there is supposed to be a transition to the construction and production 
phase. However, this has not happened, rather the industry has seen considerable delays. 
The reasons for these delays have been multiple: the depressed price of natural gas since the 
heights of the global commodity boom has resulted in delayed investment in a multitude of 
frontier projects across the globe (Andreasson, 2018). For IOC technical personnel in the 
sector, declining prices in international markets were a common reason for the slowdown in 
Tanzania.239 Yet, this does not tell the whole story. For high-ranking IOC executives, the 
political and legal changes in the sector seen since 2015, and their resulting impacts on 
negotiations, has been the cause of the deadlock in the sector.240  
Discussions with state personnel, from senior managers to employees, often 
emphasised the importance of the country obtaining a ‘good deal’. They decried previous 
agreements signed with MNCs in the gas and the gold sector for the poor fiscal returns 
obtained from extraction, as well as the social issues that arose near extractive sites. At its 
core, the discussion over ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deals rested on socio-economic factors. A ‘bad’ 
deal took many forms, ranging from concerns over enclave development, tied with 
insufficient domestic labour and business participation in the extractive sector, as well as 
perceived poor revenues and tax generated from extraction. Much of this came from the 
countries experience of the gold sector. 
This chapter will focus on the attempts by the Tanzanian government and business 
actors to obtain a greater share of benefits from the gas sector through legal and 
bureaucratic changes in the gas sector, with legislation that has been described as ‘resource 
nationalism’. In essence, this chapter explores the legal attempts the Tanzanian state has 
used to obtain, in their view, a ‘good deal’. The way the government has done this has been 
through legal mechanisms to ensure that mistakes made either now, or in the past, can be 
 
239 IOC Engineer 3 Interview. 
240 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview; Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
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rectified in the future. In essence, the government has passed legislation in an attempt to 
control the timelines of projects, and to reverse mistakes made in the past, to ensure that 
the country always benefits from extraction.  
The legal changes in the Tanzanian gas industry raise questions about the current 
theories around the causes of increased state involvement. As mentioned in the literature 
review of this thesis, much of pro-market resource nationalist literature contends that the 
politics behind oil directly corresponds to boom-and-bust phases of the market; when prices 
are high, sellers and governments gain leverage over IOCs, with the roles reversed in the case 
of low oil prices. Other theories have focused on the maturity of the sector. For example, 
Vernon’s OBM explores the changing bargaining relations between the state and 
international corporations; it argues that while an extractive industry is young, bargaining 
power is tilted towards international corporations, due to the capital, technology and 
infrastructure needed to establish the industry. Over time, however, this power shifts to the 
government as extractive investments and infrastructure mature and become ‘hostages’ to 
state interests, particularly in developing countries (Vernon, 1971). 
In the case of Tanzania, these theories suggest that the forces of the international 
market, combined with the fact that essential infrastructure needed to extract, and export 
gas has not yet been constructed, would suggest that the government would look to pass 
generous legislation with fiscal incentives in order to attract international investment. Yet 
the opposite has happened; the government has made considerable legal changes to the 
sector, first with the petroleum act in 2015 (GoT, 2015d) and then four pieces of resource 
legislation in 2017. Hence, while global gas prices continue to fall, and the infrastructures 
planned have not yet been put into place, the government has placed more stringent policies 
on the gas sector. To better understand why Tanzania has gone against the grain, a greater 
focus on the temporalities shaped by domestic politics and past experience of natural 
resource exploitation, alongside international factors, can allow for a better understanding 
of the drivers of Tanzania’s resource nationalist turn.  
This chapter will argue that the legal and bureaucratic changes enacted by the 
government have been done in an effort to control the timing and pace of the sector’s 
development in order to capture a greater share of the economic revenue. This chapter will 
explore the specific articles in the laws that relate to both the centralisation of resource 
governance and to utilising time, in this case, the future, to ensure that agreements with IOCs 
are in Tanzania’s favour. Central to this has been the project phasing the offshore sector finds 
190 
 
itself; the sector is currently in between the exploration and construction phase, and the 
government has seen the negotiations required before the construction phase as the last 
possible time to guarantee to, in their view, get a ‘good deal’. Alongside improving the 
current and future agreements between the government and IOCs, the extension in time has 
also been used in an attempt to increase expertise in the industry both through local content 
and improving bureaucratic capacity in order to properly regulate the sector. However, due 
to Magufuli’s removal of key personnel in a variety of different ministries and parastatals, 
this has not happened, and instead, has weakened the country’s efforts to increase human 
capital and create a culture whereby decisions are incredibly centralised.  
 This chapter is structured as follows: first, it will explore the legal changes in the past 
decade that have been used by the Tanzanian government as an attempt to obtain a greater 
control of the sector. Central to this has been the attempted control of time through legal 
mechanisms to ensure that any perceived mistakes of the present can be rectified in the 
future. It will then explore how the relative inexperience of the Tanzanian state in managing 
hydrocarbons, both in terms of expectations and governance, has been restructured in 
preparation for a greater role in the sector. It argues that this attempt at improving the 
bureaucracy of the sector has been diminished by short term politics of Magufuli’s term. 
Section four concludes.  
2 Legal Changes in the Tanzanian Gas Sector 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, before the passing of the 2015 
Petroleum Act, previous legislative experiences around extractives and bureaucratic and 
regulatory expertise were centred around the mining industry, as well as the 1980 petroleum 
act (GoT, 1980). By the time of the offshore discoveries, it was completely outdated and was 
modelled on the oil sector, rather than gas. Furthermore, this act was written during a time 
of depressed oil prices in the global market and the introduction of structural adjustment 
policies, which in general offered generous terms to international corporations and little 
oversight to their activities across sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Hilson, 2004; Banchirigah, 2006). 
Tanzania itself was a participant in these programmes, and an increase of investment in the 
mining sector was seen as one of the main ways the Tanzanian economy could be better 
integrated into the global economy (Chachage, 1993; Butler, 2004). The legal changes which 
started in 2015 would see a dramatic shift away from the neoliberal extractive policies of the 
1980s and 1990s.  
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2.1 Initial Discoveries and Difficulties 
As in many countries that have recently discovered hydrocarbon deposits, Tanzania’s 
discovery of exportable quantities of gas in 2010 caused both celebration and promises of 
development by politicians, who promised an ‘economic revolution’, powered by business 
and labour participation in hydrocarbon projects (Bungane, 2016b), and also warnings that 
such endowments can create the conditions of a ‘resource curse’ (The Citizen, 2012; Stiglitz, 
2012). Discoveries, and signed deals with IOCs during the period of 2010-2014 were 
conducted at a time where neither the bureaucratic infrastructure nor the legal framework 
had been reformed to correctly regulate and govern the hydrocarbon sector. In essence, as 
this sub-section will show, the pace of development of the gas sector on the ground (or in 
this case, in the deep sea), went at such a pace that the state bureaucracies did not have the 
required human capital to govern and assist the sector, meanwhile the legislative framework 
had not been updated to accommodate neither the natural gas sector nor modern 
developments in the hydrocarbon sector.  
To understand the reasoning behind the legal changes of 2015, one must first 
understand the context in which Tanzania entered the gas sector. One of the lead drivers 
behind the legal changes in the Tanzanian petroleum sector put forward to me by Tanzanian 
bureaucrats was the fact that previous hydrocarbon legislation and negotiations occurred 
during a time where there was little experience, both on the theoretical and practical side of 
engineering, as well as the business side of the industry, as a whole.241 This was not just in 
the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and TPDC, but also the wider bureaucratic structure of 
the Tanzanian state; hydrocarbon governance requires not just those directly involved in the 
extraction, but also a range of departments dealing with different aspects of the sector, such 
as labour and finance.242 With a considerable number of departments requiring an input in 
the gas industry, the bureaucratic scope, both in terms of breadth and depth presented a 
challenge for the Tanzanian government.  
During the time of discovery, many analysts, NGOs, and scholars had argued that 
poor quality institutional frameworks had led natural resources to contribute to a resource 
curse within developing countries (e.g., Okpanachi and Andrews, 2012; Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015). Hence, a discourse of ‘good governance’ and institutional 
reform as a ‘solution’ to the resource curse was a particularly resonant discourse for donors 
and NGOs during the initial discoveries of commercial quantities of natural gas in the late 
 
241 State Auditor Interview.  
242 Retired Senior TPDC Executive.  
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2000s and early 2010s. In Tanzania, state development organisations such as Norway’s 
NORAD (2019), Germany’s GIZ (2013) and the UK’s DFID (2014a) all ran some form of 
programme to aid the country to prepare for the industry. This was alongside other 
international organisations, such as the African Development Bank (2017) and the 
Commonwealth of Nations, which aided in PSA drafts, financial modelling, and training.243 
Development of human capital takes time. It takes time both to educate, establish 
and gain experience within a sector that is newly introduced to a country. Since little 
hydrocarbon exploration had taken place throughout the history of Tanzania, TPDC lacked 
the technical and business acumen required for a national oil company. Before 2010, TPDC 
was seen more as a promoter for exploration, rather than a direct actor in the exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons (Pedersen et al, 2020). Hence, the discovery of gas meant 
that the purpose of TDPC had to change, and new personnel and expertise was required to 
aid the country’s efforts in building human capacity to both participate in the sector, as well 
as manage the projected revenues that were expected at the time. One interviewee, who 
was one of the first recipients of the local content process for the gas industry, highlighted 
the minimal level of preparation the government had for the sector:  
‘We were taken from the mining geology course at the University of Dar es Salaam. There were no 
skill levels or working culture when we started. The government was not ready for the gas. The institutions and 
skills programmes were incorrect, and there was not enough teachers or professors. The people running the 
skills programmes for the IOCs did not know what the companies wanted. The universities did not have any 
programmes for oil and gas. Us students were not ready to do the job, with little practical experience offered by 
the University of Dar es Salaam.’244 
Tanzanian engineers noted a large gap in knowledge and expertise between them 
and their IOC counterparts during initial discoveries. With the pace of the gas industry during 
time going at a high speed, it appears that investment in human resources was going to have 
to accelerate to be at a standard to participate in the industry. The speed and movement of 
the industry did not allow this to happen; as stated before, gaining education, skills and 
expertise requires time. While there was some form of knowledge and skills within TDPC and 
other ministries, these dwarfed in comparison to the knowledge and skills of IOCs. At the 
core of this was information asymmetry between the government and the IOCs operating in 
Tanzania. The fast pace exacerbated this, as within the space of four years, Tanzania’s 
 
243 Ibid.  
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hydrocarbon potential changed from an unknown variable to a country that could participate 
in global and regional energy markets. 
The shortage of human personnel with the knowledge or the experience of the sector 
did not just hinder day to day operations, but also negotiations with the IOCs for the first 
rounds of PSAs and the LNG project. While there was some assistance by development 
agencies and donor governments, these could not fill the knowledge gap nor the power 
imbalances between the government and the IOCs. Furthermore, there were political 
considerations; one senior (and now retired) TPDC executive claimed that Kikwete went ‘too 
soft’ on the IOCs and ensured that terms in the PSA terms were ‘very good’ for them.245   
The quality of PSAs between the government and IOCs depends on a lot of factors, 
one of which is what stage the exploration the country is in.246 The lack of geological 
information in the region meant that both the government and prospective IOCs did not have 
the knowledge of where the hydrocarbon deposits were. Considering the fact that deep sea 
exploration was both capital intensive and required advanced technology, this created a 
situation whereby IOCs were taking a larger risk for exploration when compared to other 
regions of the world where there is more geological data. It also creates a situation whereby 
IOCs, who do have the geological expertise required to explore offshore, can try and 
downplay the quality of the resources in order to obtain a more generous deal.  
As the Tanzanian gas industry was in its infancy, PSAs were modelled on a lack of 
geological knowledge and expertise. The lack of geological knowledge, on both sides of the 
negotiating table, increased the potential risk for the IOCs due to the nature of exploration 
that was to take place. This, with a pro-business Kikwete presidency, aided the creation of 
PSAs that would later be seen as unfavourable to his successor. Exacerbating this was the low 
level of expertise the petroleum sector, and despite efforts by international aid organisations 
and multinational institutions, resulted in severe information asymmetries between 
Tanzanian negotiations and their IOC counterparts, both in terms of negotiating ability and 
technical expertise. Despite the current claims from the government, the terms in the PSAs 
were not out of the ordinary for a country that had no proven hydrocarbon resources 
 
245 Retired Senior TPDC Executive. Note that this could be an attempt to ‘shift the blame’ so to speak 





(Manley and Lassourd, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the IOCs did not have problems with the 
PSAs.247  
  The initial discovery of gas came with little coordinated policy by the government 
and a lack of experience in the sector, all during a time of high energy prices. While gas was 
being discovered, much of the legal framework for the sector was from the 1980 petroleum 
act, enacted in a time of depressed commodity prices and structural adjustment policies. On 
the one hand, by industry standards, the gas industry during this time was growing at a 
standard pace and aided Tanzania to be added to the global energy map. Yet, on the other 
hand, it built a legislative and bureaucratic deficit based on information asymmetries 
between governmental institutions and IOCs. Attempts to rectify this started in 2015. 
2.2 ‘They are Changing the Rules of the Game in the Middle of 
a Match!’: Legal Changes in the Tanzanian Gas Industry 
 The pace of developments of the gas sector, combined with a legislative framework 
from 1980, ensured that new legislation was required both to reflect the gas, rather than the 
oil sector, and legislation that could better regulate the modern industry. This would take the 
form of the 2015 Petroleum Act (GoT, 2015d). Before this act, there was little legislative 
demarcation over the sector and a modern framework was required for hydrocarbon 
governance.248 The 2015 legislation was designed for the high oil prices seen during the 
commodity super cycle (Bofin and Pedersen, 2017). 
On the question of the contemporary origins of Tanzania’s state-centred policies in 
the extractive sector, some commentators on the industry have focused on Magufuli’s 
actions in the sector (e.g., Paget, 2017a). However, the reality is that the passing of the 2015 
Petroleum Act served as a greater foundation for resource nationalist policies (Jacob and 
Pedersen, 2018). Influencing this legislation were electoral concerns, with opposition parties 
utilising the poor gains from the extractives sector in the 2010 and 2015 elections (Jacob and 
Pedersen, 2018). Despite the changes, Lange and Kinyondo (2016) contend that the 2015 
legislation was relatively ‘soft’ out of fear of losing investors. Nevertheless, IOCs claimed that 
the act had been a ‘bit of a blocker’ for furthering the industry to production.249 While the 
act brought considerable changes, there were still ambiguities within the legislation, 
particularly over procurement for petroleum rights (Kasanda and Mallikaaratchi, 2015). 
NGOs that focus on the sector were kinder in their appraisal, highlighting strong regulatory 
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248 State Lawyer 2 Interview. 
249 Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview.  
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principals and increased transparency (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2016; Lee and 
Dupuy, 2016).  
The 2015 Petroleum Act on the one hand, fundamentally changed the regulation of 
the gas sector, but on the other hand, continued with the highly centralised nature of 
resource governance in the country. This can be seen with the act specifically including 
approval of the minister for any exploration and development licences,250 with approval also 
required by the cabinet.251  It also places extra responsibilities of the minister in charge of the 
department that controls the sector which includes the responsibility to develop and 
implement policies in the sector, ensuring transparency as well as a variety of technical and 
legal processes. Considering the fact that ministers are hired (and fired) by the president 
(GoT, 1977), the reality is that while the legislation states that the minister is in control of the 
sector, the president has considerable influence on who dictates policy.   
The biggest changes came in terms of regulation; the act separated the regulation of 
the sector between PURA, which as the namesake suggests, supervises, and regulates the 
upstream sector, and EWURA, who supervises the mid- and downstream sector. In particular, 
PURA’s new mandate is extensive, and included not just monitoring and regulation, but it 
also acts as an advisory body to the cabinet and negotiates future PSAs. It changed the role 
of TPDC, changing it from a quasi-commercial and regulatory body to a fully-fledged NOC to 
undertake commercial aspects of the sector (Melyoki, 2017). It also created the oil and gas 
bureau, which is constituted within the office of the president, and will advise the cabinet on 
matters relating to the oil and gas economy. 
Unlike the 2017 legislation, there appears to be some concessions between the draft 
bill and the finalised legislation. For example, the initial bill stated that TPDC will retain a 25% 
interest in any joint venture vehicle, but this was changed to be optional for TPDC. One of 
the changes that was rebuffed concerns development licence terms; under the 1980 
legislation, development licences were for 20 years, and renewed every 20 years. This 
renewal was planned to be changed to be 15 years in the draft legislation. The original 1980 
 
250 The specific minister means ‘the minister for the time being responsible for petroleum affairs’ 
(GoT, 2015d: 19). At the time of passing, this was the Minister of Energy and Minerals, now, after the 
division into the Ministry of Mining and the Ministry of Energy, the minister responsible is the head 
of the latter.  
251 The act does not specify which ministry is in control over the sector. Rather the minister in 
question is defined as ‘the minister for the time being responsible for petroleum affairs’ (GoT, 
2015d: 19). At the time of passing the legislation, this was under the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals. This has now been split into the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Minerals, with 
natural gas under the supervision of the former.  
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terms have now been reinstated (Kasanda and Mallikaaratchi, 2015). While the act brought 
considerable changes, there were still ambiguities within the legislation, particularly over 
procurement for petroleum rights (Kasanda and Mallikaaratchi, 2015). Greater changes, 
frictions and ambiguities would occur in 2017.  
These legislative changes were driven by the heightened mistrust of international 
investors, deriving from previous experiences in the mining sector.252 Discussions with state 
bureaucrats suggested that the government had ‘learnt lessons from the past’ and sought to 
apply them to the future to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated.253 One CCM MP 
explained the role Magufuli had with these legal changes:    
‘When Magufuli came into power, he came with this nationalistic view of putting a house in order, and 
we have not struck a good balance with contracts in the mineral sector for many years. We have formed many 
committees to look at the challenges of the mineral sector and come up with recommendations which the 
government could take on board and execute. But their recommendations just sat on the shelves and collected 
dust. So, he [Magufuli] came in and said, ‘hey you know we spend to bring these documents on the table, look 
up what recommendations were given, and the government next year will implement them’. I know these bold 
reforms are painful, no doubt about that, but it's part of that putting the house in order…What the current 
administration is doing is trying to set a new pace [italics added].’254 
In setting a new pace, the Tanzanian government has sought to bring developments in 
the gas sector under the control of the government, rather than the rapid pace seen between 
2010-2014. This has been done in an effort to avoid the mistakes in the mining sector, as well 
as the potential mistakes of hydrocarbon PSAs signed before 2015. This has been done during 
a phase in the commodity cycle where it is more amenable; falling commodity prices have 
ensured that there is a declining rate of return to investment, and therefore there would 
have been pauses and delays between exploration and construction and production. A 
slower pace also aids the acquisition of human capital required for capacity building required 
for governance over the gas sector, although this has been hampered by other actions by the 
government, which will be explored in the next section. The main methods the government 
has done this is by passing new resource legislation.  
The year 2017 saw the passing of four pieces of legislation that greatly strengthened 
government oversight and participation in the extractives sector, but also provoked fierce 
opposition from IOCs. During my time in fieldwork, much of the discussion around extractives 
centred around the passing of these laws. The four laws were: The Written Laws 
 
252 State Auditor Interview; CCM MP Interview. 
253 State Auditor Interview.  
254 CCM MP Interview. 
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(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (GoT, 2017c); the Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty Act) (GoT, 2017a); the Natural Wealth and Resources (Review and 
Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act (GoT, 2017d) and the Tanzania Petroleum 
(Local Content) Regulations act (GoT, 2017b).255 These legislations made the governance of 
the sector one of the ‘most radical in Africa’ (Bofin and Pedersen, 2019: 19).  
The 2017 hydrocarbon legislation continued the centralisation of natural gas 
governance, with the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty Act) (2017a) 
with article 5.2 of the legislation stating that ‘the natural wealth and resources shall be held 
in trust by the president on behalf of the people’ (GoT, 2017a: 6). This change in the 
legislation changes the de facto control of the sector to de jure. Previously, this was officially 
under the state, although in reality due to the changes covered above in the 2015 legislation. 
This change makes the president an even more important part of the direction of the gas 
sector and in resource governance.  
For the time being, all agreements signed before the new legislation will continue in 
place (GoT, 2017c). However, unlike the 2015 petroleum act, the 2017 legislations included 
legal mechanisms to ensure that any mistakes in PSAs and governance, either perceived or 
real, could be rectified in the future. This is seen with article 4.1 of the Natural Wealth and 
Resources Contracts act, where the ‘National Assembly may review any arrangements or 
agreement made by the government relating to natural wealth and resources’ (GoT, 2017a: 
6), and re-negotiate any terms that are considered ‘unconscionable’ (GoT, 2017d: 7). 
Such terms that could be considered unconscionable include PSA terms that ‘restrict 
the right of the state to exercise full permanent sovereignty of its wealth, natural resources 
and economic activity’, and are ‘depriving the people of Tanzania of the economic benefits 
derived from subjecting natural wealth and resources to beneficiation in the country’ (GoT, 
2017a: 8). In essence, this act provides a wide scope of interpretation for the renegotiation 
of natural resource contracts. It also provides a legal mechanism to ensure that the Tanzanian 
government does not get, in their view a ‘bad deal’; the ability to reopen contracts allows the 
government to correct perceived mistakes that have either been made in the past or are 
currently being discussed and turn out to provide poor returns in the future. This also ensures 
that if there are changes in the global economic climate, such as a rise in commodity prices, 
the government could quickly reopen PSAs in an attempt to obtain greater revenues. In 
 
255 Local content regulations act was covered in greater detail in the previous chapter.    
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essence, it allows the government to control the timeline of extractive projects, revisiting 
terms and agreements when outside factors make the agreement disadvantageous.  
Alongside the declaration of sovereignty over minerals, article 11 of the Natural 
Wealth and Resources act also removes international arbitration from any potential disputes 
between IOCs and the government (GoT, 2017a). This is politically advantageous, as 
governments find it difficult to settle by negotiation in arbitration due to domestic political 
ramifications (Wälde, 2008). It also allows the removal of a potential disruption of 
renegotiation of contracts mentioned above, further strengthening the governments hand in 
case of any dispute.  
These legal changes are as much a catalyst for a nationalist discourse as they are legal 
and economic policies. They have been utilised to symbolically re-establish control over the 
extractives sectors. Considering the popular distrust of MNCs in Tanzania, the push for 
greater involvement in the sector and the closure of tax loopholes proved popular in the 
country. They have also utilised international law to further their claim of ownership of 
natural resources. The language of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent 
Sovereignty) act mirrors a UN resolution in 1962 that stated that the ‘rights of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources’ (UN, 1962), as 
well as a similar resolution passed in 1974 that cited economic sovereignty the state has ‘over 
its natural resources and all economic activities’ (UN, 1974). Much like today, these 
resolutions were passed during a time of increased state involvement in the extractives 
sector.  
These new laws, and specific articles mentioned above, give the government the 
power to both correct issues, and allow for a more controlled pace in the sector. Controlling 
the pace is important due to the fact that many of the perceived grievances the government 
has over extractive contracts come from a time where the pace of development on the 
ground was not matched in capacity building. It also allows for an expansion and obtention 
of human capital of the bureaucratic structure required to correctly govern the sector. It 
allows the government to control PSAs during changes of circumstance, such as rising gas 
prices, new hydrocarbon discoveries or exploited loopholes, that could change PSAs from 
being favourable to unfavourable. In essence, ensuring that the government always gets a 
‘good deal’.   
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2.3 Eroding Trust 
The fear of getting a poor deal is centred around three linked factors: the country’s 
previous experience in the gold mining sector, the state’s inexperience of the hydrocarbon 
sector and concern that the country could face the challenges associated with the ‘resource 
curse’. Alongside the populist rhetoric of Magufuli (Ponican, 2019a), the passing of resource 
legislation in 2017 was a ‘pre-emptive strike’ as a parameter for negotiations.256 The result of 
this is that there have been fears among that negotiations are not being conducted in ‘good 
faith’ by the government.257 The combative strategies of the government to ensure that any 
deal is a ‘good deal’, combined with previous experiences and  potential future developments 
in the sector, has quickly eroded trust between the government and IOCs operating in the 
country. 
As will be shown, it was not just the legal changes themselves that brought about 
animosity between the government and IOCs, but rather the strategies that accompanied 
the legal changes. The laws brought in have both reinforced a sense of government control 
in the sector, centred around the rights that the state owns natural resources. This was 
combined with a fear of poor returns in the sector with any potential deal in the future could 
bring. The strategies of bringing this, however, has eroded trust between the government 
and IOCs, and their reactions to these legal changes were negative.258 These new laws also 
‘spooked’ interviewees in the domestic supply services to the sector.259 
The level of the animosity towards the 2017 legislations depended on what stage in 
the production phase their respective projects were in. Smaller IOCs in Tanzania, which were 
involved in the onshore gas industry, appeared to be less concerned with the laws than the 
larger IOCs involved in the offshore sector. Songas, for example, is 40 percent owned by the 
government and already did all their banking onshore, and these parts of the laws did not 
concern them, although did find them a ‘smash and grab’ on the industry as a whole.260 
Likewise, Swala Oil, despite their current issues with the Tanzanian government, did not find 
considerable concerns with the legislative changes.261  
 
256 Interview, State Senior Executive 2, Dar es Salaam, 28.03.2018. 
257 IOC Independent Lawyer Interview.  
258 Ibid. 
259 Businessperson 3 Interviewer, IOC Supply Services.  
260 IOC Executives 2 Group Interview.  
261 Group Interview, IOC Executives 1, Dar es Salaam, 14.03.2018. During my time in Tanzania, a 
dispute emerged between Swala Oil and the government over the acquisition of 40% of PanAfrican 
Energy Corporation, the parent company of PanAfrican Energy Tanzania. While this deal did not 
affect the running of PanAfrican Energy Tanzania, the government felt it should be intitled to taxes 
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The laws represented the biggest threat to the larger IOCs in the LNG group. As the 
legislation had been passed before production, but after exploration, for the IOCs it was like 
‘changing the rules of the game in the middle of a match’.262 In the hydrocarbon industry, 
there is, of course no one deal that resolves all the issues; separate contracts are signed 
between different IOCs for different blocks, and a separate deal between the government 
and the IOCs also has to be signed for gas infrastructure like the LNG. For the government, 
these deals had become a ‘burden’ (Bungane, 2016a).  
A major issue IOCs found with the legal changes was not just the laws themselves, 
but the process of which they were made. The desire to review gas PSAs began before the 
election of Magufuli. In 2014, the Tanzania Revenues Authority announced that it wanted to 
review all mining and gas agreements with MNCs (The Citizen, 2014). Furthermore, 
Magufuli’s opponent in the 2015 general election, Edward Lowassa, announced that, if 
elected, he would review all gas contracts to make sure that ‘every citizen benefits from this 
business’ (The Citizen, 2015c). There were considerable domestic pressures to enact a review 
of contracts both from the wider population and by politicians in the opposition party. 
Considering how the extractives industry had been targeted by opposition parties in the 
previous elections (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018), as well as Magufuli’s populist rhetoric 
(Poncian, 2019a). In this respect, the domestic driver for the review of the contracts should 
not have come as a surprise for the IOCs. 
The government’s strategy for the legal changes to the gas sector were similar to that 
of the mining sector; special parliamentary committees were set up to review PSAs with 
extractive companies. The committee then provided legal changes based on their findings. 
Legislation is then passed based on the findings, with little consultation of any private actors. 
The passing of the 2017 gas legislation followed a similar pattern, with one of the main 
exceptions from the gold mining sector is the fact that the sector also saw export bans and 
large fines.263 The approach to Acacia mining in particular, combined with the apparent 
 
from the deal and ordered a delay of the acquisition to see more details. From my observation it 
appears that Swala was in the right over the dispute, as it did not affect Tanzanian hydrocarbon 
operations, and out of all the energy companies in Tanzania, the company had been one of the most 
compliant with the new legislation, even going so far to be the first IOC listed on the Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange. This was furthered when, in another IOC interview held just after meeting Swala 
representatives, the interviewee promptly responded that Swala always ‘played by the rules’ (Senior 
IOC Executive 4 Interview)).    
262 Senior IOC Executive 1 Interview. 
263 Unlike the gold sector, the only operating side of the gas sector is onshore, and only serves 
domestic customers, chiefly the government.   
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disregard for the ‘sanctity’ of contacts,264 has eroded IOC trust of the government. Similar to 
the parliamentary committees report into the mining sector, the report into the gas sector 
has not been made public. 
Dispute the fact that the industry has now established itself over the past decade, 
comments that the government does not understand the industry and that they do not know 
how to expand Tanzanian involvement in the gas industry were common.265 While this was 
in part due to the fact that before 2015, the country had fairly lax regulation with minimal 
tax requirements, and hence this was a challenge of the status quo for the sector. In this 
respect, the legal changes also ensured a degree of learning and understanding within the 
bureaucracy that supervises and governs the extractive sector. Additionally, as both the 2015 
petroleum act and the 2017 resource legislations are changes, and particularly for the latter, 
a challenge to the status quo of resource governance, it would be understandable that there 
would be strong IOC opposition. Nevertheless, this criticism was constant among different 
IOCs with the establishment of the investigative committee. When interviewing one of the 
smaller IOCs, that supplied the domestic sector with gas for electricity generation, one 
respondent stated: 
The special committees visited all IOCs in Tanzania. They wanted to know how PSA’s work, and how come the 
government is not making money. They did not know that the government is taking a chunk of money. They did 
not know the government has to pay for the gas either. Goodwill has kept the lights on. They did not know that 
Wentworth are sellers, and TPDC and TANESCO are the buyers.  There are big issues to resolve. The task force is 
complete, but don’t know the findings. Based on previous reports, it might be bad.266 
There were suggestions that the 2017 laws were written by one person in a quick 
manner.267 Some IOCs had only one day to consult on the legislation,268 while others did not 
get consulted at all.269 This proved frustrating for many IOCs in the country, irrespective of 
size. This suggests that, while the industry as a whole is currently not advancing at a similar 
pace as it did in the early 2010s, legislative change was fast, with little involvement of other 
actors.  
In this respect, the legal changes are as much a negotiating tactic as a widespread 
change in resource governance. While pro-market theories on resource nationalism suggest 
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265 Independent IOC Lawyer Interview; Senior IOC Executive 4 Interview. 
266 Senior IOC Resources Executive 3 Interview. Note that this is one of the IOCs operating in the 
onshore gas sector and therefore is producing.  
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international drivers, it is domestic drivers that have led to these laws. Time is central to this 
as articles have been placed as a safeguard against either perceived mistakes made in the 
past or perceived mistakes currently being made through revisiting PSAs and ensuring that 
arbitration occurs in Tanzanian courts. Time has also been used both used as a ‘shock tactic’, 
where legislative measures have been passed in a quick manner with little discussion with 
IOCs over the planned changes. This has been used in part to set a new pace for the industry. 
While the shifting from the exploration to the production phase in the sector was standard 
by IOC standards, for the Tanzanian state, there were concerns that mistakes would be made 
with the speed of the sector advancing to the production phase. Nevertheless, these laws, 
and the way they were enacted, have eroded the trust between the state and IOCs, slowing 
down the pace of the industry to a pause.    
3 Politics and Bureaucratic Restructuring 
Institutional changes to state organisations began in 2012 onwards, with a push towards 
a more resource nationalist agenda (Pedersen et al, 2020). Yet it was the 2015 petroleum 
legislation not only brought legal changes, but also structural changes in the bureaucracy of 
the gas industry. Chief among these was the establishment of the PURA, changing the role of 
TPDC (Melyoki, 2017), new responsibilities for EWURA, and new advisory bodies such as the 
oil and gas bureau, which was created within the office of the president in order to advise 
the cabinet on matters relating to the hydrocarbon industry. This bureaucratic restructuring 
was done in aid to obtain expertise in the sector as well as clarify the governance structure 
of the sector.  
3.1 Learning as you go: Familiarization in the Gas Industry 
The discovery of commercial quantities of natural gas, and the resulting interest from 
IOCs, including the ‘supermajor’ IOCs, prompted a period of learning by the Tanzanian 
government and the bureaucrats taking charge of both legal changes and negotiations with 
IOCs. For the government, this period of learning the intricacies of the industry, and was 
described to me as one of the largest challenges facing the Tanzanian upstream sector.270 
This was both for technical personnel as well as the more administrative and legal side of the 
industry. This inexperience in the sector was reflected upon with an interview with a CCM 
MP, who stood on the energy and minerals committee. When asked about the challenges 
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facing the sector, he claimed that the main challenge that affected the country was the fact 
that:     
Being new affects us. It's challenging in itself because if you're not careful on the get go at the beginning you can 
make poor preparations in terms of putting your house in order. And by that we mean making sure you are 
ready…The IOCs have more knowledge than our country because they are older. They are older than our 
country itself, many of these IOCs have been here for at least 200 years. So, there is no doubt they have more 
financial and technical capacities of resource extraction. So, working with young emerging countries with a 
company with which are still developing, and they are required to allocate resources sufficient to make sure the 
sector is managed well. It means you have to invest in people you, have to invest institutions which becomes a 
challenge’.271  
The growth in knowledge of Tanzanian personnel has been a strategy for the 
Tanzanian government as a whole since the inception of the gas industry, often though local 
content initiatives. Alongside this reason, the promotion of growth in human capacity in the 
gas sector was done for two purposes; firstly, as mentioned before in this chapter, the 
discovery of considerable deposits in the late 2000s, there was an understanding that the 
establishment of strong institutions could prevent some of the issues around the ‘resource 
curse’. Secondly, the Tanzanian government needed personnel to staff and run these new 
institutions required to manage the industry. Many of the technical and legal personnel 
interviewed in this thesis had previous training, either on-the-job or as a master’s degree, in 
either the UK or US.272 Fundamentally, alongside the presence of a new industry required 
trained personnel to correctly manage, supervise and participate in it. The importance of 
human personnel was emphasised by the same CCM MP who claimed that:   
Sometimes people believe that once you have very good [oil and gas] policies and legal documents that you are 
good to go. I would say that's one tenth of the job. It's an important one tenth. But the nine tenths are in the 
human personnel behind these institutions and legal policy document, making sure they are knowledgeable 
enough to use these documents as a guidance on how you manage their resource in a way that benefits the 
owners and these are the truth to them. So, for Tanzania being a new sector, I'm glad that was part of those 
that group being trained to advise on how we can put a house in order in terms of what I just said and ready to 
shoot the sector that way that we can benefit as a country.273. 
All this learning has taken considerable time, and the country still has not managed 
to obtain the depth of experience required for the sector. This has presented information 
asymmetries from the start. It also led to some paradoxes: Training of negotiators has come 
 
271 CCM MP Interview. 
272 A high proportion of interviewees went to Scottish universities for oil and gas training, and this 
allowed for some building of rapport before and after interviews discussing similarities and 
differences between life in Tanzania and Scotland. For more information, see chapter three.  
273 CCM MP Interview. 
204 
 
from both the IOCs themselves,274 and by countries closely tied to IOCs such as Norway.275 
This has occurred while negotiations were and still are ongoing. Hence, from the start of the 
Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector, there has been strong information asymmetries from the very 
beginning of the gas lifecycle.  
In this respect, the initial training of personnel that could supervise and participate in 
the upper levels of a national gas industry did not run in tandem with the exploration and 
appraisal phases of the gas industry. The clear information asymmetries present in the 
industry have also ensured that the strategy of taking time to ensure that such asymmetries 
can be overcome, or at least narrowed. However, alongside difficulties in training and 
obtaining experience in the sector, has been political moves that have stymied capacity 
building.  
3.2 ‘One Fool Costs the Whole Country’: Political Changes in 
Tanzanian Bureaucracy  
It appears that the approach of ‘learning as you go’ to speed up the process has now 
been reversed; concerns over getting a perceived fair deal have overcome speeding up the 
process to ensure that construction and production could be completed in a timely manner. 
These bureaucratic changes required by law require an increase in personnel. The limited 
numbers and lack of experience of TPDC staff was noted as early as 2014, with NORAD noting 
that there are ‘limited professional staff available in TPDC to carry out its mandate effectively’ 
(Pedersen et al, 2020). The election of Magufuli brought considerable changes in personnel, 
with the firing of previous heads of ministries and parastatals and replacing them with his 
own hires. Rather than focusing on a specific sector, this has been across the board of 
Tanzanian bureaucracy.276 A part of this was expected, as ‘every minister comes in with their 
own agenda, they expect changes to be implemented.’277 With the change from the more 
business-friendly Kikwete, whose administration saw intra-CCM conflicts over corruption 
(Gray, 2015), to the more hard-line state-centred Magufuli, such changes were to be 
expected. Initial firings over corruption were originally celebrated both in the country and by 
the international community (Guardian, 2015; DW, 2016). However, such celebrations 
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275 The Norwegian government is closely tied to Equinor, with the government historically holding a 
majority ownership of the company.  
276 This had the knock-on effect of trying to obtain interviews from bureaucratic personnel very 
difficult. See Chapter three for more detail.  
277 State Geologists Group Interview. 
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quickly changed when Magufuli’s more authoritarian tendencies became apparent (e.g., 
Economist, 2018).  
One of the largest bureaucratic changes in the sector started before the election of 
Magufuli. The establishment of PURA in the 2015 Petroleum Act. Its remit includes advising 
the energy minister and the government in matters relating to the negotiations of PSAs,278 
as well as being the regulator and monitor of the sector. Whilst these changes appear on 
paper, by the time I had met PURA personnel in 2018, there had been little movement in 
staffing the organisation so that they can fit their remit. Nobody within PURA had been 
directly employed to the organisation, rather the personnel there had been seconded from 
either the TPDC or the Ministry of Energy and Minerals.279 Because of this, PURA has 
struggled, as one senior member seconded to PURA from the ministry of energy told me:  
We’re currently in the management of the transition period. These responsibilities were originally under the 
TPDC. PURA was given these responsibilities. Some of these responsibilities are still under TPDC, by nature we 
had to transfer these responsibilities. This is still in the process, we need to build capacity in human and capital 
resources. We are required to execute things, but we do not have the capacity.280 
Because of this, PURA is still unable to fulfil its mandate and has stymied its function and 
caused difficulties in the oversight of the sector. As PURA is essential for the upstream 
regulation and provides advice to the minister of energy on gas related matters, it, in theory, 
is central for the governance of gas. On a side note, I found that PURA to be the most 
approachable and easiest government sector to interview, both in terms of obtaining 
interviews and information given.  
For the gas sector, senior personnel in TPDC, Ministry of Energy and Minerals (which 
would later be divided) and EWURA were removed by Magufuli. This has contributed to the 
considerable slowdown of the sector and has cost many of the smaller IOCs operating in the 
sector time and money to follow these constant changes in laws and personnel.281 Alongside 
this, the entire senior management were removed from TANESCO, affecting the onshore gas 
industry.282 Many of these changes at the top were political, and some senior officials 
interviewed were there in an ‘acting’ capacity. Examples included all personnel at PURA, as 
 
278 The act specifies the Energy and Minerals minister, but since 2018, the ministry has been split into 
two: The Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Minerals. The process of dividing the ministry into 
two was ongoing during my time in fieldwork.  
279 Senior State Executive 2 Interview.  
280 Ibid. 
281 IOC Executives 1 Group Interview. 
282 IOC Executives 2 Group Interview. 
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well as the senior executive at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals interviewed, and the 
acting head of TPDC.283  
The result of this has been paradoxical; while there has been attempts to build up 
expertise in the sector through both academic and practical training, the government has 
simultaneously removed Tanzanians that have had in some cases, decades of experience in 
the sector. This has not been a coordinated attack on the sector, but rather a part of a wider 
campaign conducted by Magufuli to remove civil servants, often under charges of corruption. 
It has become his ‘signature move’ (Paget and Kwayu, 2020). While this began as a popular 
commitment to remove corruption from the government, it has become a mainstay policy 
that has continued throughout his first term in power.  
The result of this has been an installation of a culture of fear in the sector. The fear 
behind making decisions has in part affected the gas industry. Both the fear behind making 
decisions that could turn out to be poor for the country, or not politically agreeable, and this 
loss of expertise has had the knock-on effect on the Tanzanian bureaucracy. Representatives 
from Songas, one of the smaller IOCs that operates Songo-Songo, noted that:   
‘There are big changes to the political regime. People used to be open to make decisions, this time around 
people are pushed to meet stakeholders. There is a weakness in the independence of institutions – [senior 
officials from] EWURA were removed from the job, TANESCO were removed, the MD of TPDC removed. This has 
slowed down processes in the sector due to the loss of intelligence. There is currently nothing happening on the 
ground, people ‘are putting their heads below the parapet’. People don’t know where they are going. Hopefully, 
this is temporary, but the last year/year and a half have seen things move more slowly.’284 
Considering how centralised the Tanzanian state is to the running and governance of 
the gas industry, this has aided the current pause in the sector. The fear has both reinforced 
the fact that decision-making is centralised to the president. This centralisation, combined 
with the fact that firings of bureaucratic personnel have become commonplace, has created 
an absence of leadership in the sector. The result has been that while there have been 
considerable legal changes put into effect, the bureaucratic structure to run the industry in 
day-to-day operations has lagged. The new personnel require time to obtain knowledge and 
experience compared to their predecessors, leading to concerns that there will be a lack of 
 
283 Examples included all personnel at PURA, as well as the senior executive at the Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals interviewed, and the acting head of TPDC. 
284 IOC Executives 2 Group Interview. 
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action, or bad decisions.285 This absence of leadership also affected on the ground operations 
in Mtwara.286 
In this respect, while the passing of the legislation has been done quickly due to the 
political will of the president, attempts to control the sector have not been followed through 
with strengthening of personnel.  Rather, the constant firings and removal of senior 
personnel has removed expertise that could have aided the running of the sector. This is 
combined with a culture of fear that has developed in the Tanzanian bureaucracy, leading to 
a lack of leadership that is unwilling to make decisions in case of making a mistake, to create 
an industry that shows little signs of advancing, and has exacerbated tensions between IOCs 
and the government. The reforming and political upheaval of institutions that provide 
oversight and governance of the upstream sector has gone against the longer-term strategy 
of enhancing institutions for greater hydrocarbon oversight. Rather, there has been short-
term changing of personnel, done for political purposes, that have weakened a longer-term 
strategy to improve human capacity.  
4 Conclusion 
Legislation and bureaucratic oversight have been more of an effort to control the 
temporality of the sector rather than the space. While the models that explore resource 
nationalism have paid considerable attention to international temporalities such as the 
market cycle and the stage of the sector in a country, they have paid less attention to 
domestic factors, nor the historical imaginaries that could be present that drives countries to 
commit to such policies. The view of the past, in this respect, the poor economic return from 
extractives, has led to the government of Tanzania to try and both correct these mistakes of 
the past and ensure they do not happen again in the future. These domestic drivers and 
temporal safeguards are central to stop perceived ‘bad deals’ from occurring in the future.  
The legal changes have been conducted in an attempt to obtain greater economic rent 
from the gas through the controlling of time, in this respect, the ability to correct perceived 
mistakes of the past. This is reflected in the legislation passed in 2017 that allows for the 
renegotiation of contracts and a removal of international oversight and opposition through 
the removal of international arbitration. In essence, the government has looked to ensure 
that any deal passed will not be a detriment to the state in the future. This was done in part 
 
285 IOC Executives 1 Group Interview. 
286 Interview, Gas Technician, Mtwara Municipality, Mtwara, 09.07.2018. 
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due to the previous experiences the government has had in the sector and was done to alter 
the previous information asymmetries experienced when exploration began. These laws 
were passed quickly to make sure they are available for upcoming negotiations on the LNG 
plant. While some public employees claim they will allow for an ease in negotiations, it rather 
has eroded trust in the government from the IOCs. 
Bureaucratic restructuring has both been enacted and slowed by political changes. 
While there have been large changes to the regulation of the sector, the ministries and 
regulators have lost both personnel and expertise with Magufuli’s commitment to lower the 
number of staff across the Tanzanian bureaucracy. This has meant that the changes have not 
been implemented or are being implemented slowly. The country, despite now having some 
sort of experience in the sector, remains underutilised to handle considerable revenues that 
an export sector can bring. The bureaucracy to handle the sector lacks both breadth and 
depth. In many respects, due to Magufuli’s instillation of fear and sackings of senior 
personnel, the capacity of taking decisions needed to advance the offshore sector is limited. 
Other institutions, such as PURA, are still building capacity half a decade after its instillation.  
In this respect, time has been used as a tool by the Tanzanian government to ensure 
that Tanzanian government officials have both the capacity and the institutions to handle the 
sector effectively, going at their own set pace rather than the faster pace seen during the 
initial discovery and exploration phase. This has been done to obtain greater economic 
benefits from the sector, or, as Tanzanian government employees put it, to get a ‘good deal’. 
The pace of the industry has been fundamentally altered, and thus has prevented any 
momentum to production in the industry. This, in theory, has given the government the 
opportunity to set up institutions like PURA effectively to oversee the whole industry and 
renegotiate PSAs and negotiate the LNG at a position of higher strength. This has not 
happened. Instead, the governments firing of personnel and greater centralisation of 
decision making has led to a culture of fear that has made it difficult to make decisions at the 




Chapter IX: Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
This thesis has sought to unpack the ways temporalities of the hydrocarbon sector have 
been exhibited from a variety of actors across different spatial scales. Due to the nature of 
time, this is not an exhaustive list, rather this thesis has highlighted some of the most 
prominent ways temporality has been exhibited in the sector due to differing actions and 
strategies by direct stakeholders. These differing perceptions of time have resulted in friction 
between a variety of actors. Yet, these frictions have been exhibited in a variety of ways. This 
chapter seeks to assemble the arguments presented in the previous chapters to answer the 
research questions first presented in the introduction to this thesis. It will then discuss post 
research events in the sector that have occurred after my time in Tanzania, as well as some 
of the broader methodological limitations this study has. 
2 Temporal Frictions  
This study’s main research question asked how the temporalities of extraction 
influence the actions of direct stakeholders in Tanzania. As demonstrated throughout this 
thesis, actions by different stakeholders have not been uniform. Secondary questions 
focused further on how materialities, economic development and governance have 
interacted with time and temporality. As this thesis has shown, this has had a variety of 
consequences. Chief amongst these has been frictions between differing stakeholders across 
various spatial levels. This study has not sought to be an exhaustive list of all aspects of 
temporality and time exhibited in the sector, for example, this thesis has not focused on 
environmental concerns around hydrocarbon extraction, which would have enormous 
spatio-temporal repercussions both at the global and local scale. Rather, it has had a specific 
focus on the frictions, politics and materialities influenced, or had been influenced by, the 
temporalities in the sector. 
2.1 Changing Extractive Temporalities 
 The temporalities of extraction this thesis has covered have chiefly been in the form 
of the commodity cycle, linear project timelines and often contrasting imaginaries of the 
future. These temporalities are not static and have evolved since the discoveries of deep-sea 
hydrocarbons in the early 2010s from a variety of events, both international and domestic, 
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with stakeholders altering and changing their actions through a variety of different means as 
a tactic to respond to these changes.   
Global capital, dictated by the rising commodity prices, reshaped the space of both 
Tanzania and Mtwara to ‘energy frontiers’. Frontiers suggest a reterritorialization of space 
for capital, however it is also a readjustment of temporalities for the region. This was true for 
both Tanzania and Mtwara. For Tanzania, the country was seen to have potential as an 
energy investment destination with a future as a mid-tier hydrocarbon exporter. Yet the 
changes go beyond the market discourse that introduced this thesis. Both IOCs and the 
government made plans for Tanzanian gas based on high commodity prices, when these 
prices fell, rather than sustaining their heights, these plans have had to be changed, and with 
them, projected futures of what gas can provide. Nevertheless, for the government, the use 
of gas for industrialisation and wider economic development has remained in spite of a drop 
in global gas prices, and instead, has seen increased demands on the sector for greater 
inclusion and developmental results since the fall in prices in 2014.      
This reterritorialization also reshaped Mtwara’s attractiveness as an investment 
destination. The introduction of the hydrocarbon sector also brought with it new forms of 
temporalities that have had drastic influences on local economy of Mtwara. As chapter five 
demonstrated, Mtwara became a frontier for domestic capital as well as an investment 
destination for international investment. In this respect, the temporalities of extraction, in 
this case, the commodity cycle, influenced domestic financiers to invest in the region in 
preparation for a commodity boom. While Mtwara did receive an economic boom, it was not 
a direct resource boom, rather it was a construction and investment boom in preparation for 
a resource windfall. Hence, despite domestic investment, the reshaping of Mtwara as an 
investment destination was very much international through regional gas prices. Once these 
prices began to fall, and it became apparent that there would be little advancement to the 
construction and production phase of the offshore sector, domestic investment into 
construction and real estate dropped. In other words, while the investment in Mtwara was 
from international and domestic sources, the driver of this investment, and its demise, was 
purely international. 
As Frynas et al (2017) argue, preparation for natural resource windfalls can lead to 
characteristics of the ‘resource curse’ appearing. While not a macroeconomic analysis, as this 
thesis demonstrated with Mtwara, these preparations also occur at a local level, and lead to 
negative effects on the region. Much has been written on post- resource boom regions and 
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towns (e.g., Ferguson, 1999; Walsh, 2012), however, in the case of Mtwara, there has been 
no resource windfall to enable a ‘boom town’. Rather, it is a city that has faced a resource 
bust without actually experiencing a resource boom. In this respect, it is a different situation 
to Ferguson’s analysis of the Zambian Copperbelt in Expectations of Modernity; in some 
respects, in the 1960s, the Copperbelt experiences some of the attributes that was promises, 
albeit for a short period of time, of ‘modernity’. In the case of Mtwara, they have not. Rather, 
there had been some improvements to infrastructure that enhanced the belief that a gas-led 
future was possible, but the resource windfall and subsequent industrial development failed 
to materialise. Because of this, offshore gas is still there, but the experiences of the Mtwara 
population have led to the imagined future that was promised to dissipate.  
This bust in Mtwara was not just connected to global markets and commodity price 
trends. It was also connected to the transitions of phases in the gas well lifecycles for both 
the onshore and offshore sector. For the offshore sector, while there had been a decline in 
gas prices, discussions to progress the sector had been ongoing, albeit slowly. Hence, the 
sector was still experiencing movement in the boardrooms of Dar es Salaam, rather than on 
the ground in Mtwara. For the onshore sector, there had been a change from the 
construction phase to the production phase. This led to a reduction in temporary unskilled 
jobs and semi-skilled jobs, to more skilled permanent employment that were less in number 
and out of reach for the majority of the local population. As stated in chapter five, the poor 
communication over this change and impact on local agricultural practises has had an impact 
on livelihoods for those living close to the extraction sites as people lost out to the changes 
made with little of the improvement promised.  
Whilst rarely explored with extractive literature, project lifecycles and phase transitions 
in hydrocarbon infrastructure projects also have a great impact on direct stakeholder actions. 
As demonstrated in chapter six, for the LNG and EACOP projects, transition to the 
construction phase has thus far proved elusive. This is due to the lack of FDI decisions for 
both projects, and a lack of synchronicity for both projects. However, the causes and results 
of this have been different.  
For the LNG project, the long timescale from construction to production, has had an 
impact both on the project itself and the government’s commitment to the project. This is 
tied to the Tanzanian government’s long-term strategy for gas-based development, which is 
covered below, and the lack of short-term political gain for advancing the project. This 
absence of short-term gain, with the focus on export rather than domestic development, has 
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led to a lack of political will on the government’s side for the project. The absence of short-
term political gain is in contrast with the EACOP project, which would allow for a temporary 
boost in employment and business participation.  
Alongside this is the fact that the IOCs involved in the project have not agreed amongst 
themselves technical details and an overall strategy. The schism between Shell and Equinor 
is particularly noticeable, with the latter now engaging directly with the government over a 
smaller LNG plant to process gas from block 2, Equinor’s gas field, which may in fact fit in 
better with Tanzania’s goals for domestic development. This has all been conducted with 
technological and market changes in the gas sector, and a perceived ‘window of opportunity’ 
that may see the opportunity of international export close. In short, the main actors of the 
LNG have competing visions of future timescales and strategies and has led to deadlock for 
the LNG to progress.  
EACOP, on the other hand, was more impacted by frictions between the IOCs operating 
in Uganda and the Ugandan government. As the HGA between Tanzania and the IOCs 
operating on EACOP have to be uniform in a variety of areas with the Ugandan HGA, there is 
little the Tanzanian government can do in such a situation. Rather, the short construction 
phase and the amount of investment, has led to an increase in interest of local content 
policies, which were the subject to chapter seven. These frictions are expanded upon below.  
Extractive temporalities, in this case commodity price cycles and linear project lifecycles, 
have had different effects that are dependent on the nature of the project and actors. For 
IOCs in Tanzania, the market price and price forecasting have both encouraged exploration 
in Tanzanian waters, and dictated future infrastructure investments. The government has 
sought to use the construction phase in both the LNG and EACOP projects to maximise 
business and labour participation. Although neither projects have begun to start 
construction, there has been far more pushback from the LNG project than the pipeline, due 
to the technicality of the project. These lifecycles also impart themselves on the local 
community through temporary employment and encouragement of investment. As seen in 
Mtwara, when temporary employment evaporates, poor communication from the 
government and IOCs has led to a reversal in the imaginary of what natural gas can do for 
the future of the region.  
2.2 Resource Nationalism and Time 
Alongside an increase in commodity prices has been attempts by states across Latin 
America and Africa for greater benefits from the extractive sector. Tanzania has been at the 
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forefront of these resource nationalist policies in Africa, and this has increased tension 
between extractive MNCs and the government in the process. As mentioned throughout the 
thesis, older pro-market models of resource nationalism in the hydrocarbon sector suggest 
that time is a central factor behind states increasing their presence in resource extraction, 
albeit in a deterministic manner (e.g., Vernon, 1977; Bremmer and Johnson, 2009). With the 
rebalance of resource nationalism as a term and analysis, there has been great gains in the 
knowledge of the drivers behind increased state participation (e.g., Childs, 2016; Koch and 
Perreault, 2019), however, time and temporality has been left out of this analysis.  
The Tanzanian government, first with Kikwete in a quiet manner, and then Magufuli in a 
more brazen way, have committed towards policies deemed ‘resource nationalist’. The 
drivers for these actions have been both political and developmentalist. The policies were 
utilised by Kikwete and Magufuli to avoid opposition talking points, provide a populist policy 
that is widely popular in the country. For Magufuli, it also allowed the discourse of resource 
nationalism to tie himself with Nyerere’s economic ideals of self-sufficiency and used this 
legacy to boost his own political popularity, as well as correct perceived wrongs of past 
dealings with MNCs. 
As chapter four and seven demonstrate, the role of hydrocarbons within Tanzanian 
development has been domestic industrialisation by utilising gas as a resource for electricity 
generation, and as a raw resource for petrochemicals that could be used to supply the 
agricultural sector. Rhetorically, this was for the entire nation, rather than just direct benefits 
in the locations resources were found. The result of this was to enact new resource 
legislation, first in 2015, and then multiple resource legislations in 2017. The speed of passing 
and the lack of consultation and discussion with private sector stakeholders for the latter set 
of legislations both eroded trust for further negotiations and demonstrated a form of ‘shock 
and awe’ to legislative change. IOC responses to the legislative changes have a been strong 
condemnation of the legal changes and the way that these laws were enacted. This is in part 
due to the fact that the 2017 legislations presented a change in the status quo for IOCs and 
was tied with lowering gas prices which would affect the economic viability of the project.  
While some market analysts suggested that the commodities super cycle could continue 
for decades (e.g., Canuto, 2014), these policies have instead been enacted amongst a 
backdrop of declining oil and gas prices. In this respect, the Tanzanian case is opposite to pro-
market theories of resource nationalism, which suggest a reduction in such policies during 
times of low commodity prices and a lack of established infrastructure. The case of Tanzania 
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suggests that resource nationalism is less tied to the temporalities of extraction, either the 
project lifecycle or commodity cycle, than pro-market theories suggest.  
For Tanzania, these theories do not hold weight because they have neglected the history, 
domestic policies and changing strategies of governments who pursue resource nationalist 
policies. As shown in the previous chapter, these latter legislations were enacted in an effort 
to control the time of the sector. Alongside the symbolic declarations of permanent 
sovereignty over resources found in Tanzania, the laws allow the ability of the government 
to reopen PSAs allow the government to attempt to correct the perceived mistakes of the 
past and the present, while the removal of international arbitration allows for the removal 
of potential international opposition. Through this, the laws have been used as a safeguard 
for the effects of the PSAs over time to ensure that the country benefits from hydrocarbon 
extraction during peaks and troughs of the commodities cycle.  
The laws have also been used to help set a new pace for the sector, one that is slower 
and more amenable to the domestic demands the government wishes to put on natural gas. 
In theory, a slower pace would allow for human capital to ‘catch up’ after the fast progression 
during 2010-2015 and would ensure a more through negotiation process to ensure that the 
government obtains a ‘good deal’. However, this has been compounded by short term firings 
of experienced personnel and a culture of fear of making decisions in middle management, 
which leads to questions over whether this slower pace in the sector will benefit the 
government. 
Alongside using attempted corrections of past issues is developmental imaginaries of the 
future. This has been shaped largely by the materialities of natural gas; firstly, hydrocarbon 
infrastructure projects, in particular the EACOP project, were to aid local businesses and 
labour participation through local content strategies, and aid other sectors of the economy 
through a ‘multi-sectoral’ strategy. In this manner, EACOP was to be used as a springboard 
for business growth and an increase in the skills of the national workforce. However, the 
viability of this strategy, in particular semi-skilled and skilled labour, remains questionable 
due to the geographies of local content, which have been focused on the core of the country, 
leaving other areas with the less beneficial ‘local-local’ content. More importantly is the use 
of gas in electricity generation, and as a raw resource for industrial purposes has shaped 
natural gas into a developmental resource. Unlike other resources, such as gold, the 
developmental impact of gas was expected to be higher and wider reaching across more 
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sectors. For example, utilising gas for fertiliser production, both as energy to power the 
factory, and as a raw resource, would allow farmers access to domestic fertiliser.  
Concerns over getting ‘bad deals’ are compounded by non-renewable nature of 
hydrocarbons. Because of this, there is extra pressure to ensure that the PSAs signed 
between the government and IOCs would allow Tanzania to benefit from hydrocarbon 
extraction. As highlighted in the previous chapter and chapter six, pressure to progress the 
offshore sector from IOCs, either due to market, technological or geopolitical changes, have 
been offset by this government mind-set. Tanzania’s long-term strategy for hydrocarbons 
has guided its current approach to hydrocarbons, although outside factors may ensure that 
offshore extraction may not become economically viable in the future.  
Tanzania’s nationalist agenda is further highlighted by the fact that the policies are 
focused on using gas and its associated infrastructure for domestic development. This is true 
even for export-orientated infrastructures such as the LNG and EACOP projects. At its core, 
natural gas is envisioned to play a vital part of Tanzania’s industrialisation and economic 
growth, and all parts of the sector are seen to play a role in this goal. In this respect, 
Tanzanian resource nationalism called back to an idealised past, but also to a future where 
gas would fuel, both literally and figuratively, economic development and industrialisation.  
The materialities of natural gas, combined with the imaginaries of the future and 
resulting strategies, have created friction both within the state, which is covered in the 
section below, and between the government and IOCs. The historical legacy of gold mining, 
combined with the contemporary political dissatisfaction of extractives, has led the 
government to attempt to obtain a ‘good deal’ before production takes place. In essence, it 
is viewed that securing changes before this transition is paramount to ensure that the 
government obtains greater benefits from natural resources. This is at the core of the 
temporalities of Tanzania’s resource nationalism and helps explain the drivers behind the 
legal changes and the combativeness of the government toward MNCs. This is tied with a 
long-term vision to utilise all parts of the gas sector for domestic development.  
2.3 Temporal Tensions between the Core and the Periphery 
As demonstrated with the sub-sections above, the temporalities of the hydrocarbon 
sector have predominately caused friction between actors. However, the introduction of 
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation to Tanzania did not just influence the relationship 
between the Tanzanian government and international capital, but also the relationship 
between the government and local populations within the country. Resource nationalism is 
216 
 
not just committed to policy, governance, and legislation, they are also nationalist in the 
social sense. For Tanzania, this meant that hydrocarbons are supposedly of the benefit of the 
whole nation, not just the regions that accommodate the projects. This is rooted in the 
historical imaginary of Tanzanian nationalism and has had unintended consequences. The 
introduction of the hydrocarbon sector in Tanzania has drawn out tensions between the core 
and the periphery of the country. This has been true for both Mtwara and Tanga. However, 
the actors and frictions exhibited have been different for both regions and cities  
For Mtwara, the frictions have been between the local population and the central 
government over the future of the gas sector, and this has had violent consequences. 
Although not explicitly discussed in current literature on the phenomenon, resource 
nationalism can evolve through a variety of changes in the sector. Traditionally a region that 
has been neglected by the central government, the resource sub-nationalism exhibited in 
Mtwara had been closely tied with the wider Tanzanian resource imaginary of gas-led 
development, with the main exception being the degree of localism. The expectations and 
imaginaries were exacerbated by political promises made in the 2010 general election.    
The boom-and-bust cycle, and the different phases of project lifecycles, combined with 
investment from international and domestic sources ensured that economic development 
was quickly tied to a natural gas industry in Mtwara. As chapter four and five demonstrate, 
these changes have had long lasting effects on the city and region. The discovery of gas was 
accompanied by infrastructure improvements in the forms of increased electricity generation 
and access, improved roads, and new factories. This was accompanied by investment into 
the region, with the construction of modern banks and hotels to accommodate the sector. 
These provided the material confirmation that natural gas was to act as a modernising force 
for the region and boost economic and social development.  
This imaginary began to change with the confirmation of a pipeline that transported 
gas from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam for electricity generation. The competing imaginaries of 
the future had less to do with the removal of the gas from the ground, but rather how, and 
more importantly, where the gas would be used. The confirmation, and subsequent response 
by the government to the protests and riots, resulted in a change in the perception of what 
gas can provide for the region. With gas now going to Dar es Salaam, it has also symbolically 
removed the developmental imaginaries that were the bedrock of Mtwara resource 
nationalism. This removal of a core part of this imaginary led to protests, and eventually 
violence, and was cracked down by the government who saw the protests as a threat to their 
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authority and sovereignty over the gas. Now, rather than being the economic catalyst 
promised, gas has added to the historical grievances that many in the region perceive.  
Such frustrations with the centralised model of resource governance were also found in 
the EACOP project, albeit at a smaller, less confrontational level and confined within the 
business class in Tanga. As chapter seven demonstrates, Tanzania’s local content policies, 
and the desire to implement them quickly due to the (at the time), short construction phase. 
The speed to establish a local content policy and provide information networks had alienated 
the local elite in Tanga, who are unable to participate in the process due to the majority of 
companies in Dar es Salaam mobilising, both to form pressure groups and to control the flow 
of information to members.  
Unlike Mtwara, the frictions between the core and the periphery are chiefly held within 
the business community. While there were frustrations with the government over local 
content policies, much of Tanga’s business community was frustrated with their counterparts 
in Dar es Salaam and EACOP’s management. The desire to implement local content policies 
at the same speed as EACOP’s implementation (at the time), led to a centralisation of 
businesses available to participate.  
Materiality, in this case in the form of pipeline infrastructure, altered the perceptions 
of time for both the population of Mtwara and the business community, albeit in different 
ways. For Mtwara, it was a signal of the end of gas-fuelled industrialisation for the region, for 
Tanga, the short timescale for construction and the investment required led to a closing out 
of potential participants for local content on the project. This emphasizes the multifaceted 
ways materiality can impact one’s perception of time, as the announcement and construction 
of the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline removed the idea of future prosperity, but the 
announcement of EACOP initially promised increased economic development for the regions 
the pipeline passes. It further highlights the importance of the influence hydrocarbon 
infrastructure has in social processes (e.g., Mitchell, 2011), and how these processes are 
localised within their historical context. 
The rhetoric of Tanzania’s resource nationalism is one that supports natural resources 
benefiting the whole nation. Yet, for both Mtwara and Tanga, this rhetoric has rung hollow; 
for Mtwara, the production of gas has allowed for some realisation of development from gas, 
chiefly though electricity generation. However, while this production enabled electricity 
generation, its benefits have not been equal; with the southern regions supplying the natural 
gas, they have yet to be connected to the national grid to enjoy such benefits. In this respect, 
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there is a perception that the more prosperous regions of the country, chiefly the north and 
Dar es Salaam, have benefited from Mtwara gas. For Tanga with local content applying 
equally to the whole country, and more unskilled-focused ‘local-local’ content applying to 
the immediate area, there has been a geographical separation of the skilled and unskilled 
opportunities available for the project. This is compounded further by the networks 
established to distribute information, which have tended to distribute information to more 
established and better-connected firms in the economic core of the country, excluding 
smaller firms in Tanga in the process. 
3 Post-Research Events and Limitations of this 
Thesis 
It is important to note, that since my time in Tanzania, there has been serious 
developments in the Tanzanian hydrocarbon sector regarding its future. This has been 
particularly applicable to chapter seven of this thesis, which focused on the temporalities of 
local content on the EACOP project.  The highlighting the spatial and temporal effects local 
content policies have exhibited in the backdrop of a temporary project that was (supposedly) 
to be completed by 2020 has come undone through events outside of the country. At the 
time, these urgencies were very real, with the expectation that construction would occur in 
2019 and 2020.  
Since the 4th of September 2019, all technical work on the EACOP project has been 
suspended, leading to questions of the viability of the project altogether. This is less to do 
with the technical side of the project itself, but rather issues in the Ugandan upstream sector 
over the farming down of a stake in the industry between Tullow Oil and Total (Reuters, 
2019a). In April 2020, Tullow oil, one of the IOCs operating in Uganda, has announced that it 
has sold its entire stake in Lake Albert to Total (Tullow Oil, 2020), meaning that only Total 
and CNOOC are currently participating in the Ugandan sector, with Total having a sizable 
amount of control. Considering previous selling of assets have brought tax issues between 
the IOCs and the Government of Uganda, such issues could arise again and cause further 
delays.   
For EACOP, there are serious domestic blocks to the project progressing; the HGA 
between both Uganda and Tanzania with IOCs have yet to conclude. While the cause of the 
suspension was outside of the Tanzanian government’s control, there were other factors that 
had yet to be passed. The ESIA on the Ugandan portion of the pipeline has not been well 
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received, with Ugandan NGOs criticising the report for legal and methodological issues 
(Observer, 2019b; Daily Monitor, 2019). The Tanzanian portion of the ESIA has been made 
public, but after the announcement of the suspension of the project (EACOP, 2020b). The 
fallout of this for local content is that all tenders on the project have also been suspended. 
For many businesses in Tanzania who had planned to participate in the project, the 
preparation and urgency generated at the peak of interest in 2017 and 2018 has come to 
naught. In this respect, EACOP highlights how local content policies and preparation are still 
at the mercy of wider factors in the context of nascent extractive industries and their 
associated infrastructures.  
There have also been changes to the actors participating in the sector and proposed 
infrastructure plans. This is seen with ExxonMobil looking to sell their stake in Block 2, and 
focus efforts in neighbouring Mozambique (Reuters, 2018a). While they have looked to sell 
the block, there has been no offers yet from other IOCs, most likely in part due to the 
resource legislation in 2017. The slow exit of one of the largest IOCs in the world has further 
signalled that the Tanzanian gas sector is underwhelming in short and medium term, and 
IOCs are focusing efforts both on more established markets and in markets where further 
progression has been made. This is combined with a schism in the LNG group between 
Equinor and Shell, with the former looking to build a smaller LNG to ensure faster 
construction and production. Alongside ExxonMobil attempting to leave Tanzania, Ophir 
energy has been acquired by the Indonesian firm MedcoEnergi, and it is currently unknown 
how this would affect Ophir’s projects in the Tanzanian deep-sea.  
The global COVID-19 epidemic has also had massive shifts to the global hydrocarbon 
sector. Declining hydrocarbon prices have impacted the largest IOCs and oil-producing states, 
and questions remain over the long-term impact the global pandemic will have on the 
extractives sector (Albulescu, 2020; for mining, see Laing, 2020b). Despite these drops in 
prices, discussions over the LNG plant are set to resume in January 2021 (East African, 2020), 
and the government has hinted to drop its opposition to international arbitration (Schaafsma 
and Wood, 2020). A combination of factors, ranging from market and price changes, to the 
re-election of Magufuli, may signal a change in course. Alternatively, such declarations of 
resumed talks have been common since 2015, and this announcement could be a similar 
situation whereby talks are ongoing but little progress is made.  
Alongside the hydrocarbon events above, new political policies may shift people’s 
perceptions of the government. In Mtwara, after my visit to the region, Magufuli announced 
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that the government would purchase cashew nuts at a higher rate than private buyers were 
offering (BBC, 2018). Such a policy has proven to be popular with cashew nut farmers at the 
time, but soon proved contentious (Citizen, 2018c). Therefore, it could be speculated that 
the opinions from the people of Mtwara on the government may have been different than 
what they have told me at the time of interview. Furthermore, the validity of the re-election 
of Magufuli, who won in a supposed landside, has been questioned by international actors.  
These recent events, occurring after fieldwork had been completed, both highlight 
the limitations and support the findings of this research. This research is but a snapshot in 
time, and as demonstrated in the thesis, temporalities are fluid and evolve because of events 
at all spatial levels. There are also methodological issues to consider. First of all, no data was 
collected on the gas extracted on the Songo-Songo, so this thesis is not a complete picture of 
the whole hydrocarbon sector in the country. This was in part due to time limits during my 
fieldwork in Tanzania, but it was also accessibility limits; Songo-Songo is a chain of islands 
away from the Tanzanian mainland, with the nearest region the sparsely populated Lindi. 
This is in comparison to Mnazi bay, which is connected to mainland Tanzania and near the 
city of Mtwara, the largest city in southern Tanzania. Alongside this, as mentioned before, 
this thesis does not proclaim to have explored all temporalities in the sector and has some 
considerable exclusions. One such example of what this thesis does not include is a discussion 
or analysis of how extraction may alter the temporalities of environmental and climate 
change on local, national, or global actors.  
4 Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to explore how temporalities have interacted with the 
geographies and governance of extraction. To do so, it has explored how actors on different 
spatial scales have interacted with one another, and how the temporalities of extraction have 
guided actions of stakeholders involved in the sector. The different results presented 
throughout the thesis are not a complete list of the temporalities of the sector in Tanzania, 
rather they highlight the importance of including temporality in future scholarly research on 
the impacts the hydrocarbon and wider extractives sector, has on politics and society.  
With the temporalities of the sector being multifaceted, their impacts are equally so, 
and have been dependent on a variety of differing factors. One of the guiding temporalities 
for the Tanzanian state has been an imagined future whereby gas plays a direct role in the 
industrialisation of the country. This was shaped both by the developmentalist agenda and 
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the materiality of the gas. This imagined future has directly influenced both the social and 
legal aspects of resource nationalism.  
This resource nationalism has created friction, both between the government and 
IOCs, and the government and local communities. For the former, this has chiefly been in the 
form of legal changes, whereby the government has sought to ensure that the mistakes of 
the past cannot be repeated again. Legal mechanisms have been put in place to correct any 
mistakes and take advantages of the cyclical nature of commodity prices. Yet these frictions 
have slowed down the sector and has led to some IOCs questioning the economic viability of 
the deep-sea gas.  
For the latter, Tanzania’s nationalist agenda, one of which has sought to not 
differentiate people and regions, has paradoxically exacerbated regional frustrations and 
tensions between the core and the periphery. For both Mtwara and Tanga, this in theory is 
amicable, but in practise this has further fractured national unity. Furthermore, its goal for 
wider national economic development has rung hollow for communities close to the project 
or extraction site when the perceived chief benefactor has been the economic core of the 
country. 
The nature of these projects has also led to different perceptions of time, and 
therefore different actions. The introduction of the onshore and offshore sector initially 
provided a boost for the regional economy of Mtwara, and a change in the perceptions of 
the region. These perceptions dissipated with the announcement of the Mtwara-Dar es 
Salaam pipeline. Conversely, the EACOP project has promised greater opportunities for 
participation in the sector, and the short timeframe led to quick actions by well-connected 
businesses in the economic core of the country, shutting out potential smaller competitors 
located near the pipeline in the process. The LNG project, on the other hand, has not been 
progressing at the rate it was predicted to, in part due to the lack of synchronicity of the IOCs 
and the government.  
Guiding these investments has been the commodity cycle, which has dictated 
investment actions of IOCs. High prices allowed for exploration in Tanzania, reterritorializing 
East Africa into a hydrocarbon frontier in the process. Yet these prices did not last. The falling 
commodity prices, and legal changes in the sector, has made Tanzania less of an attractive 
investment destination than a decade ago. Continued changes in the market and 
technological advancement may further hinder offshore extraction and throw a lot of the 
government’s plans for the sector in disarray.  
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In conclusion, this thesis has argued that the temporalities of the gas sector have 
created differing perceptions of time and temporality across different actors at different 
spatial scales. The potential for hydrocarbon revenues and wider economic development has 
been promised at the short, medium, and long term, influenced direct stakeholders’ actions. 
The result of this has been predominately friction between the local and the national, and 
the national and international. As long as these frictions persist alongside the changing gas 
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1 Appendix A: List of People Interviewed 










Gender Tanzanian  
National? 
Date 
Businessperson Single 2 Shop Owner Mtwara M Yes 02.07.2018 
Businessperson Single N/A Tanga Chamber of Commerce Tanga M Yes 07.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 5 Construction Services Tanga M Yes 14.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 4 Medical Supply Services Tanga M Yes 18.08.2018 
Businessperson Single 1 Shopkeeper Mtwara F Yes 24.07.2018 
Businessperson Single 3 IOC Services Supplier Dar es 
Salaam 
M No 31.01.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 1 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 2 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 3 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
Cashew Farmer Single 4 N/A Mtwara M Yes 23.07.2018 
CCM MP Single N/A CCM Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 16.02.2018 
CCM Regional Party 
Administrator 
Single N/A CCM Mtwara M Yes 13.07.2018  
Chongoleani Village Group 1 N/A Tanga Mx3, 
Fx3 
Yes 18.09.2018 
Chongoleani Village Group 2 N/A Tanga Mx3, 
Fx3 
Yes 19.09.2018 
CUF MP Single N/A CUF Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 14.03.2018 




M No 15.03.2018 
Dockworker Single 1 Mtwara Port Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 18.02.2018 
Dockworker Single 2 Mtwara Port Mtwara M Yes 20.07.2018 




M No 12.03.2018 
East African Foreign 
Ministry Employees 
Group N/A Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
East African Cooperation 
Dodoma Mx3 Yes 06.03.2018 
Economic Planner Single N/A Mtwara Municipality Mtwara M Yes 09.07.2018 




M Yes 02.03.2018 




M Yes 22.02.2018 




M Yes 28.06.2018 
Environmental and 
Social Consultant 
Single N/A Independent Consultant  Dar es 
Salaam 
M No 09.08.2017 
Fisherman Single 1 N/A Mtwara M Yes 24.07.2018 
Fisherman Single 2 N/A Mtwara M Yes 24.07.2018 
Former IOC Driver Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 12.07.2018 
Former IOC Yard Worker Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 10.07.2018 
Gas Technician  Single N/A Mtwara Municipality Mtwara M Yes 09.07.2018 
Businessperson Single N/A Mtwara Chamber of 
Commerce 
Mtwara M Yes 10.07.2018 
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Mx2 Mixed 28.03.2018 
Lawyer Single N/A Independent IOC Lawyer  Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 18.03.2018 




M Yes 19.03.2018 




M Yes 21.11.2017 
Local Content Director Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Mtwara M Yes 13.07.2018 
Madimba Village Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx2, 
Fx4 
Yes 12.07.2018 




M Yes 26.03.2018 




M Yes 01.02.2018 
Msimbati Villagers Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx3, 
Fx4 
Yes 18.07.2018 
Mtwara City Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx4 Yes 07.07.2018 
Mtwara Market 
Association 




Single 1 Mtwara Poverty Reduction 
NGO   




Single 2 Mtwara Poverty Reduction 
NGO   




Single 3 Mtwara Poverty Reduction 
NGO   
Mtwara M Yes 17.07.2018 
Mtwara Poverty 
Reduction NGO Group 





Mtwara Resident Single N/A N/A Mtwara M Yes 10.07.2018 
NAF Hotel Manager Single N/A NAF Hotel Mtwara M Yes 02.07.2018 
Local Content 
Coordinator 




F Yes 18.04.2018 
NGO Executive Single N/A Environmental and Social 
NGO 
Tanga M Yes 07.08.2018 
Oil and Gas Bank 
Executives 
Group N/A Stanbic Bank Dar es 
Salaam 
Mx2 Yes 22.02.2018 
Planning Officer Single N/A TPDC Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 28.02.2018 




M Yes 27.11.2017 
State Local Content 
Coordinator 




M Yes 18.03.2018 
Retired Senior TPDC 
Executive 
Single N/A TPDC Dar es 
Salaam 
M Yes 15.03.2018 
Ruvura Village Group N/A N/A Mtwara Mx1, 
Fx5 
Yes 05.07.2018 




M Yes 24.11.2017 




M Yes 04.12.2017 
Business Senior 
Executive  




F Yes 05.12.2017 




M No 12.03.2018 




M Yes 13.02.2018 




M No 14.03.2018 




M Yes 21.03.2018 




M Yes 28.03.2018 
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Senior Mtwara Local 
Government Officer 
Single N/A Mtwara Municipality Mtwara M Yes 26.07.2018 
Tiffany Diamond Hotel 
Manager 
Single N/A Tiffany Diamond Hotel Mtwara M Yes 18.07.2018 
State Local Content 
Coordinators 
Group N/A TPDC Dar es 
Salaam 
Mx3 Yes 22.03.2018 
State Geologists Group N/A TPDC Dar es 
Salaam 
Mx3 Yes 03.02.2018 
Well Manager Single N/A Hidden to Preserve 
Anonymity 
Mtwara M Yes 17.07.2018 
 












3 Appendix C: Research Participation Consent 
Form 
CONSENT TO PARTICPIATE IN RESEARCH: INTERVIEWS 
 
Researcher: Aidan Barlow 
Email: S1666073@sms.ed.ac.uk 
Organisation: University of Edinburgh, Centre of African Studies 
Position: PhD candidate 
Research Topic:  
These interviews will contribute to the formation of a PhD thesis that examines the 
connections between regional projects and processes, and national development strategies 
in the East African Hydrocarbon sector. 
Expected Outputs:  
This interview, alongside others, will contribute to the formation of a PhD thesis. Selected 
chapters of this thesis may contribute to a variety of academic publications, including 
books, academic journal articles and conference presentations.  
Funding:  
Travel expenses and this research are funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC). A research body funded by the UK government.  
Procedure:  
The participant will be asked a series of questions relating to their expertise or experience 
in the regional or national hydrocarbon sector in East Africa. The length of time this 
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interview will take will be roughly 30 minutes but may be less if the interviewee is under 
time constraints. With the interviewee’s permission, the interview will be recorded. The 
purpose of the recording is to enable the most accurate record of the information is 
provided. The audio recording is for transcription purposes only. No external audience will 
hear the interview. Recordings can be paused at any time should the interviewee wish so. 
Any information provided off the record will not be used in publications. If the interviewee 
prefers not to be recorded, written notes shall be taken instead. If the respondent wishes 
to be interviewed in their local language, please note a translator will be present. 
Post-Procedure: After the interview an email will be sent to the interviewee with the 
transcribed document of the interview. If there are any disagreements in the transcription, 
please feel free to contact the interviewer. 
 
Risks and Benefits of being in this study:  
There should be no risk for the participant in this study. All information provided during this 
interview will be kept secure and used only for this thesis. This thesis is hoped to provide 
practical, regional solutions currently facing the East African hydrocarbon industry.   
Confidentiality:  
Any recordings, written notes, transcriptions or written documentary evidence taken from 
this interview will not be shared with any third party without the permission of the 
interviewee. All such informational will be digitally stored on an encrypted storage device. If 
the results are published in the future, information and/or quotes from the interview may 
be used with permission granted by the interviewee (see part 3 of this document).  
Compensation/Reimbursement: 
You will be paid for your travel to the location of the meeting (if applicable), if meeting at a 





3.1 Section two: Permissions and copyright 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood this information sheet and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
[  ] 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time. 
[  ]  
3. I agree to take part in the above study, and I assign the copyright in my contribution 
to the above project to Aidan Barlow 




___________________                _______________           ____________________________ 
Name     Date   Signature 
3.2 section three: use of information in publications 
Please tick box A, B, C or D and sign below 
A I permit use of my name with quotes and information gained from the 
interview(s) in subsequent publications. 
 
B I permit the use of quotes and information gained from the interview(s) in 
subsequent publications on the condition that I am not personally 
identifiable. 
 
C I permit use of my name with quotes and information gained from the 
interview(s) in subsequent publications, on the condition that I can check and 
either approve or disapprove any quotes or information attributed to me in 
advance of publication. 
 




___________________                _______________           ____________________________ 
Name of interviewee  Date    Signature 
___________________                _______________           ____________________________ 
Name of interviewer  Date    Signature 
 
 
